Dangerous offender

In the context of a dangerous offender assessment, the Crown sought to adduce evidence from charges of possession of child pornography that were judicially stayed in 2002.

The accused argued issue estoppel.

The court held that the judicial stay, which resulted from the Crown's refusal to comply with a disclosure order, was the functional equivalent of a determination on the merits.

Consequently, the Crown was estopped from leading evidence regarding the materials alleged to have been in the accused's possession.

However, the Crown was permitted to introduce the accused's statement to the police, provided it was not used to prove the stayed offences or contradict the earlier factual finding.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and the mandatory victim fine surcharge following convictions for criminal harassment and breaching a Long-Term Supervision Order.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on a victim impact statement without cross-examination, and by finding his conduct met the threshold for a serious personal injury offence and the criteria for a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the designation, finding no error in the sentencing judge's reliance on the victim impact statement or his application of the dangerous offender provisions.

The appeal against the victim fine surcharge was allowed on consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and assault against his former girlfriend's children, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the child complainant and improperly took judicial notice of child behaviour in sexual abuse cases.

He also argued his severe physical disabilities from a stroke reduced his risk of reoffending, warranting a determinate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's risk could not be managed in the community despite his physical impairments.

Following the quashing of the appellant's conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to address the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge had improperly grounded the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence on convictions for failure to comply with an undertaking, which are not serious personal injury offences.

The Court set aside the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence, substituting concurrent 30-day sentences for the failure to comply convictions.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following guilty pleas to sexual interference, child luring, and making child pornography.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding the predicate offence was a serious personal injury offence and in considering his history of domestic violence as part of a repetitive pattern of behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sexual abuse of a child involved the use of violence and inflicted severe psychological damage.

The court also admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's rehabilitative progress but concluded it did not render the indeterminate sentence unreasonable given his high risk of reoffending.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences, including assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement against his former girlfriend, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred by mischaracterizing defence evidence as an alibi, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and over-relying on similar fact and post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in characterizing certain evidence as an alibi, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the curative proviso applied.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, finding the trial judge reasonably assessed the psychiatric evidence and the appellant's risk to re-offend.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexual assault and unlawful confinement against his domestic partner.

He was subsequently designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding corroboration, consent, and the justification under s. 27 of the Criminal Code.

He also appealed the dangerous offender designation and the indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and upholding the dangerous offender designation and sentence based on the appellant's extensive history of domestic violence and treatment-resistant personality disorders.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence and dangerous offender designation, arguing the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principles from Gladue and Ipeelee regarding Aboriginal offenders.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had thoroughly reviewed the appellant's history, the Gladue report, and expert psychiatric evidence.

The court concluded the sentencing judge properly applied the relevant principles and reasonably found no evidence that the appellant's risk to reoffend could be controlled in the community.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence following a guilty plea for sexual interference.

He argued the sentencing judge misapprehended evidence regarding his ability to manage his risk in the community using sex-drive reducing medication (Lupron) and sought to introduce fresh evidence of his progress on the medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge reasonably concluded that the mere possibility of taking medication did not adequately reduce the high risk he posed to the public.

The court also dismissed the application to adduce fresh evidence, noting it was not credible due to the appellant's manipulative nature and was more appropriately a matter for parole authorities.

The appellant appealed her sentence and dangerous offender designation, arguing that the public could be adequately protected by a determinate sentence made consecutive to her lengthy remanet.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's violent behaviour could not be controlled in the community was supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The Crown applied to designate the respondent a dangerous offender following his convictions for two separate, unprovoked, and brutal attempted murders of vulnerable women working alone in retail stores.

The court found that the predicate offences were serious personal injury offences and that the respondent's conduct demonstrated a pattern of repetitive, persistent, and aggressive behaviour with a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences.

Psychiatric evidence indicated a moderate to high risk of violent re-offending and a lack of insight into the triggers for his violence.

Concluding that there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, the court designated the respondent a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following his guilty plea to sexual assault.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record, including three prior sexual assaults, and was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and severe substance abuse issues.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to his pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour and failure to control his sexual impulses.

However, the court concluded that a lesser measure than an indeterminate sentence would adequately protect the public, imposing a determinate sentence of five years followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for three home invasions involving robbery and sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding his risk of recidivism and amenability to treatment, and erred by applying the pre-July 2008 Criminal Code sentencing regime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of the expert evidence, which supported a high risk of violent or sexual recidivism.

The court also held that applying the new regime would not have changed the outcome, as the appellant met neither the test for a long-term offender designation nor a determinate sentence.

The application to admit fresh evidence was also denied.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following his conviction for kidnapping and sexually assaulting a third victim while threatening to use a knife.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive history of violence, non-compliance with court orders, and diagnoses of sexual sadism and antisocial personality disorder.

Despite the offender's recent use of anti-androgen medication (chemical castration), the court found no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community, given his history of deceit and the need for lifelong treatment.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term in penitentiary.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the long-term offender (LTO) option.

The appellant also introduced fresh evidence of a 2010 risk assessment showing rehabilitation progress.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility the trial judge would have imposed an LTO order in 1998 even with the fresh evidence.

The court noted that the appellant's progress should be assessed by the Parole Board, not through a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize a police officer's testimony regarding the sound of a dry-fired handgun and reversed the onus of proof regarding his intent to kill.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The sentence appeal regarding the dangerous offender designation was also dismissed.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of an application for a dangerous offender assessment order under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, adopting the interpretation of 'serious personal injury offence' from R. v. Goforth.

The court found that some of the respondent's offences met the definition and ordered an assessment, remitting the matter to the trial judge.

The appellant broke into the 76-year-old complainant's apartment, sexually assaulted her, and stabbed her multiple times.

He was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, attempted murder, and other offences, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Crown had withdrawn its dangerous offender application after the appellant refused a psychiatric assessment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the life sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge made no error in principle and that the egregious circumstances of the offences and the need to protect the public justified the maximum sentence.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the offender following his guilty pleas to aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record involving violence and breaches of court orders.

Psychiatric evidence established that the offender suffered from anti-social personality disorder and substance abuse disorder, placing him at a high risk to violently re-offend.

The court found that the offender met the statutory criteria for a dangerous offender designation.

However, based on the offender's positive institutional behaviour and rehabilitative efforts since his arrest, the court found he rebutted the presumption of an indeterminate sentence.

The court imposed a fixed sentence of seven years (reduced to one year after pre-sentence custody credit) followed by a ten-year Long-Term Supervision Order.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation, arguing that the Crown must show evidence of untreatability to sustain the order.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly focused on whether there was a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the appellant's risk in the community.