Karen M. Weiler

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder with a firearm and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment after shooting a victim at a bar.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing issues of identity, intent, and intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions on identity and intent were amply supported by the evidence, and there was insufficient evidence of intoxication.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year sentence was within the appropriate range given the serious, life-altering injuries sustained by the victim in a public place.

The appellant, a federal inmate, appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application regarding his classification as a medium security risk.

While the appeal was pending, the appellant was placed on day parole.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the issue of his security classification moot.

The Court also noted that correctional authorities retain discretion under the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations to consider factors beyond the custody rating score when determining security classifications.

The appellant vendor appealed an order granting specific performance of a real estate contract to the respondent purchaser.

The appellant argued the respondent was disentitled to equitable relief due to 'unclean hands' for swearing a false affidavit regarding his status as a nominee, and that the property was not objectively unique.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the respondent's conduct did not prejudice the appellant and the property was uniquely suited to the intended commercial use, making damages an inadequate remedy.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order finding that Ontario had jurisdiction over the action and was the more convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's application of the real and substantial connection test from Muscutt v. Courcelles.

The Court also found no error in the motion judge's weighing of factors, including the location of witnesses and avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings, to conclude that Ontario was the more convenient forum.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his motion to vary a consent divorce order.

The motion judge had ordered the appellant to continue paying $600 per month in spousal support for life, $150 per month for medical coverage until the respondent turned 65, and to maintain $100,000 in life insurance.

The appellant argued that fundamental changes in both parties' financial situations after age 65 warranted a variation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the anticipated changes were uncertain and speculative, and that the current order was fair to both parties.

The respondents brought a motion for security for costs against the appellant.

Following the hearing of the motion, the parties were unable to resolve the issue of costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs of the motion to each of the moving parties on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $7,500 each, payable by the responding party.

The respondent obtained a Norwich order for pre-action discovery against the appellants to investigate alleged fraudulent conveyances and misrepresentations following a failed corporate acquisition.

The appellants appealed the order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Norwich order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to consider whether the pre-action discovery was necessary.

The Court held that the respondent already possessed sufficient information to formulate a pleading and that the extraordinary equitable remedy of a Norwich order was not required.

The appellant school board appealed a trial decision finding it liable for a proportionate share of retirement gratuities owed to teachers transferred during a school board reorganization.

The trial judge found that while the agreement between the boards did not fall under s. 135(26.1) of the Education Act, it was still a valid and enforceable agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Education Act does not preclude agreements outside of s. 135(26.1), the agreement was not vitiated by mutual mistake, and the appellant's liability was not limited to the initial estimated amount.

Following the reorganization of Ontario school boards, the appellant and respondent school boards entered into an agreement to share the liability for retirement benefits of transferred teachers.

The appellant later argued the agreement was invalid because it did not fall under section 135(26.1) of the Education Act and was vitiated by common mistake.

The Court of Appeal held that the Act does not preclude boards from making binding agreements outside of section 135(26.1).

The Court also found no fundamental mistake that would void the agreement and refused to cap the appellant's liability at the initial estimated amount.

The appeal was dismissed.

The parties lived in a common-law relationship for 12 years.

After separation, the respondent was awarded $996,500 for unjust enrichment based on the trial judge's blurring of the 'value received' and 'value survived' approaches to quantify her contribution to the appellant's business success.

The appellant appealed the quantification method.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in blurring the two approaches and that the correct method was to determine the 'value received' and perform a quantum meruit calculation.

The award was set aside and the matter remitted for a new trial on quantification.

The respondents brought a motion for security for costs of the appeal.

The appellant argued the issue was res judicata because a pre-trial motion for security for costs had been dismissed.

The Court of Appeal rejected the res judicata argument, noting that the circumstances before and after a trial are different.

The court found that the appellant, a foreign corporation, failed to discharge its burden of proving it lacked access to funds to post security.

The motion was granted, and the appellant was ordered to post $120,000 in security for costs.

The moving party brought a motion for security for costs of an appeal under rule 61.06(1).

The responding party, who had made a consumer proposal in bankruptcy, was appealing a decision that refused to set aside a consent order converting a default judgment into a judgment in fraud.

The responding party argued he consented to the order due to his former solicitor's misunderstanding and failure to explain the consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that although the responding party was impecunious, his appeal was not plainly devoid of merit and he should not be deprived of the opportunity to have his claim adjudicated.

The appellant brought motions for a stay pending appeal of a trial judge's order dividing family assets, an extension of time to perfect the appeal, and consolidation of appeals from interlocutory orders.

The respondent brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the appellant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured her.

The motion to consolidate was dismissed because the appellant had not obtained leave to appeal the interlocutory orders.

The motion for an extension of time was granted.

The respondent's cross-motion for security for costs was dismissed as the appeal was not frivolous and the appellant had sufficient assets.

A passenger was seriously injured in a leased vehicle and sued the driver, lessee, and owner.

The driver was insured by ING, while the owner was insured by Lombard under a policy that included umbrella liability coverage.

The application judge ruled that Lombard's policy provided first-loss insurance and had to respond in priority to ING's policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Lombard's appeal, confirming that the umbrella policy was an owner's policy and must respond in priority under s. 277(1) of the Insurance Act.

The appellant, a parent and former school volunteer, appealed an order striking his statement of claim against the school board and various officials.

The claim alleged negligence, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and misfeasance in public office arising from a ban restricting his access to school property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the negligence claims, finding no duty of care was owed.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the appellant had sufficiently pleaded the elements of misfeasance in public office against the school principals, superintendents, and the board, by alleging the ban was continued for the improper purpose of deliberately harming him.

The Law Society and the respondent lawyer brought separate appeals from a Divisional Court decision that set aside a Law Society Appeal Panel's order upholding a finding of professional misconduct and disbarment.

The Divisional Court had remitted the matter to a new hearing panel due to breaches of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

It held that the Hearing Panel breached natural justice by refusing a brief adjournment to allow the lawyer to be represented by counsel, and by proceeding immediately to the penalty phase without adequate notice.

The Court also upheld the Divisional Court's refusal to stay the proceedings for undue delay, binding the new hearing panel to the original findings on delay up to the start of the first hearing.

The appellant, a commercial landlord, appealed his convictions for theft and mischief arising from his actions in changing the locks on a tenant's store and damaging/removing her property.

He argued he had a colour of right under the Commercial Tenancies Act, that the trial judge was in a conflict of interest, and that the charges were duplicative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no conflict of interest, that the Criminal Code applied, and that the trial judge reasonably rejected the colour of right defence based on the appellant's conduct and statements.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud, unauthorized use of credit card data, and possession of stolen traveler's cheques, arguing he was denied a trial in French, his guilty pleas were invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial judge failed to properly inquire into the pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had not requested a French trial, failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial judge's inquiry into the negotiated guilty pleas was sufficient.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her request for leave to institute a new proceeding against the respondent bank.

The appellant had previously defaulted on her mortgage, resulting in a default judgment and the sale of her home.

After multiple unsuccessful proceedings to set aside the default judgment, she was prohibited from instituting further proceedings without leave.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to deny leave, agreeing that the appellant sought to relitigate previously decided matters and had failed to pay costs from prior proceedings.

The appellant appealed an order finding that a third party was not a necessary party to the action under Rule 5.03.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claim against the appellant's former articling student did not implicate the third party's rights such that her presence was necessary to adjudicate the issue.