Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus regarding his transfer from a minimum to a medium security institution.

The appellant argued the transfer relied on confidential information that was not properly assessed for reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the transfer decision was procedurally fair, based on reliable evidence from a security information officer, and not unreasonable.

The appellants, out-of-province resort operators, appealed decisions dismissing their motions to stay or dismiss personal injury actions for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal convened a five-judge panel to reconsider the Muscutt test for assumed jurisdiction.

The Court modified the Muscutt test by elevating the weight given to Rule 17.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, creating a presumption of a real and substantial connection for most of its subrules.

The Court also collapsed the fairness factors and clarified the distinction between jurisdiction simpliciter and forum non conveniens.

Applying the revised test, the Court found a real and substantial connection between Ontario and the appellants in both cases and upheld the motion judges' decisions that Ontario was the appropriate forum.

The appellants appealed a decision striking their claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of duty of care against a teacher and school boards.

The motions judge had struck the claims on the basis that the psychological damages pleaded were not reasonably foreseeable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that a teacher's alleged breach of duties towards a 13-year-old student could not cause reasonably foreseeable psychological damage.

The parents' direct claim against the school board was also permitted to proceed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment upholding a prenuptial agreement.

She argued the agreement should be set aside due to inadequate financial disclosure, lack of independent legal advice, duress, and a change in circumstances post-marriage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had adequate knowledge of the respondent's finances, received proper independent legal advice, and was not under duress when signing the contract.

The court also upheld the trial judge's evidentiary ruling admitting a contemporaneous memorandum.

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal of a Superior Court order directing payment out of court.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion and quashed the appeal, finding that the underlying order was temporary and interlocutory under Family Law Rule 2(1) and general jurisprudence, as it did not finally determine the issue of support arrears or the appellant's set-off defence.

The moving party sought to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his appeal for delay and requested an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The underlying action involved a defamation claim regarding a book review, which the motion judge had dismissed by setting aside service ex juris and finding Ontario was not a convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal found that while the delay was explained by administrative errors and caused no prejudice, the appeal lacked any real chance of success on the merits.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his summary conviction for dangerous driving and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider his moral blameworthiness and awareness of risk after he took medication that caused drowsiness and drifted across the centre line.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the trial judge properly applied the Beatty test, concluding the applicant's conduct was a marked departure from the standard of care and he was aware of the risk.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the trial judge did not prematurely foreclose a conditional discharge.

The respondent condominium corporation suffered flooding due to a failed standpipe system and sought $600,000 for its replacement under an all-risk insurance policy issued by the appellant.

The application judge found the loss was covered, ruling that a water hammer event caused the damage and that section 99(3) of the Condominium Act nullified the policy's exclusion for faulty design.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the standpipe system was improperly designed before the insurer came on risk, making the failure a non-fortuitous event.

The court further held that the loss fell squarely within the policy's exclusion clause and that section 99(3) did not apply because the damage was not resultant damage.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a Norwich order, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to explicitly set aside the underlying December Order.

The Court also determined the costs of the proceedings below.

Departing from the general rule that costs follow the event, the Court ordered that no costs be awarded to any party for the Superior Court proceedings, citing the appellants' shifting legal positions, the unsettled nature of the law regarding Norwich orders, and the underlying conduct of the appellants.

The moving party sought to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed a motion to stay a writ of possession pending appeal.

The moving party's home had been sold for default of mortgage payments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to review, finding no grounds to set aside the order as the mortgage was undisputedly in default and the documents relied upon did not establish a renewal or compromise.

Following a request for clarification and further submissions respecting costs in relation to an initial disciplinary hearing, the Court of Appeal ordered that the costs for that hearing be reserved to the Tribunal presiding over the re-hearing.

The appellants, a former spouse and his brother, appealed orders refusing to set aside a previous order that granted child support and voided a property transfer between them.

The appellants argued they had not been properly served and that the original order was made ex parte.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding strong evidence that the appellants deliberately evaded service and failed to move promptly to set aside the order once they were aware of it.

The appellant bank issued an irrevocable and transferable letter of credit.

The letter of credit was transferred to the respondent, who subsequently presented documents for payment.

The appellant refused to pay, citing discrepancies in the documents and a lack of notice regarding the transfer.

The motions judge granted summary judgment in favour of the respondent on liability and ordered the appellant to pay costs, including a Sanderson order for the co-defendant's costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that notice of the transfer was not required under the terms of the credit or the UCP 500, and that the documentary discrepancies were minor and immaterial.

The Court also upheld the costs awards, including the Sanderson order.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a Defence Fee Funding Protocol, arguing they should have access to further frozen assets to pay legal costs after their bank account was depleted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the protocol's wording specifically limited access to the bank account and did not extend to assets subject to a proprietary claim.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the appellants' access to $3,500 per month for living expenses from all frozen assets was also dismissed.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim and awarding $20,000 in costs against him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge properly exercised his discretion in awarding costs and correctly concluded that it was plain and obvious the action could not proceed.

The respondent did not seek costs for the appeal.

The employee was terminated from his position as CFO but agreed to the assignment of his employment contract to an affiliated company within the corporate group.

The trial judge found that the contract was terminated and awarded the employee two years' severance pay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by concluding the contract was terminated rather than assigned, and by reversing the burden of proof regarding an alleged forbearance agreement.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the severance award, and the employee's cross-appeal for negligent misrepresentation against the individual defendant was dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion to set aside an order dismissing their application to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from a 2007 judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's finding that the moving parties failed to explain their two-year delay or their failure to appear before the original judge.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The parties made written submissions regarding costs following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal determined that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity scale rather than an elevated scale.

The court awarded the respondent a total of $61,000 in costs, which included amounts for proceedings before the professional discipline appeal panel, the lower court stay motion, the lower court appeal, and the appellate proceedings, after setting off a previous costs award in favour of the appellant.

The Crown brought a motion for directions regarding an appeal where the unrepresented appellant intended to allege ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant had been denied legal aid and sought time to retain counsel upon his release from custody.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the matter to allow the appellant time to retain counsel and directed the Crown to obtain specific transcripts and produce the appeal book in the interim.

The appellant, a federal inmate, appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application regarding his classification as a medium security risk.

While the appeal was pending, the appellant was placed on day parole.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the issue of his security classification moot.

The Court also noted that correctional authorities retain discretion under the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations to consider factors beyond the custody rating score when determining security classifications.