John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding net family property and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that a domestic contract was no longer operative because a plan of subdivision was never registered, allowing the appellant's investment interest to be included in the net family property calculation.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge imputing corporate income to the appellant and awarding retroactive spousal support based on the financial evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his section 10 Charter rights were violated when he was questioned by police on the street.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not detained during the interaction, and therefore his Charter rights were not engaged.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding the validity of an 'alert' demand.

The appellant argued that the officer making the demand must know or believe the person was operating or in care and control of the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming prior authorities that such knowledge or belief is not required for an officer to make an 'alert' demand.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest because the informant did not reveal the source of their information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly assessed the totality of the circumstances and that the informant's source is only one factor in that analysis.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the imposition of consecutive sentences totaling 14 months was fit and revealed no error in principle.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction on three grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge's jury charge on reasonable doubt was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the charge did not strictly comply with Lifchus, the jury would not have misunderstood the standard of proof given the W.(D.) instruction on the alibi defence.

The court also found no merit to the argument that cross-examination was improperly curtailed.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding whether their trial should be heard by a judge rather than a justice of the peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the statute recognizes complex cases may be heard by a judge, it does not require it, making the decision a matter of discretion.

The court found no reviewable error in the lower courts' decisions.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a default judgment of nearly $50,000.

The appellant argued he was under a disability when served with the statement of claim and that the default judgment should be set aside under Rule 19.08(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the appellant was not under a disability at the time he was noted in default, his medical condition provided a reasonable explanation for his failure to defend the action.

The default judgment was set aside to allow the appellant to present a triable defence on the merits.

The appellants were injured when a youth, who had left a residential treatment home operated by the respondent without permission, crashed a stolen car into their house.

Over three years later, the appellants moved to add the respondent as a defendant, alleging negligent supervision.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding the respondent was protected by the six-month limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act and refusing to exercise discretion to add the party due to presumed prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming the respondent was acting as a public authority fulfilling a public duty, and the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the delay.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order that struck her constructive trust claims on the basis of res judicata stemming from a consent order in Ireland.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that conflicting evidence regarding the scope of the Irish consent order and the respondent's domicile must be resolved at trial.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the respondent's argument that Ontario was forum non conveniens, noting that Ontario was the acknowledged appropriate forum for the appellant's support claims.

The respondent worked as a commissioned salesperson for the appellant under an agreement that allowed either party to terminate without notice or penalty.

The trial judge found this provision unconscionable due to unequal bargaining power and awarded reasonable notice.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the trial judgment, finding no evidence of unconscionability, duress, or vulnerability.

The respondent understood the contract, which contained terms beneficial to him, and the termination provision was enforced.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a written agreement.

The appellant argued that a contemporaneous oral agreement altered its payment obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the written agreement was clear and unambiguous, and evidence of an oral agreement cannot be admitted to contradict its terms.

The Court also noted that even if the dispute was subject to an arbitration clause, summary judgment was appropriate under s. 7(2), para. 5 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The appellants, defendants in commercial litigation, sought to set aside a sealing order made in a separate matrimonial proceeding involving the plaintiff.

The appellants' counsel had accessed the matrimonial file, which had not been physically sealed due to an administrative error, and copied documents to use in the commercial litigation.

The motion judge ordered the appellants to comply with the sealing order and dismissed their cross-motion to set it aside.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants were not 'persons affected' by the sealing order within the meaning of Rule 37.14(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as their proprietary or economic interests were not directly affected, and therefore they lacked standing to challenge it.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice claim against the respondent hospital.

The appellants alleged that the hospital's failure to change a post-operative dressing caused a surgical wound infection.

The Court of Appeal found no genuine issue for trial, as the appellants led no evidence to contradict the hospital's expert, who concluded there was no negligence and that re-applying a dressing to a clean, dry wound was appropriate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The employer college hired a probationary teacher on the condition that she enrol in a graduate program.

When she failed to do so within ten months, the employer dismissed her.

The union grieved the dismissal, and the Arbitration Board reinstated the employee, finding the condition invalid because it was individually negotiated outside the collective agreement and conflicted with it.

The Divisional Court dismissed the employer's application for judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, holding that the standard of review was patent unreasonableness and that the Board correctly concluded that the collective bargaining regime precludes individual bargaining of terms or conditions of employment whose non-fulfilment could lead to dismissal.

The appellant owned a motorboat that his brother borrowed to take passengers across a lake at night.

The brother made a navigational error and crashed into an island, resulting in one death and serious injuries.

The trial judge found the brother liable as the operator and also found the appellant liable as the owner under the Canada Shipping Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in interpreting the Act as imposing statutory liability on an owner for the fault of the vessel in these circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the issue of the owner's liability under ordinary tort principles.

The appellant, a police officer, was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon and obstruction of justice after a knife was found in his son's desk at school.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the appellant on both counts, finding no evidence that the knife's handle was made of metal, an essential element of the prohibited weapon charge.

The Crown successfully applied to the Superior Court to set aside the discharge.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the discharge, holding that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error by failing to consider circumstantial evidence or by improperly weighing the evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a construction dispute, challenging the trial judge's assessment of a quantum meruit claim, the failure to award damages for delay, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of reasonable labour and findings regarding delay were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The court also declined to interfere with the discretionary costs award, fixing costs of the appeal at $15,000.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on the ground that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit it to lead similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or unreasonable exercise of discretion in the trial judge's ruling.

The trial judge applied the proper standard, considered the similar acts cumulatively, and reasonably concluded that the prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence outweighed its probative value.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and the total sentence of ten years imposed for three offences.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to assess the complainant's credibility based on the totality of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the ten-year sentence was beyond the appropriate range and exceeded the Crown's suggested sentence.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to six years concurrent for each offence, taking into account pre-trial custody.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial decision awarding the respondent insured a substantial loss of earning capacity benefit (LECB) and interest on overdue payments.

The respondent, a university student who suffered cognitive deficits and depression following a motor vehicle accident, cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to lock in her pre-accident earning capacity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded the respondent's residual earning capacity was zero due to her psychological makeup, and correctly awarded interest from the date benefits were overdue.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the pre-accident earning capacity must be adjusted as the insured ages pursuant to the statutory formula.