John I. Laskin

The appellants sold their shares in a trailer park to the respondents, taking back a promissory note bearing 10 percent interest annually until maturity.

The note did not specify a post-maturity interest rate.

After the respondents defaulted, the trial judge held that the post-maturity interest rate was 5 percent pursuant to section 3 of the Interest Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the prejudgment interest provisions of the Courts of Justice Act ousted section 3 of the Interest Act.

The Court exercised its discretion to fix the post-maturity interest rate at 10 percent, matching the pre-maturity rate, to reflect commercial reality and prevent the respondents from benefiting from their default.

The appellant appealed his sentence for the forceful sexual assault of a 13-year-old girl.

The trial judge had declined to impose a conditional sentence, finding that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence given the violence, threats, and profound impact on the complainant.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not manifestly excessive, despite the appellant's positive background and family support contributions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower courts that the appellant was in care and control.

The court noted the appellant was heavily intoxicated, the keys were in the ignition, the car was running, and he had stated an intention to resume driving.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after losing control of his vehicle while speeding on a wet road.

He appealed his convictions, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated and the Attorney General lacked authority to prefer the indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code after his committal was quashed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's analysis.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge erred in principle regarding the appropriateness of a conditional sentence.

The sentence was reduced from two years less a day to 15 months imprisonment.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their motion to extend the time for service of their statement of claim regarding a motor vehicle accident.

The motion judge had refused the extension, finding the defendants would suffer prejudice because their motor vehicle insurance had been cancelled prior to the accident, leaving them personally liable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the delay in serving the statement of claim did not cause this prejudice and did not affect the defendants' ability to maintain a defence on the merits.

The time for service was extended.

The appellant appealed the order of the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error and dismissed the appeal, fixing costs at $6,000.

The moving parties brought motions to quash an appeal from an order that dissolved two earlier orders.

The responding parties argued that the order was a final determination on the issue of standing, making it appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory, as it did not finally dispose of the issue of standing, and granted the motions to quash the appeal.

Borins J.A. dissented, finding the order final as it disposed of the plaintiffs' claim for interlocutory injunctive relief.

The appellants appealed an order confirming a deputy registrar's findings regarding the accounting of clinic funds, including OHIP billings and bank loans.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the deputy registrar's conclusions were supported by the evidence and authorized by the clarification order.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a consent order dismissing its action against the respondent.

The motion judge found that the appellant would not have consented to the order but for a misrepresentation, but refused to set it aside because the appellant did not demonstrate a genuine issue for trial or prejudice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in principle by expanding the test for setting aside consent orders.

The consent order was set aside.

The appellants appealed a judgment enforcing a settlement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal assumed jurisdiction on consent of counsel but dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge had jurisdiction and made no error in exercising his discretion.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error by the motion judge, noting that the evidence filed in support of the motion did not warrant the order sought.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, as the respondent filed no factum.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice in a CCAA proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasoning of the motion judge, and awarded costs of $10,000 to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the order of the motion judge striking out his pleading and granting a divorce judgment and related relief.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge properly struck the pleading based on the appellant's non-compliance with previous court orders.

The Court also found no palpable and overriding error in the granting of the divorce judgment and related relief.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The appellant appealed her committal for surrender and applied for judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

She challenged the constitutionality of the new Extradition Act, which the Court of Appeal dismissed based on its previous decision in United States of America v. Yang.

She also argued that the surrender would be unfair and oppressive and that the Minister's reasons were inadequate.

The Court found no substance to her allegations and held that the Minister's reasons were adequate.

The appeal and application for judicial review were dismissed.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $8,000 per month in spousal support following a 23-year marriage.

Prior to the appeal, the appellant wilfully defaulted on his support obligations, accumulating over $50,000 in arrears.

The Court of Appeal noted it could dismiss the appeal for non-compliance but chose to hear it on the merits.

The court upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the appellant's income and the decision not to impute income to the respondent due to her ongoing responsibilities caring for their special needs children.

The appeal was dismissed, and the spousal support order was affirmed.

The appellant was terminated from her employment of 15.5 years while dealing with medical issues.

The trial judge found the employer acted in bad faith and initially awarded 12 months' notice, which she later increased to 16 months after being informed of a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The appellant appealed the notice period and the dismissal of her claim for aggravated and punitive damages.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in increasing the notice period after learning of the settlement offer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the 16-month notice period was within a reasonable range and that a trial judge has broad discretion to alter a judgment before it is formally entered.

The plaintiff sought to examine the Honourable John Manley, a Member of Parliament, for discovery in a civil action.

The motion judge ordered the Member to attend no sooner than 15 days after the commencement of Parliament's summer recess, finding that parliamentary privilege against testifying only applied while Parliament was actually sitting and for 14 days after adjournment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the privilege of testimonial immunity extends throughout a parliamentary session, as well as 40 days before a session begins and 40 days after it ends.

The court concluded that any changes to this privilege must be enacted by Parliament, not the courts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping, extortion, assault, and uttering a death threat.

The charges arose from an incident where the appellant and co-accused kidnapped the victim, forced him into a car, and assaulted him.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting a 911 call under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, in his jury instructions regarding conceded facts and identity, and in allowing prior consistent statements to enhance a witness's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and noting the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case.

The accused appealed his assault conviction to the summary conviction appeal court, which dismissed the appeal with brief, conclusory reasons.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing the appeal judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to give adequate reasons constituted an error of law that deprived the accused of meaningful appellate review.

Upon reviewing the trial record, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence and subjected the accused's testimony to stricter scrutiny than the complainant's.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction imposed by a judge and jury.

In light of the Court of Appeal's disposition of the co-accused's appeal, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.