John I. Laskin

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent, who had been convicted in California of criminal harassment.

The extradition judge discharged the respondent on the harassment charge, finding the US failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the conduct underlying the California conviction corresponded to the Canadian offence of criminal harassment, as California law did not require proof that the victim reasonably feared for their safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the US appeal, confirming that the balance of probabilities is the correct standard under s. 29(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, that the victim's trial transcript was properly admitted, and that the extradition judge's conclusion was not unreasonable.

The appellant sought the extradition of the respondent, who had been convicted in California of criminal harassment.

The extradition judge discharged the respondent on the harassment charge, finding that the appellant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the conduct underlying the California conviction corresponded to the Canadian offence of criminal harassment, as the victim's testimony did not establish she reasonably feared for her safety.

The appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that section 29(1)(b) of the Extradition Act imposes a balance of probabilities standard, the victim's transcript was properly admitted, and the extradition judge's conclusion was reasonable.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the equalization of net family property.

She argued that a 1979 agreement excluded the matrimonial home from the calculation and that the respondent's alleged lottery winnings should be included.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the agreement did not exclude the home and there was no evidence of lottery winnings.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to correct a conceded double-counting error regarding a vehicle, reducing the equalization payment by $10,500.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision which found that minutes of settlement did not contain all essential terms to constitute an enforceable agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the essential terms of the easement and licensing agreements were set out in the minutes.

The dispute over a $2,000 cost for committee of adjustment approval did not justify resiling from the agreement, as the respondents were obligated to assume this cost, or alternatively, it was a minor matter that could be resolved by a judge.

The appeal was allowed and judgment was granted in accordance with the minutes of settlement.

The appellant pleaded guilty to twenty charges, including multiple armed bank robberies, and was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment following a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued the joint submission was unfair because it resulted from an eleventh-hour change in the Crown's sentencing position from what was discussed at the pre-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge conducted the hearing fairly, the Crown had not resiled from a prior agreement, and the sentence was appropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the appellant's mental health challenges.

The appellants appealed the appointment of an administrator for a condominium corporation and the award of substantial indemnity costs against them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the appointment of the administrator, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that a state of disequilibrium existed due to tension between two groups with divergent interests regarding the transient use of units.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and substituted an award of partial indemnity costs, finding no basis for substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed his sentence, acknowledging it was fit when imposed but seeking intervention based on fresh evidence regarding his medical condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant could serve his sentence without any impairment to his medical condition and treatment.

The Crown appealed a youth court judge's refusal to make a DNA data bank order following the young persons' guilty pleas to forcible confinement.

The youth court judge had ruled that forcible confinement was not a primary designated offence under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that forcible confinement is a primary designated offence.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to a different youth court judge to determine whether the orders should be made.

The appellant appealed his total sentence of 11 years (plus two years credit for 17 months pre-trial custody) for severe and prolonged domestic abuse of his common-law spouse.

The abuse included daily terrorization, throwing the victim from a balcony, placing her in a freezer, and sadistic sexual abuse.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, noting the appellant's terrible criminal record, lack of mitigating factors, and history of domestic abuse.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to vary his spousal support obligation, which was based on a separation agreement incorporated into a judgment.

The motion judge found no material change in circumstances in the appellant's financial situation or health, attributing his financial difficulties to his debts and lifestyle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's findings and awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed her five-month custodial sentence.

The Crown acknowledged that this was an exceptional case where the appellant had turned her life around since the offence, and incarceration would not serve the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, set aside the custodial sentence, and substituted a five-month conditional sentence, leaving the probation and restitution orders in place.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action, arguing the judge erred in finding just cause for termination.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's contextual approach, agreeing that the appellant's unauthorized store closure, false reports of staff resignations, and prolonged insubordination justified dismissal without notice.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the quantum of trial costs was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately exercised his discretion under Rule 57.01.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge gave inadequate instructions on in-dock identification and the W.D. framework regarding defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the instructions sufficient given the context of the trial and the evidence presented.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was deemed fit given the seriousness of the crime and the appellant's record.

The appellants appealed a jury award for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the admissibility of lay evidence related to the respondent's claim for loss of future income as a hair colourist, finding it relevant and not prejudicial.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding general damages, finding the jury's award inordinately high, and substituted an award of $125,000.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellants sold a book of business and list of customers to the respondent under a share purchase agreement that included a non-competition agreement.

The trial judge found that the non-competition agreement precluded the appellant from doing business with former customers for four years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that despite some ambiguity, the commercial sense of the transaction supported this interpretation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, ING Canada Inc., appealed an order striking out portions of its amended statement of defence in an action brought by the respondents for misrepresentation and breach of a share purchase agreement.

The struck portions included pleas that the respondents owed an implied duty of good faith to disclose errors discovered before closing, references to the parties' intentions and expectations, and related factual allegations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the law regarding implied duties of good faith in commercial contracts is not fully settled, and therefore it was not plain and obvious that the defence would fail.

The court concluded that the detailed analysis required to determine whether to imply a duty of good faith, and the relevance of the parties' intentions, should be left for trial.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing errors in the trial judge's assessment of her daughter's evidence, the use of a blended voir dire, misapprehension of an officer's evidence regarding a TTC machine, and the lawfulness of her arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that its jurisdiction is limited to errors of law alone and none of the issues raised met this threshold.

The court held that credibility assessments are for the trial judge, the blended voir dire did not cause unfairness, the misapprehended evidence did not affect the conclusions, and the arrest was lawful as the officer found her committing the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge provided an inadequate Vetrovec warning regarding an accomplice witness and failed to properly instruct the jury on the frailties of both voice and eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the conviction rested mostly on unsavoury and frail evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for the sexual assault of an elderly woman in her home.

The sentence had been imposed following a joint submission after a partial preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle with the joint submission, noting the appellant's prior record for a similar offence and need for treatment.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.