James Duncan Lockyer

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after allegedly killing a criminal associate to prevent him from exposing their involvement in a prior convenience store robbery and murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions on reasonable doubt, that Crown misconduct deprived him of a fair trial, and that the trial judge failed to give a proper Vetrovec warning for unsavoury witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions adequately conveyed the standard of proof, the Crown's misconduct did not irreparably prejudice the right to a fair trial, and the verdict would have been the same even with a stronger Vetrovec warning given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for killing his ex-girlfriend.

He appealed the conviction on several grounds, including the admission of post-offence conduct, similar fact evidence, and hypnotically enhanced testimony from a witness.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking an increase in the 10-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the sentence as fit and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The central issue at trial was eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's charge to the jury failed to adequately address the specific frailties of the identification evidence, including discrepancies in descriptions and failures to identify the appellant in photo line-ups.

The trial judge also erred in failing to properly review the defence evidence and in his application of section 24(2) of the Charter when admitting conscriptive evidence regarding the appellant's prior use of aliases.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of two inmates charged with second-degree murder following the fatal stabbing of a fellow inmate at Kingston Penitentiary.

The trial judge acquitted the accused on the basis of self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in finding an air of reality to the self-defence claim and in assessing its subjective elements, specifically by finding that words alone could constitute an assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the victim's words, considered in the context of his aggressive conduct and history of violence, were sufficient to constitute an assault, and that the trial judge properly inferred the accused's subjective state of mind from the circumstantial evidence.

The respondent, whose murder conviction was overturned and a new trial ordered, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown brought a motion seeking direction on whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction under s. 679(7.1) of the Criminal Code to hear the bail application after the respondent had already appeared in the Superior Court.

The Court of Appeal held that it has concurrent jurisdiction with the trial court over bail applications pending a new trial, even after the accused's first appearance in the trial court.

However, given the anticipated length and need for viva voce evidence, the Court declined to hear the application and directed that it be heard in the Superior Court.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of second-degree murder.

The deceased was found with an electrical cord around her neck, initially thought to be suicide.

The Crown alleged the respondent strangled her and staged the suicide.

The trial judge excluded evidence of the respondent's former girlfriend regarding a prior incident where he tied her up with a phone cord.

The trial judge also allowed cross-examination of the deceased's sister about suicide letters and failed to instruct the jury on s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in excluding the former girlfriend's evidence, no reversible error in the cross-examination, and that while the trial judge should have instructed on s. 229(a)(ii), the non-direction did not amount to reversible error.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 5.5 months' imprisonment for assault causing bodily harm and failing to comply with an undertaking.

The appellant and a co-accused assaulted the victim after suspecting him of stealing money, kicking and punching him while he was on the ground.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's failure to explicitly consider a conditional sentence, as it had not been requested by defence counsel and was inappropriate given the appellant's breaches of release conditions.

The court also held the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder of his girlfriend and sentenced to life imprisonment with 10 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the jury charge on motive and reasonable doubt was flawed.

The Crown appealed the sentence, seeking an increased period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding the trial judge erred in minimizing the aggravating features of intimate partner violence and indignities to the victim's body.

The period of parole ineligibility was increased to 12 years.

The appellant appealed convictions for first degree murder and manslaughter arising from the stabbing deaths of two sisters.

The court held that the trial was unfair due to multiple reversible errors, including the admission of expert evidence that strayed from crime scene staging into inadmissible criminal profiling, the admission and mishandling of prejudicial after-the-fact conduct evidence related to a trip to Jamaica, improper Crown submissions and jury instructions about a supposed false alibi unsupported by any evidence, the introduction in the charge of an additional theory of liability without notice to the defence, and inadequate instructions on weak identification evidence.

The cumulative effect of these errors required a new trial.

Because the Crown did not cross-appeal the manslaughter conviction, the new trial was ordered on first degree murder with respect to one victim and manslaughter with respect to the other.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the strangulation of his wife.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial but overwhelming, pointing to the appellant having killed his wife at home and then attempting to stage a robbery.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions, in admitting statements made to police after the appellant had asserted his right to counsel, and that the Crown made improper remarks in closing.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in admitting the police statements because their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value, the error was harmless given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence.

The curative proviso was applied, and the appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, which was based solely on the eyewitness identification of the complainant, a taxi driver.

The Court of Appeal found the identification evidence to be unreliable due to discrepancies in the complainant's descriptions, the brief and stressful nature of the encounter, and flaws in the photo line-up.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant was convicted of counselling murder and counselling unlawful bodily harm after tape-recording conversations in which he encouraged two women to have a doctor maimed or killed.

The appellant claimed he did not intend for the crimes to be committed, but only wanted to get the women's intentions on tape to warn the doctor.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the mental element for counselling was satisfied if the appellant intended his advice to be accepted.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred; the offence of counselling requires proof that the counsellor intended the commission of the offence counselled.

As the Crown conceded there was no evidence the appellant intended the substantive offences to be committed, the appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant was convicted of three bank robberies based primarily on eyewitness identification evidence and a statement obtained following his arrest.

He appealed his convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made several fatal errors in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification, including stating that stress is a neutral factor and endorsing an in-court experiment.

The Court also noted that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the investigating officer's failure to tape record the appellant's statement.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought release from custody pending his new trial for first degree murder, having spent almost 10 years in custody.

The Court of Appeal had previously quashed his conviction due to errors regarding jailhouse informant testimony and bad character evidence.

The court found the applicant met his onus under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code, noting the Crown's case was now considerably weaker, the applicant had strong community ties, a positive institutional record, and posed minimal risk to the public.

The application for release was granted subject to strict conditions, including a cash deposit and substantial sureties.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning but erred by providing the jury with examples of potentially confirmatory evidence that were not capable of confirming the informant's testimony.

The trial judge also erred by allowing the Crown to introduce highly prejudicial investigative hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's antecedents, including alleged ties to terrorism and the drug trade, to rebut a defence claim of an inadequate police investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge violated his right to be present at his trial under s. 650 of the Criminal Code by holding an in camera meeting with the federal Crown and an investigating officer to determine an informer privilege claim over RCMP records.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the 'other suspect' defence, Vetrovec warnings for unsavoury witnesses, and the fact-finding process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the in camera meeting was part of a separate proceeding under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act, not the trial itself, and that the appellant had expressly consented to the procedure.

The Court also found no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, raising several grounds including errors in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt, failure to give a Vetrovec warning, improper comments on the evidence, and the admission of crime scene photographs and prior statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a firearms offence.

He argued the police lacked articulable cause to detain and search him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the officers had a reasonable suspicion based on a detailed and compelling tip from an identified complainant, justifying a pat-down search.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed due to the seriousness of the offence, though a stay was entered on one count due to the rule against multiple convictions.

The appellant appealed from the rejection of an entrapment application following guilty pleas to drug trafficking and related offences.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and reasonably rejected the original entrapment theory advanced on the record then before the court.

However, fresh evidence established that a key police agent had perjured himself about his criminal record and raised serious concerns about possible state complicity in that perjury and incomplete disclosure.

Applying the fresh evidence framework, the court concluded the new evidence could reasonably have affected the result of the entrapment hearing.

The convictions were quashed and a new entrapment hearing was ordered, while the guilty pleas and guilty verdicts otherwise stood.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a violent kidnapping and assault connected to collection of a drug debt.

The court held that the trial judge erred by telling the jury that if it found the accused's testimony to be a fabrication, that finding could be added as positive circumstantial evidence of guilt absent independent evidence of concoction.

The court also found prejudicial Crown misconduct and related charge errors concerning the right to remain silent, improper cross-examination tied to defence counsel's failure to confront a witness under s. 11 of the Canada Evidence Act, and improper closing submissions suggesting a key Crown witness had been believed in another proceeding.

Given the credibility-driven record and the non-overwhelming Crown case, the proviso could not be applied.

A new trial was ordered.