James Duncan Lockyer

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied on the testimony of a witness whose memory of seeing the appellant near the crime scene was refreshed through hypnosis, as well as similar fact evidence from a former girlfriend.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that post-hypnosis evidence is presumptively inadmissible because it does not meet the reliability requirements for novel scientific evidence.

The Court also found that the similar fact evidence lacked sufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect, and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder after a shooting outside a restaurant.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a single identification witness who refused to answer questions during cross-examination by the defence.

The trial judge admitted the witness's evidence and provided an inadequate warning to the jury regarding the lack of cross-examination.

The trial judge also erred in admitting a prior inconsistent statement of another witness for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, and in admitting highly prejudicial hearsay evidence regarding the police manhunt for the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant's right to make full answer and defence was undermined.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a notice regarding a publication ban under s. 539(1) and (3) of the Criminal Code.

The text of the decision on the appeal from the dismissal of two applications for certiorari in respect of a preliminary inquiry was withheld from publication until the completion of the trial to protect the evidence adduced at the preliminary inquiry.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment and 18 months' probation for two counts of robbery and related offences, including the use of a firearm.

The appeal was heard years after the sentence had been fully served.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was appropriate given the seriousness of the offences, which involved robbing clerks late at night with an imitation firearm and a large knife, balanced against the appellant's youth and rehabilitative prospects.

In the context of a Reference regarding his 1959 murder conviction, the applicant sought production of third-party nursing school and psychiatric records of a key Crown witness.

The applicant tendered fresh evidence from two individuals who claimed the witness admitted to lying at trial and sought psychiatric hospitalization to avoid testifying at a 1966 Supreme Court rehearing.

The Court of Appeal applied the O'Connor test and ordered production of the nursing school records, finding they provided independent confirmation of the fresh evidence with minimal prejudice to the witness's privacy.

However, the court refused to order production of the psychiatric records, concluding that the witness's high expectation of privacy outweighed the limited probative value of the one-page discharge form.

In a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice concerning the 1959 murder conviction of Steven Truscott, the Crown sought to introduce fresh evidence from a witness, Ms. X. The proposed evidence described a brief, unwanted sexual advance by Truscott in a cornfield approximately a year before the murder.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to rebut good character, challenge credibility, support another witness's testimony, and act as similar fact evidence identifying Truscott as the killer.

The Court of Appeal ruled on the admissibility without hearing the testimony viva voce, finding the evidence clearly irrelevant to any material fact in issue.

The Crown's application to tender the evidence was dismissed, and the defence's request for a publication ban on the ruling was denied.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport with liquor bottles containing the drug.

He claimed a man he met in Antigua asked him to deliver the bottles to an unknown person in Canada.

On appeal, he argued that evidence of his nervous demeanour at customs should not have been admitted and that the trial judge erred in leaving wilful blindness with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the demeanour evidence was contemporaneous with the offence and did not render the trial unfair, and that the inherently suspicious circumstances provided an air of reality to the wilful blindness instruction.

In a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice under s. 696.3(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code regarding the 1959 murder conviction of Steven Murray Truscott, the parties sought directions on the scope of the issues.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the Reference is limited to the issue of fresh evidence, which means material not presented in prior court proceedings (including the 1966 Supreme Court Reference).

The Court further held that the Kaufman Report does not limit the evidence the parties can tender, and that transcripts from the Kaufman investigation are part of the record but must satisfy hearsay exceptions to be admitted for their truth.

The appellant was jointly charged with two co-accused of sexually assaulting a 14-year-old complainant.

Following a jury trial, the appellant was convicted while his co-accused were acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were reconcilable because the Crown's case against the appellant was significantly stronger than against his co-accused, supported by DNA evidence and a post-offence statement.

In the context of a ministerial reference regarding Steven Murray Truscott's 1959 murder conviction, the court addressed two preliminary issues.

First, the court granted the appellant's request to have the panel hear witness evidence viva voce rather than out of court.

Second, the court dismissed a motion by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to permit camera access to the proceedings, finding that recording is prohibited under s. 136(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the statutory exemptions did not apply because the Crown did not consent.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the identification evidence of the surviving victim, who had a significant criminal record, gave inconsistent statements, and had a motive to lie.

The trial judge refused to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the victim's evidence, reasoning that such warnings do not apply to victims.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, as a Vetrovec warning was mandatory given the witness's unsavoury character and the importance of his testimony.

The error could not be saved by the curative proviso, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder of a former drug associate.

On appeal, he raised nine grounds of error, including the trial judge's instructions on the failure to call witnesses, the Crown's cross-examination on the failure to cross-examine Crown witnesses, the use of disclosure to tailor evidence, the right to silence, the admission of his criminal record, the voluntariness of statements, informer privilege, the trial judge's interventions, and the jury charge on alternative verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

While the trial judge erred in attributing an alternative defence of manslaughter to the appellant, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding that the circumstantial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the error occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The Crown appealed an order quashing the accused's committal for trial.

The preliminary inquiry judge had misapprehended the evidence regarding the cause of death.

The reviewing judge found that the pathologist's evidence supported a non-culpable explanation for the death and that other causes were mere speculation.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that the fire was deliberately set, nor any evidence of motive, animus, or an altercation.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge that the circumstantial evidence amounted to no more than speculation and suspicion, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for counselling to commit aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge's reasons were insufficient regarding his intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge implicitly but clearly rejected the appellant's evidence and properly applied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The reasons were deemed sufficient under the Sheppard standard.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after his common-law wife drowned when his truck went into a river.

The Crown alleged he staged the accident to collect life insurance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on his out-of-court statements, reasonable doubt, after-the-fact conduct, and the admission of photographs from an unrelated accident.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge committed reversible error by characterizing the appellant's exculpatory statements as 'excuses' that carried less weight than 'admissions', thereby reversing the burden of proof and denigrating the defence of accident.

The trial judge also erred in his instructions regarding the appellant's failure to contact the police.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault on the basis of inadvertent Crown non-disclosure of evidence suggesting the complainant was a prostitute.

The Court of Appeal found that the undisclosed evidence met the test in Dixon and Taillefer, as there was a reasonable possibility the failure to disclose affected the verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a total sentence of nine years imposed after being found guilty of 26 charges, including possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine, possession of counterfeit money, and firearms offences while subject to a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was fit and not outside the range for the serious offences committed.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his robbery convictions, arguing they were unreasonable because the Crown's case relied entirely on an unrecorded inculpatory statement made to police while in custody.

The appellant contended that any conviction based exclusively on an unrecorded statement should be presumptively unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal rejected this per se rule, holding that while a proper recording assists the trier of fact, its absence does not automatically render a statement inadmissible or a conviction unreasonable.

The court also dismissed arguments regarding the trial judge's failure to give specific jury cautions about the unrecorded statement and hearsay evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued procedural directions for the hearing of a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice concerning the 1959 murder conviction of the appellant.

The Reference is to be heard as if it were an appeal on the issue of fresh evidence.

The directions address the preparation and sealing of the Record, the scope of the Reference, and the potential release of specific paragraphs of the Kaufman Report.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting post-hypnosis identification evidence, failed to properly instruct the jury on eyewitness identification and alibi evidence, and delivered an unbalanced charge that favoured the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the post-hypnosis evidence was properly admitted, the trial judge committed serious errors in his jury instructions regarding the frailties of the identification evidence and the requirements for finding a fabricated alibi.

Furthermore, the jury charge lacked fairness and balance, compromising the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.