David H. Doherty

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the voting rights of owners of parking and storage units.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that under section 49(3), owners of such units are not entitled to vote, subject to the statutory exception.

The appellant appealed an order finding that his mother lacked capacity to grant a power of attorney, as well as a s. 140(1) order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the arguments regarding procedural fairness and capacity, finding the trial judge's conclusions fully warranted by the evidence.

However, the Court set aside the s. 140(1) order because it was not sought on a timely basis, was not argued, and no reasons were given for it.

Leave to appeal costs was dismissed, and costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and no demonstrated prejudice to the appellants' claims flowing from the order.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, specifically challenging an order made under s. 161 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge exercised his discretion judicially and tailored the order to the offender's circumstances.

The Court also corrected administrative errors in the s. 161 and SOIRA orders to reflect the proper durations of ten and twenty years, respectively, as stated in the trial judge's reasons.

The court-appointed receiver of a corporation recommended that the company enter a plea agreement and plead guilty to a charge of mail fraud in the United States.

The motion judge approved the recommendation as being within the bounds of reasonableness.

The appellants appealed, arguing the receiver failed to properly assess the risk of conviction and the benefits of the plea agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the receiver's assessment of the risk of conviction, cost savings, and reduced exposure to civil liability and restitution was reasonable.

The United States sought the appellant's extradition for his alleged involvement in a telemarketing fraud.

At the extradition hearing, the appellant sought to call a co-conspirator as a witness to challenge the reliability of the co-conspirator's sworn statement and grand jury testimony, which were included in the Record of the Case.

The extradition judge refused to allow the witness to be called because the appellant could not demonstrate the potential relevance of the anticipated evidence to the committal determination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an extradition judge may require a party to outline the anticipated evidence and demonstrate its relevance to the limited weighing of evidence permitted under the Extradition Act before allowing a witness to be called.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused had punched the victim, causing him to fall and hit his head, which resulted in fatal injuries.

The accused also kicked the victim shortly after.

The trial judge limited the Crown's cross-examination of the accused on his prior convictions for crimes of violence, and instructed the jury on self-defence and causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary ruling on the criminal record.

Although the trial judge erred in her instructions regarding whether the punch and kick constituted a single transaction, the error did not affect the verdict, as the jury clearly found the punch was in self-defence and the medical evidence did not support the kick as a contributing cause of death.

The respondent employee sued his former corporate employer and its directing mind for breach of an employment contract, claiming a 50 per cent commission on profits from a real estate project completed after his resignation.

The trial judge found both the corporation and the directing mind liable for the full 50 per cent of the profits, including those earned by third-party investors.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the contract entitled the employee to post-termination profits based on an objective interpretation of the agreement.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that the employee was not entitled to profits earned by third-party investors, and dismissed the action against the directing mind personally, finding no basis to pierce the corporate veil.

The appellant was briefly detained by a police officer for investigative purposes after an accomplice attempted to use a stolen gift certificate.

The officer asked exploratory questions before receiving additional information and arresting the appellant, at which point he was advised of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued his section 10(b) Charter rights were violated because he was not informed of his right to counsel immediately upon the initial detention.

The Court of Appeal held that in the context of a brief investigative detention, the phrase 'without delay' allows for a brief exploratory interlude before the right to counsel must be provided.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant's home was fraudulently transferred to an impostor who then mortgaged the property to the respondent.

The respondent registered the mortgage without knowledge of the fraud.

The appellant sought to set aside the mortgage.

The Court of Appeal held that the Land Titles Act operates on the theory of deferred indefeasibility.

Because the respondent acquired its interest directly from the fraudster, it was an intermediate owner and its charge was invalid against the true owner.

The appeal was allowed and the mortgage was set aside.

The appellant husband, an extraordinarily wealthy man, structured his affairs using nominee corporations to hide his assets and avoid paying spousal and child support.

The trial judge pierced the corporate veil, finding the husband was the beneficial owner of the lands held by the corporations, and ordered the lands vested in the respondent wife to satisfy over $11 million in support and other monetary awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the court's broad discretion to grant vesting orders in family law cases where a spouse demonstrates a clear intention to evade support obligations.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding a dangerous driving conviction.

The appellant argued that the summary conviction appeal court judge misapplied the curative proviso after the trial judge allegedly misstated the legal test for dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err or depart from the correct legal test.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge misused information provided in the pre-sentence report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the absence of remorse was a relevant consideration in determining whether a conditional sentence was appropriate.

The sentence imposed was found to be fit.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence to be illegal and varied it to a suspended sentence with two years of probation on the same terms imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant appealed the 10-year length of a prohibition order and sought a variation to permit him to attend proscribed public places in the company of an adult.

The Crown consented to the variation but opposed reducing the length of the order.

The Court of Appeal granted the variation, adding the exception for being accompanied by an adult over 18, but deferred to the sentencing judge's discretion regarding the 10-year duration given the serious nature of the offence.

The sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The respondent was convicted of attempted murder after using his pick-up truck to run down the victim following a consensual fight.

The trial judge sentenced him to three years in the penitentiary.

The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing it was manifestly inadequate given the respondent's concerted effort to kill the victim and the devastating injuries caused.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the three-year sentence wholly inadequate despite mitigating factors such as the lack of planning and the respondent's work record.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was increased to six years.

The appellant appealed the two-year driving prohibition imposed as part of his sentence for dangerous driving.

The appellant had no prior criminal or driving record and operated a self-employed business that required driving.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence on consent showing the prohibition would force the sale of his business.

Finding the two-year prohibition excessive and a particular hardship, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the driving prohibition to one year.

The moving party, the first wife of the respondent husband, sought leave to intervene in an appeal regarding a vesting order made in favour of the husband's second wife.

The trial judge had ordered the husband's beneficial interest in certain corporate properties vested in the second wife to satisfy substantial support arrears.

The moving party, who also held foreign judgments for support arrears against the husband, sought to intervene to protect her interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the intervention was instigated by the husband to frustrate the second wife's recovery, and that allowing it at this late stage would unduly delay and prejudice the second wife's rights.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment and 18 months' probation for two counts of robbery and related offences, including the use of a firearm.

The appeal was heard years after the sentence had been fully served.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was appropriate given the seriousness of the offences, which involved robbing clerks late at night with an imitation firearm and a large knife, balanced against the appellant's youth and rehabilitative prospects.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision granting a young person's application for certiorari and mandamus, which had directed the youth court to order publicly funded legal aid.

The young person, charged with uttering a threat, was refused legal aid and sought a court order for funded counsel at his first appearance while considering extrajudicial sanctions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under section 25(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, a young person is only entitled to apply for publicly funded counsel at specific stages of proceedings, such as a trial or a hearing related to custody, and not at a first appearance.