Catriona Verner

The appellant pleaded guilty to five counts, including sexual assault of a minor and attempting to procure a person to become a prostitute, and was sentenced to five years and two months in prison based on a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued that the agreed statement of facts did not support the convictions and that the sentence was beyond the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's guilty pleas were informed and unequivocal, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range for the offences.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis that she aided or abetted the principal offender in fatally stabbing the deceased.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made three errors in the jury charge: omitting the requirement of the principal's subjective foresight of death, failing to focus the jury on when the principal's intention was formed, and improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these errors amounted to errors of law that could have had a significant impact on the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged child sexual offence convictions and an indeterminate sentence imposed following a dangerous offender designation.

The court held that one conviction had to be set aside because the trial judge misapprehended a child complainant’s videotaped statement on the central issue of who issued the alleged invitation to sexual touching, requiring a new trial on that count.

The remaining convictions were upheld, despite an error in using one complainant’s evidence as corroborative similar fact evidence, because the verdict on those counts would inevitably have been the same.

On sentence, the court found an error in overstating the facts underlying one prior sexual assault conviction, but held that neither that error nor the set-aside predicate conviction created any reasonable possibility of a different result on the dangerous offender issue.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to incest, sexual assault, sexual interference, making and possessing child pornography, and a firearms storage offence arising from prolonged sexual abuse of the offender's child.

The main issue was whether the sentencing judge erred by refusing to view a disc containing child pornography and recordings of the abuse, and whether the resulting six-year global sentence was unfit.

The majority held that a sentencing judge may exclude otherwise relevant evidence where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value and found no reversible error in the refusal to view the disc in the unusual circumstances.

The majority further held that, although lenient, the six-year global sentence was not clearly inadequate and dismissed the Crown appeal; a dissenting judge would have increased the sentence to nine years.

The appellant appealed his sentence finding him to be a dangerous offender and imposing an indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by considering facts from a prior acquittal, applying the pre-July 2008 dangerous offender regime, and misapprehending evidence regarding his potential control through anti-androgen medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the inclusion of the acquittal facts inconsequential, no practical distinction between the legislative regimes for this offender, and that the sentencing judge's findings on the speculative nature of anti-androgen control were supported by the record.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery with a firearm.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay evidence of a witness's prior testimony identifying him from a photo array, and by misdirecting the jury on the use of evidence regarding a black man fleeing the scene.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the hearsay evidence lacked threshold reliability because the witness's professed memory loss prevented meaningful cross-examination.

The court also held the jury instruction on flight was misleading.

The curative proviso could not be applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of offences arising from a jewellery store robbery.

Police obtained a 'tower dump' warrant for cell phone records near the store without reasonable grounds, violating s. 8 of the Charter.

Using this unconstitutionally obtained information, police secured subscriber warrants and residential search warrants.

The trial judge excluded the tower dump records but admitted the subscriber and residential evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, reasoning that the subscriber records could have been lawfully obtained via a telephone records order under s. 492.2(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the evidence and dismissed the appeals.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder following a fatal beating.

On appeal, they argued that the trial judge made errors in his charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a statement allegedly made by one appellant, which was crucial to determining his intent.

For the other appellant, the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on how to apply the concept of reasonable doubt to his exculpatory statements and to eyewitness identification evidence that excluded him as the primary attacker.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing an error in the assessment of the reasonable possibility of eventual control of his risk of reoffending in the community.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis and upheld the conclusion that the risk could not be satisfactorily addressed through Parole Board controls.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal beating death of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement to police, failing to correct Crown closing arguments, and failing to properly instruct the jury on post-offence conduct and mens rea.

He also appealed the 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the sentence due to the severe aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of his nieces and nephew from two separate trials.

In the first trial, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury on the risk of innocent collusion between the young complainants and the specific frailties of their evidence.

The Court also found the Crown's closing address was highly inflammatory and improperly suggested the absence of a proven motive to fabricate meant the complainants were telling the truth.

In the second trial, the trial judge erred by applying issue estoppel to prevent the appellant from challenging the nieces' similar fact evidence based on the first jury's verdict.

Both appeals were allowed and new trials ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault involving two child complainants, as well as a subsequent conviction involving a third child complainant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and ordered new trials.

In the first trial, the court found the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury about the opportunity for innocent collusion between the complainants and the specific frailties of their evidence.

Furthermore, the Crown's inflammatory closing address deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

In the second trial, the judge erred in law by holding she was bound by the jury's verdict in the prior case when assessing similar fact evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of a police officer.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding expert psychiatric evidence and that the Crown engaged in illegal jury vetting by seeking police officers' opinions on potential jurors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions correctly explained how to weigh expert opinions based on hearsay without shifting the burden of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not give the Crown an unfair advantage or create an appearance of bias, as the police opinions were not drawn from databases and the Crown had no obligation to disclose them.

The appellants appealed convictions for two counts of first degree murder and two counts of conspiracy to commit murder arising from planned execution-style killings.

They argued that undisclosed police criminal-record checks on prospective jurors created an unfair jury selection process and that the trial judge's final charge contained multiple reversible errors, including inadequate Vetrovec cautions and erroneous instructions on duress, conspiracy, included offences, bad character, and written jury materials.

The court held that any positive criminal-record information should have been disclosed, but the appellants failed to show a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the verdict or the overall fairness of the trial, particularly given trial counsel's awareness and inaction.

Although aspects of the charge were imperfect, the instructions were adequate when read as a whole and the prosecution case was overwhelming.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for child pornography offences committed in 2004, 2005, and 2008.

The trial judge rejected the Crown's submission for a two-year sentence with probation, finding probation inappropriate and imposing a longer sentence due to the appellant's relentless determination to commit offences while on strict bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the total sentence was not unreasonable given the numerous aggravating circumstances and upholding the section 161 order.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on and misapprehending Correctional Services of Canada reports, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly considered the institutional history and did not treat the reports as expert opinions.

The court declined to admit the fresh evidence under the Palmer test, noting the appellant continued to pose a serious risk to public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a forged credit card and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000.

He was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment, one year of probation, and a $4,100 restitution order.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by not crediting his strict bail conditions and in considering parity with a co-accused.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record, but varied the restitution order to $2,100 as the evidence of loss was unclear and the appellant had volunteered to pay that amount.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and drug offences.

On the dangerous driving conviction, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding a police officer's misconduct record but found it would not have affected the trial judge's credibility assessment.

On the drug convictions, the court declined to enter acquittals, finding there was some evidence of continuity, and upheld the summary conviction appeal court's order for a new trial.

The appellant pleaded guilty to threatening death, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance arising from a dysfunctional domestic relationship.

He was originally sentenced to four years in custody.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentence manifestly unfit given the unusual circumstances, noting the appellant had attempted to extricate himself from the relationship but the victim repeatedly followed him.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to time served, equivalent to 35 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge rejected his evidence simply because she believed the complainant, and that the reasons were insufficient under the Sheppard test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not expressly articulate the basis for rejecting the appellant's evidence, a fair reading of the reasons as a whole showed she considered all the evidence, including the complainant's emotional state and the 911 call, which supported the complainant's version of events.