Catriona Verner

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly address the Long-Term Offender (LTO) question.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the medical experts were not examined on the LTO issue and the trial judge did not effectively decide the question.

The court concluded that a new hearing was necessary.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson-related offences and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, noting the appellant conceded causing fire damage to four properties and was inevitably reckless as to whether the residential properties were inhabited.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding ample evidence to support the dangerous offender designation given the intractability of the appellant's pyromania and his lack of motivation for treatment.

The accused, a black man, was charged with robbing an East Indian man.

At trial, the judge permitted the defence to challenge potential jurors for cause based on potential bias against a black accused, but refused to extend the challenge to include the race of the complainant.

The accused was convicted and appealed, arguing he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion.

The Court declined to take judicial notice of a general theory of race-based 'natural sympathy' between jurors and complainants of the same race.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon following an unprovoked attack on two intoxicated victims outside a bar.

He appealed his convictions and six-year sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his alibi evidence, failed to assess the reliability of identification evidence, misapplied the burden of proof, and improperly admitted reply evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, correctly assessed both the credibility and reliability of the witnesses, and imposed a fit sentence given the serious, premeditated nature of the assaults.

The Crown appealed the nine-month sentences imposed on the respondents, who pled guilty to forcible confinement, assault with a weapon, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to their two adopted sons.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the respondents' prolonged breaches of trust as an aggravating factor and that the sentences were demonstrably unfit given the horrific and prolonged cycle of abuse.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentences were increased to five years for the mother and four years for the father.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after the victim was found sexually assaulted and beaten to death.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that a first degree murder conviction under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code requires the sexual assault to precede the murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the 'single transaction' principle from Paré, holding that the exact sequence of the murder and sexual assault is immaterial provided they form a continuous sequence of events involving illegal domination.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's instructions on the appellant's statements, after-the-fact conduct, and identification evidence.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences involving five complainants and designated a long-term offender.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting bad character evidence without a limiting instruction against propensity reasoning and by allowing inadmissible reply evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the admission of highly prejudicial evidence regarding the appellant's character, combined with the Crown's closing address and the trial judge's failure to caution the jury, rendered the trial unfair.

The curative proviso could not apply.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions and long-term offender designation were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of a frail, vulnerable friend and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by denying two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody based on the appellant's change of counsel, and by holding that provocation could not mitigate the sentence.

The Court held the appropriate range was 8 to 12 years due to numerous aggravating factors.

Factoring in proper pre-trial custody credit and provocation, the sentence was reduced to 9 years' imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting his wife 13 times and was sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, he argued that the trial was rendered unfair because the Crown retained and obtained notes from a psychiatrist initially consulted by the defence, breaching privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that privilege was likely waived and no prejudice resulted since the Crown did not lead the evidence.

The Court also dismissed arguments regarding jury instructions on automatism, section 16, and reasonable doubt.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and parole ineligibility was reduced to 13 years because the trial judge improperly relied on unproven hearsay evidence of a prior attempted murder as an aggravating factor.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an escape plot and relying on it for psychiatric assessments.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of his progress in prison to be designated a long-term offender instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the escape plot evidence was admissible and relevant to the experts' risk assessments.

Furthermore, the fresh evidence did not establish a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, precluding a long-term offender designation.