Alison Harvison Young

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency against his sister and appealed the conviction.

The appeal raised five issues, all concerning the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability of the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's conclusions.

The court reiterated the high deference owed to trial judges' credibility findings and affirmed that the judge correctly applied principles regarding witness demeanor and the theory of recent fabrication.

Optiva Inc. appealed a Superior Court decision that refused to set aside an arbitration award and denied leave to appeal.

The arbitration award found Optiva breached a contract with Tbaytel and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeal addressed whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to proceed by summary judgment, whether Optiva's challenge to this ruling was time-barred under s. 17(8) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and whether the arbitrator based his interpretation of a limitation of liability clause on a legal theory not advanced by the parties.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding the arbitrator had broad procedural powers, the s. 17(8) time limit did not apply to procedural rulings, and no new legal theory was introduced.

This appeal arose from a family dispute where the appellant, Kakouli Poka, sought to overturn a trial judgment that rejected her counterclaim for unjust enrichment based on a joint family venture and granted the respondents (Tsitsos family) a monetary remedy and accounting of property.

The appellant claimed a one-third partnership in a family pizza business and contributions of $150,000, as well as significant care for the respondents' son.

The trial judge found no joint family venture, disbelieved the appellant's financial contribution and work claims, and found the care for the son insufficient to establish a venture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's evidentiary rulings regarding a struck affidavit and admitted bank statements, and her application of the law of ouster and occupation rent.

A motion to admit fresh evidence on appeal was also denied, as it failed to meet the criteria for admission.

The municipality appealed a judgment finding it liable for negligence in granting a building permit and conducting inspections of the Breens' cottage, which resulted in significant structural and code deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on duty of care and causation, affirming that the municipality owed a duty to inspect even without a builder's request and was liable for major deficiencies (crawl space, roof ventilation, structural issues) due to its unreasonable conduct.

However, the Court found the trial judge applied an excessively strict standard of care regarding minor deficiencies (stair headroom, insulation gaps), reducing the damages awarded.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment concerning the interpretation of a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) and related employment agreements.

The dispute arose after the appellants (purchasers of a business) furloughed one of the respondents (sellers/employees) due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which the respondents asserted was a constructive dismissal.

The SPA included an "Accelerated Provision" for a capital payment if an employee was terminated without cause, and an "Unprofitable Quarter Provision" allowing termination for cause without penalty.

The motion judge found constructive dismissal without cause, triggering the Accelerated Provision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's interpretation that the appellants had not exercised their option to terminate for cause under the Unprofitable Quarter Provision, and that their actions constituted a termination without cause, thereby triggering the payment.

The court emphasized deference to the motion judge's contractual interpretation and rejected arguments of commercial absurdity.

This appeal concerned a motion judge's refusal to set aside a default judgment against the appellant, Amandeep Kaur, because she was six days late in paying a costs order, which was a condition for setting aside the judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretion.

The court also dismissed a fresh evidence motion brought by the appellant, concluding it would not have affected the outcome.

The motion judge's decision to not vary the order at the settlement appointment was upheld, as such appointments are for correcting technical errors or avoiding a miscarriage of justice, neither of which was found to be present.

The appellant, Alain Joseph Boily, appealed a driving prohibition imposed following his guilty plea to criminal negligence causing death.

The central issue was whether the sentencing judge had jurisdiction to impose a driving prohibition under the amended s. 320.24(4) of the Criminal Code, which no longer explicitly lists criminal negligence causing death as an offence attracting such a prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that despite the apparent legislative oversight and the resulting absurdity (where a less serious offence would attract a prohibition but a more serious one would not), the plain language of the statute did not grant the power to impose the prohibition.

The court emphasized that correcting such a legislative gap falls to Parliament, not the judiciary.

The appeal was allowed, and the driving prohibition was set aside.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her oppression application and the granting of summary judgment to enforce a condominium lien.

The appeal concerned whether a special assessment for repairs was remedial work under s. 97(1) of the Condominium Act, thereby not requiring a member vote, and whether the condominium's conduct constituted oppression.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's determination that the work was remedial, upheld the oppression analysis, and affirmed the summary judgment, concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellants sought to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to remove a litigation guardian.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction as the order was interlocutory, not final, and quashed the appeal.

The panel then reconstituted as the Divisional Court and denied leave to appeal, finding no confusion in the relevant rule (r. 7.06(2)) and no general importance warranting leave.

This is an appeal from a judgment granting partial summary judgment and dismissing a counterclaim.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in hearing the partial summary judgment motion, in granting the judgment, in awarding duplicative compensation, and in appreciating fraudulent concealment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding errors in the motion judge's decision to hear the partial summary judgment, her findings of fact, or her awards of punitive damages and full indemnity costs, which were distinct from the denial of a success fee.

The claim regarding fraudulent concealment was also dismissed for lack of specificity.

The appellant sought to set aside or vary an order of a motion judge that dismissed his request for a stay pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no basis to interfere.

The court confirmed that the appellant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favored a stay, applying the established test from RJR-MacDonald Inc. and Livent Inc. The court also dismissed the appellant's argument regarding a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction and three-year sentence, raising grounds including unreasonable verdict, error in applying *R. v. W.(D.)*, and disproportionate sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the *W.(D.)* ground, finding the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether the complainant's rejected evidence (denying a second sexual incident) could raise a reasonable doubt regarding consent for the second incident.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed an order from a motion judge striking his pleadings related to financial matters due to his failure to pay spousal and child support, section 7 expenses, and non-compliance with multiple financial disclosure orders.

The appellant did not appear at the original motion and failed to identify any error by the motion judge on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that striking pleadings was appropriate given the serious and long-standing nature of the appellant's breaches, emphasizing the essential role of financial disclosure in matrimonial proceedings.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to dismiss his action for delay and refuse to restore it to the trial list.

The action, arising from a 2014 motor vehicle accident, was struck from the trial list in 2019 due to a lack of an expert report.

Over a year later, the respondents moved to dismiss for delay.

The appellant provided an expert report and moved to restore the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision, finding that the appellant failed to explain the inordinate delay or demonstrate that the respondents would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The appellant tenant, Hudson's Bay Company (HBC), appealed a motion judge's decision regarding relief from forfeiture under s. 20 of the Commercial Tenancies Act, seeking rent abatement due to COVID-19 impacts.

The respondent landlords (Oxford and affiliates) cross-appealed the deferral of rent payments and reduction of interest rates.

The Court of Appeal dismissed HBC's appeal, affirming that s. 20 does not permit rent abatement or reduction as it would rewrite the lease.

The court allowed the landlords' cross-appeal, finding that deferrals should only be granted to allow the tenant to comply, not to mitigate economic harm, and that the interest rate should not have been varied from the lease terms.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside a default judgment against them for unpaid freight services and breach of statutory trust.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal was convened to reconsider its prior decision in Umlauf v. Umlauf regarding deemed admissions on default.

The Court overruled Umlauf, holding that while facts pleaded in a statement of claim are deemed admitted when a defendant is noted in default, conclusions of law and mixed fact and law are not.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge made no error in refusing to set aside the default judgment because the appellants failed to file an adequate record and the evidence supported the findings of a 2% monthly interest agreement and the director's personal liability for knowing assistance in the corporation's breach of statutory trust.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for sexual assault and choking.

He argued the sentencing judge committed a 'Boutilier error' by failing to consider his treatment prospects and intractability at the designation stage, and misapprehended psychiatric evidence regarding his antisocial personality disorder diagnosis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the judge erred by not considering intractability at the designation stage, there was no reasonable possibility of a different outcome given the judge's findings at the penalty stage that the appellant posed a grave, intractable threat with no reasonable treatment prospects.

The court also found no misapprehension of the psychiatric evidence.

The parties separated in 2019.

After two years of the appellant failing to provide financial disclosure despite multiple court orders, his pleadings were struck and the matter proceeded to an uncontested trial.

The trial judge imputed an annual income of $150,000 to the appellant for child support and ordered the matrimonial home transferred to the respondent to satisfy the equalization payment.

The appellant appealed, arguing the process was unfair and the reasons inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the uncontested trial was a proper consequence of the appellant's blatant non-disclosure and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The appellant, Kester Ellis, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether cell phone location tracking data, obtained under a facially invalid warrant (a s. 8 Charter breach), should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and whether the Crown's opening statement contained inadmissible and prejudicial investigative hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the unintentional nature of the warrant error, minimal privacy impact, and societal interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court also found the Crown's opening statement to be permissible narrative evidence, not improper hearsay.

The employee was constructively dismissed from her position as Chief Operating Officer after requesting a salary increase.

The employer alleged cause but later withdrew the defence, though it continued to assert performance issues throughout the litigation.

The motion judge awarded 12 months' notice, $50,000 in aggravated damages for bad faith in the manner of dismissal, and $25,000 in punitive damages for reprehensible litigation conduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the notice period and the aggravated and punitive damages awards, but reduced the damages in lieu of notice to six months' compensation because the employee had unreasonably rejected a comparable job offer seven months post-termination.