Alexander M. Ostroff

The appellants, G.F. and R.B., appealed their sentences for sexual assault after their convictions were restored by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The trial judge had sentenced G.F. to three and a half years and R.B. to three years.

The appellants raised several grounds of appeal, including the trial judge's personal objections to the conduct, penalizing them for maintaining innocence, an alleged error in finding a breach of trust, inadequate distinction in culpability, and failure to consider collateral consequences (immigration for G.F. and mental health for R.B.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed all complaints, finding no errors in principle that impacted the sentences.

The court affirmed the finding of a breach of trust and reiterated that collateral immigration consequences cannot justify artificial sentences.

The sentences were deemed proportionate and not "demonstrably unfit."

The appellant, Ahmed Abdullahi, appealed his convictions for gun-related and criminal organization offences, and his 12-year sentence, stemming from a police investigation ("Project Traveller").

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of Somali-language translator's opinion evidence or in the jury charge regarding the criminal organization definition and flight as after-the-fact conduct.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the global sentence from 12 years to 10 years.

This reduction was due to the trial judge's error in considering the appellant's racial minority status as an aggravating factor, which the Court of Appeal deemed an improper basis for sentencing.

Justice Paciocco dissented in part on the conviction appeal, arguing that the jury charge on the definition of a criminal organization was inadequate for failing to properly instruct on the elements of structure and continuity.

The appellant, N.K., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, criminal harassment, and uttering threats, and his global sentence of five years and 11 months incarceration.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) principle, assessment of credibility, and calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of the W.(D.) principle.

However, the appeal from sentence was allowed in part; the pre-sentence custody credit was varied from five months to six months and one day, and the victim fine surcharge of $800 was set aside.

The appellant, convicted of participating in a criminal organization, conspiracy to transfer firearms, possession of property obtained by crime, and unauthorized firearm possession, sought bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the appellant's release would pose substantial public safety concerns due to his leadership in gun trafficking and stated intent to commit further offences.

The court also determined that releasing a convicted gun trafficker and head of a criminal organization would significantly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, emphasizing the strong enforceability interest given the seriousness of the offences.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, challenging the trial judge's decisions regarding expert evidence on the cause of death.

The primary expert opinion suggested drowning based on diatom analysis, but an alternate theory of starvation was also presented.

The appellant argued that the alternate theory lacked sufficient evidentiary basis and caused confusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion on an alternate cause was properly admitted given the scientific controversy surrounding diatom analysis and other evidence supporting starvation.

The court affirmed that the jury, as the trier of fact, could consider all evidence and was not bound by expert opinions, especially when alternative explanations had an "air of reality."

The appellant appealed a 20-year sentence of imprisonment imposed in 2014 for historical sexual offences committed in 1981 and 1993.

The appellant pleaded guilty to rape, sexual assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, robbery, and uttering death threats.

The sentencing judge imposed consecutive sentences emphasizing the need to separate the offender from society based on his high risk assessment and violent criminal record.

The appellant challenged the sentence on multiple grounds, including claims regarding the weight given to mitigating factors and the impact of pre- and post-sentence solitary confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence entirely fit given the circumstances of the offences, the offender's criminal history, and the sentencing objectives of denunciation and public protection.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder in the fatal shooting of a victim inside a bar.

The critical evidence was security camera footage showing two men in a stairwell moments before the shooting.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was one of the men and was holding a gun.

The trial judge opined in his jury charge that the dark object appeared to be a gun, despite the Crown's earlier concession that the object was not clearly identifiable as a gun.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's opinion compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial by improperly intervening on a critical factual issue and emboldening the Crown to withdraw its concession.

The court also addressed issues regarding identification evidence and improper Crown speculation about a disabled security monitor.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his roommate.

The trial judge refused to leave the partial defence of provocation with the jury, finding no air of reality to the defence because the accused had initiated a confrontation while armed, anticipating that the victim could react violently.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no absolute rule precluding the provocation defence merely because an accused initiates a confrontation while armed.

The court found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the contextual analysis required under the provocation defence framework and that the defence had an air of reality and should have been left with the jury.

The appellant appealed his convictions for internet luring, sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching of a 15-year-old complainant, as well as his global sentence of five and one-half years.

This was the second trial on these charges; the first trial resulted in acquittal on charges involving the same complainant, but a Crown appeal led to a new trial.

The appellant admitted to sexual activity with the complainant but claimed he honestly believed her to be between 16 and 18 years old, despite meeting her on an 18+ chat site where her profile listed her age as 18.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, upholding both the convictions and the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting and killing Arash Bakhtaryani at a banquet hall in Vaughan.

The appellant admitted to the shooting but claimed lawful self-defence.

The jury rejected the self-defence claim and convicted him of second-degree murder.

The trial judge imposed a life sentence with a 16-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the appellant raised five grounds of appeal regarding the admission of hearsay evidence, confirmatory evidence instructions, cross-examination tactics, self-defence instructions, and jury instructions regarding videotape playback.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple charges of sexual assault, non-sexual assault, and threatening with sexual violence.

The appellant and complainant had been in a relationship from 2002 to 2009.

The complainant alleged multiple incidents of sexual assault involving demands for anal intercourse and vaginal fisting, which the appellant claimed were consensual.

After a six-day jury trial, the appellant was found not guilty on one sexual assault charge but guilty on all other charges and sentenced to 4.5 years in custody.

The appeal raised issues of trial fairness regarding Crown counsel's improper cross-examination about the complainant's attractiveness and the appellant's sex drive, Crown counsel's closing address, and the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the shooting death of Troy Hutchinson.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was the actual shooter, but the jury was also instructed on liability as an aider or abettor.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea required for aiding or abetting murder.

Specifically, the jury was not properly instructed that an aider or abettor must know that the principal actor has subjective foresight of death.

The error was repeated multiple times throughout the charge and was compounded by an incorrect definition of recklessness and an inadequate answer to the jury's final question.

The curative proviso was not applied because the jury's final question demonstrated that at least one juror had a reasonable doubt about the appellant being the principal actor, making it impossible to conclude that conviction was inevitable.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault entered by a trial judge sitting without a jury.

The trial judge found that the complainant, by virtue of her intoxication, lacked the capacity to consent to the sexual activity in issue.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable and based on misapprehensions of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown proved the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the complainant's lack of capacity to consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

Three appellants were convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and committing those offences for the benefit of a criminal organization arising from a drive-by shooting in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from two gang members who testified the appellants confessed to the shooting.

The appellants challenged numerous aspects of the trial including jury selection procedures, joinder of counts, admission of bad character evidence, ballistics evidence, jury instructions on Vetrovec witnesses, and alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of Atkins and Riley but allowed Wisdom's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an attempted theft four months after the shooting, which had minimal probative value but significant prejudicial effect.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The appellant was arrested during a traffic stop on Highway 401 when police discovered cocaine and marijuana in the vehicle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony that the drugs belonged to another passenger and convicted him based on circumstantial evidence and credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, misapprehension of evidence, or the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellant was convicted by jury of robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and masking his face, and was sentenced to a global sentence of twelve years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, seeking leave to appeal and relying on fresh evidence regarding his personal history, including his status as a Crown ward and his victimization by physical and sexual abuse while in state care.

The Crown conceded that the sentencing judge committed an error in principle by failing to obtain or consider information about the appellant's personal circumstances.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to ten years' imprisonment, finding that the sentencing judge's error impacted the fitness of the sentence and that the appellant's personal circumstances were relevant to assessing his moral blameworthiness.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon (a lamp) entered by Justice Jane E. Kelly on May 15, 2012.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, and insufficiency of reasons/unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, no reversal of the burden of proof, and that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the evidentiary concerns and met the functional requirements for appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.