Alexander M. Ostroff

The appellant was convicted by a jury of participation in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of weapons trafficking, contrary to s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code, following an investigation into illegal firearms trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in law in his jury instructions on the definition of 'criminal organization' by failing to explain that such an organization must have structure and continuity, as required by R. v. Venneri.

The Supreme Court of Canada (majority) held that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that a criminal organization must pose an enhanced threat to society by virtue of its structure and continuity constituted an error of law, as the bare statutory definition is insufficient without this gloss from Venneri.

The majority further clarified the functional approach to appellate review of jury instructions, explaining that a properly equipped jury is one that is both accurately and sufficiently instructed, and that trial circumstances — including evidence, counsel's arguments, and the absence of objection — cannot substitute for a mandatory accurate and sufficient instruction on the law.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction on the criminal organization count set aside, and a new trial ordered on that count.

The appellant, Mohinder Saini, appealed his conviction for four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, as well as his six-year sentence.

The collision involved 17 vehicles, resulting in four fatalities and nine serious injuries.

At trial, the appellant claimed momentary inattention due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and "microsleep" but the trial judge rejected this, finding his conduct a marked departure from the standard of care.

On appeal, Saini argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to defence evidence, the sentence was unfit, and his s. 14 Charter right to an interpreter was breached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, the sentence was within the appropriate range, and while some interpretation errors occurred during the reading of sentencing reasons, they were not material to the trial's fairness or the appellant's ability to participate, ordering a certified translation of the reasons as a remedy.

The appellant, Ian Reid, appealed his convictions for multiple firearm-related offences, alleging Charter ss. 7 and 9 violations and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the detention was not arbitrary, the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on confidential informant information, and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding the burden of proof on the Charter application and the trial judge's assessment of police credibility.

The applicant, Fitzroy Allen, sought bail pending appeal of his convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to possess cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, for which he received a 7-year concurrent sentence.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender, his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court balanced the enforceability of the judgment against the reviewability of the conviction, concluding that the seriousness of the crime and the weakness of the appeal grounds outweighed the reviewability interest, and a reasonable member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if bail were granted.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation, appealed his conviction.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of credibility, particularly regarding the absence of motive to fabricate.

The court found that the trial judge erred by treating the absence of evidence of motive to fabricate as a proven lack of motive, which improperly enhanced the complainants' credibility, especially since the defence did not raise the issue.

This was deemed a significant and fatal error, leading to the quashing of convictions and ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL and driving while prohibited.

At trial, the sole issue was identity.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness reliability, misapprehended evidence regarding a gap in police observation, and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the eyewitness identification was contemporaneous and corroborated by circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge made no errors in apprehending the evidence or applying the burden of proof.

The appellant, a personal support worker, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a resident with Down Syndrome.

The Crown's case at trial relied heavily on hearsay statements made by the complainant to her sister and a police officer, which the trial judge admitted under the principled exception and as res gestae spontaneous statements.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his hearsay analysis by failing to properly articulate reliability as a hearsay danger, misconstruing corroborative evidence, and failing to consider alternative explanations.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 20 years for second-degree murder, which the trial judge ordered to be served consecutively to a previous parole ineligibility period for first-degree murder pursuant to s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Bissonnette, which struck down s. 745.51 as unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the Crown conceded the order could not stand.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal to the limited extent of quashing the consecutive order, making the parole ineligibility periods run concurrently.

The appellant, J.A., appealed convictions for second-degree murder of his daughter and attempted murder of his son.

The charges stemmed from an incident where he administered adult medication (Sleep MD, Nytol) and alcohol to his young children (ages 6 and 7), resulting in his daughter's death and his son's survival, as part of a failed murder-suicide attempt.

The appeal raised five grounds, primarily challenging the trial judge's "common-sense inference" instructions regarding intent, the failure to relate evidence to essential issues, and other jury charge errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the common-sense inference instruction proper as death and serious bodily harm were predictable consequences of the appellant's actions, and the toxicology evidence did not dispel this inference.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions on evidence relevance to intent.

The appellant, Adonay Zekarias, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and committing an indignity to a dead body.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence to establish motive, the reliance on inferences for motive, and the use of after-the-fact conduct to prove intent.

The appellant also raised Charter breaches but conceded them given the outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning on motive or intent, and adjourned the sentence appeal.

The appellant, B.G., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The main issue was whether Crown counsel invited the jury to rely on impermissible racial or cultural stereotyping during cross-examination of defence witnesses and in closing arguments.

The court found that the Crown's questioning and address created a risk of the jury applying negative stereotypes about Indian culture, particularly regarding women's agency and truthfulness, which was not supported by evidence.

The absence of a specific cautionary instruction from the trial judge resulted in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Shane Wood appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arson, and offering an indignity to a body.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's failure to admit defence evidence (hearsay statements of Kim Rolph-Smith), improper jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct, and inadequate handling of juror misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the hearsay evidence due to lack of reliability, no fatal omissions in the jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct, and that a juror inquiry was not warranted given the nature of the juror's note and the trial judge's corrective instruction.

The appellants, G.F. and R.B., appealed their sentences for sexual assault after their convictions were restored by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The trial judge had sentenced G.F. to three and a half years and R.B. to three years.

The appellants raised several grounds of appeal, including the trial judge's personal objections to the conduct, penalizing them for maintaining innocence, an alleged error in finding a breach of trust, inadequate distinction in culpability, and failure to consider collateral consequences (immigration for G.F. and mental health for R.B.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed all complaints, finding no errors in principle that impacted the sentences.

The court affirmed the finding of a breach of trust and reiterated that collateral immigration consequences cannot justify artificial sentences.

The sentences were deemed proportionate and not "demonstrably unfit."

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the deceased, a drug dealer, was found beaten and strangled in his apartment.

The appellant was the last person seen with the deceased and had the deceased's blood on his jacket.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a modified W.(D.) instruction regarding exculpatory footwear impression evidence, failing to correct the Crown's closing address, admitting references to dreams and flashbacks from police interviews, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions or the admission of evidence, and concluding that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the guilty verdict.

The appellant, an inmate serving a life sentence, was convicted of assaulting two jail guards.

At trial, he represented himself and brought a Charter application alleging severe mistreatment by correctional officers following the assault, including being left in handcuffs for hours, denied food and washroom access, and having his property destroyed.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, concluding he had no jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings for state misconduct that occurred after the events giving rise to the charges.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found this was an error of law, as courts have the authority to order a stay for post-offence state misconduct.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to retain new counsel after he discharged his trial lawyer mid-trial, and that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to refuse a lengthy adjournment, as the discharge was an attempt to derail the trial, and the appointment of amicus curiae ensured trial fairness.

The Court also held that while some of the Crown's conduct was improper, the trial judge's corrective instructions neutralized any prejudice.

The appellant, Ahmed Abdullahi, appealed his convictions for gun-related and criminal organization offences, and his 12-year sentence, stemming from a police investigation ("Project Traveller").

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of Somali-language translator's opinion evidence or in the jury charge regarding the criminal organization definition and flight as after-the-fact conduct.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the global sentence from 12 years to 10 years.

This reduction was due to the trial judge's error in considering the appellant's racial minority status as an aggravating factor, which the Court of Appeal deemed an improper basis for sentencing.

Justice Paciocco dissented in part on the conviction appeal, arguing that the jury charge on the definition of a criminal organization was inadequate for failing to properly instruct on the elements of structure and continuity.

The appellant, N.K., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, criminal harassment, and uttering threats, and his global sentence of five years and 11 months incarceration.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) principle, assessment of credibility, and calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of the W.(D.) principle.

However, the appeal from sentence was allowed in part; the pre-sentence custody credit was varied from five months to six months and one day, and the victim fine surcharge of $800 was set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and assault against his former girlfriend's children, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the child complainant and improperly took judicial notice of child behaviour in sexual abuse cases.

He also argued his severe physical disabilities from a stroke reduced his risk of reoffending, warranting a determinate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's risk could not be managed in the community despite his physical impairments.

The appellant, convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the application on the public interest criterion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the grounds of appeal were weak and did not clearly surpass the not frivolous criterion.

Balancing the weak grounds, serious convictions, and lengthy sentence against the lack of flight risk and public safety concerns, the court concluded that the enforceability interest outweighed the reviewability interest, making detention necessary in the public interest.