Wendy M. Matheson

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his discrimination application against the opposing party's insurer and legal counsel in a personal injury action.

The Tribunal dismissed the application on the basis that the relationship between opposing parties in litigation does not fall within the social areas protected by the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision as reasonable, finding no jurisdiction under the Code and rejecting the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness and Charter violations.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,000.

The appellant short-term rental business appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent damages for reasonable notice after finding he was a dependent contractor.

The appellant argued the Deputy Judge erred in applying the dependent contractor test and in relying on invoices rather than tax forms to establish economic exclusivity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness as the documents were produced in advance, and no palpable and overriding error in the Deputy Judge's conclusion that the respondent's work was near-exclusive.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dated September 29, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the agreed amount of $4,000.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal two decisions of the lower court and for an extension of time to bring the motion for leave to appeal one of those decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion and ordered no costs.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dated September 10, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and related relief.

No costs were ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of two Toronto Licensing Tribunal decisions that first suspended and later revoked his vehicle-for-hire licence due to uncivil behaviour toward municipal staff.

The applicant argued the tribunal ignored evidence of provocation and breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the tribunal reasonably weighed the evidence, considered the context, and appropriately prioritized the public interest after the applicant continued his behaviour despite completing anger management counselling.

The appellant was injured when the public transit bus she was riding stopped abruptly, throwing her forward.

She sought statutory accident benefits, which were denied by the Licence Appeal Tribunal under s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act because the bus did not collide with another vehicle or object.

On appeal, the appellant argued she constituted 'any other object' under the statute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the plain wording and context of the provision require the object to be outside the vehicle, and a bus does not collide with a person inside it.

The applicant, a medical resident, sought judicial review of a Postgraduate Tribunal decision that dismissed her appeal of an Academic Review Board order requiring her to withdraw from the program.

She alleged procedural unfairness based on a reasonable apprehension of bias regarding one panel member and inadequate disclosure of redacted patient records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, agreeing with the Tribunal that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias and that sufficient disclosure had been provided.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that found she had not sustained a catastrophic impairment following a motor vehicle collision.

The applicant argued the Tribunal unreasonably rejected expert evidence that her accident-related sleep impairments resulted in a 9% whole person impairment rating.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal reasonably concluded there was a lack of causal evidence linking the sleep impairment to the accident and that the Tribunal's reasons were justified, transparent, and intelligible.

The applicant insurer appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal reconsideration decision finding that the respondent, a 19-year-old student athlete who was rendered tetraplegic in a motor vehicle accident, was principally dependent on his sister for care and therefore an insured person under her automobile insurance policy.

The Divisional Court found that the adjudicator identified the correct legal principles regarding dependency and reasonably applied them to the evidence, which showed the respondent relied on his sister for physical and emotional support despite living away for school.

The appeal and judicial review were dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and fixed costs at $5,000 all inclusive.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of Associate Justice Eckler dated September 26, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered no costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her discrimination application against her employer, union, and others.

The HRTO had dismissed the application against the employer due to delay, finding no good faith reason to extend the one-year time limit under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, and dismissed the claims against the other respondents for lack of factual basis or jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court found no procedural unfairness in the HRTO proceedings and held that the HRTO's decisions were reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant, an environmental advocacy group, appealed decisions of the Ontario Energy Board granting leave to construct four natural gas projects.

The appellant argued that the Board erred in law and breached procedural fairness by denying its requests to file proposed survey and expert evidence and to convene a technical conference.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test by balancing the probative value of the evidence against regulatory efficiency.

Applying the Baker factors, the Court held that the appellant, as an intervenor, was owed a duty of fairness at the lower end of the spectrum, and the Board's procedural choices did not amount to a denial of natural justice.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her discrimination application as an abuse of process for failing to produce medical records.

In a prior case management direction, a Vice-Chair had ruled that the requirement to produce medical records was moot because the applicant was only pursuing general damages.

The adjudicator subsequently dismissed the application for non-production without addressing the mootness ruling or providing the applicant an opportunity to make submissions on altering it.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the adjudicator breached procedural fairness by implicitly overturning the prior ruling without notice or process.

The HRTO decisions were quashed and the matter remitted to a different adjudicator.

The appellant appealed a discipline decision of the College of Nurses of Ontario, which arose from an agreed statement of fact, plea, and joint submission on penalty.

The appellant brought a motion to admit fresh evidence, alleging that a panel member was asleep during the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the proposed evidence was not sufficiently cogent and partly inadmissible hearsay.

As there were no other grounds for the appeal, the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment decision dismissing their oppression claim against the respondent in his personal capacity.

The motion judge had found that the appellants did not qualify as 'complainants' under section 245 of the Business Corporations Act, as they were not creditors and their status as potential creditors did not make them proper persons to bring an oppression claim.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law.

The court confirmed that the motion judge properly applied the test for complainant status and the framework for partial summary judgment.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of an administrative penalty order issued to his father, the registered owner of a vehicle caught speeding by an automated camera.

The applicant was the driver and acted as his father's agent before the tribunal.

The Divisional Court held that under section 21.1(9) of the Highway Traffic Act, the driver does not have standing to seek judicial review.

The court adjourned the hearing and ordered the title of proceedings amended to substitute the father as the proper applicant.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating his tenancy and ordering his eviction.

The landlord sought termination on the grounds that the tenant committed an illegal act and seriously impaired the safety of others by pointing a replica gun at a landlord representative and another tenant.

At the LTB hearing, the tenant admitted the facts and testified that he pled guilty to a lesser criminal offence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the LTB's conclusions that the tenant's conduct constituted an illegal act and seriously impaired the safety of others.

The stay of eviction was lifted.

The applicant, a Black trans-male, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his discrimination claims against a walk-in clinic.

The applicant alleged he was misgendered and denied treatment based on his gender identity and race.

The Divisional Court found the HRTO's dismissal of the race discrimination claim was reasonable, as it rested on unassailable credibility findings.

However, the court held the HRTO's analysis of the misgendering allegations was fundamentally flawed because it improperly focused on whether the clinic staff intended to discriminate, contrary to established jurisprudence that intent is not required for prima facie discrimination.

The misgendering issue was remitted for a new hearing.