Susan E. Lang

The appellant sued a national credit agency, alleging it published inaccurate credit information regarding her default on a debt owed to a bank.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the report of default was correct as the debt arose under a personal guarantee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no genuine issue for trial.

The moving party (appellant) sought a stay of the judgment pending appeal.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that there were serious issues to be determined regarding the scope of a non-registration clause in an agreement of purchase and sale and its relation to a purchaser's lien.

The court also found that the moving party would suffer irreparable harm without a stay, as the responding party no longer had the $4.3 million deposit and intended to sell the property.

The balance of convenience favoured the moving party.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide the issue because a new trial was ordered in a companion appeal.

The court noted the appellant could seek a new Rowbotham order at his new trial.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for trafficking marijuana.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, rejecting arguments regarding hearing impairment, freedom of religion, lack of a search warrant, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeals, finding the original sentences of two years and one year imprisonment manifestly excessive for the small amounts of marijuana involved.

The sentences were reduced to five months and three months.

The court also varied the full forfeiture order of the appellants' property to a partial forfeiture of half the equity, as the second floor was used solely as a personal residence.

The moving party, an approved purchaser of the debtor's assets, sought to cancel the automatic stay pending appeal of orders appointing a receiver and approving the asset sale.

The responding party, an unsuccessful bidder and software licensee, opposed the motion and appealed the sale order.

The Court of Appeal (in chambers) granted the motion to cancel the stay under s. 195 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, finding that the responding party likely lacked standing to appeal the sale order as a disappointed bidder and would not suffer undue harm if the stay was lifted, as its contractual rights to software source codes remained intact.

The plaintiff was injured when she fell from the rear bumper of her parked pick-up truck after the tailgate collapsed due to an allegedly defective latch mechanism.

She sued the manufacturer nearly five years later.

The manufacturer moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by the two-year limitation period for 'damages occasioned by a motor vehicle' under s. 206(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the truck was not the dominant feature of the claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, concluding the truck was not acting in the character of a motor vehicle and the damages were not occasioned by a motor vehicle.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision awarding sole custody of their five-year-old daughter to the respondent mother.

The trial judge had found that the parties had intense conflict and no effective communication to permit co-parenting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in the trial judge's application of the best interests of the child test and her conclusion that joint custody was inappropriate given the parents' inability to cooperate.

The appellant was bitten by the respondent's dog while canvassing door-to-door.

At trial, a jury found the appellant 100% at fault for the incident, noting he ignored warnings from the respondent and the dogs.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury charge regarding apportionment of liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding it was open to the jury under section 2(3) of the Dog Owner's Liability Act to find the appellant entirely at fault.

The self-represented appellant moved to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal sitting in chambers.

The chambers judge had validated service of the respondent's certificate, directed that all trial evidence was necessary for the appeal, and required the appellant to order the transcripts.

The panel dismissed the motion, finding that the transcripts were indeed necessary for a full and fair hearing, but extended the deadline for the appellant to order them.

The appellants appealed a jury's damages award, arguing it was plainly unreasonable and unjust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the $250,000 general damages award, while generous, was supported by evidence of the devastating impact the injuries had on the respondent's life, including his inability to work, bankruptcy, and marriage breakdown.

The court also upheld the future loss of income award and found no error in the trial judge's decision not to instruct the jury on the cap on general damages.

The appellant appealed an order committing him for extradition to the United States for offences corresponding to providing property or services for terrorist purposes and participating in terrorist activity.

The appellant argued the extradition judge erred in inferring he had the requisite knowledge and intent to assist the LTTE, a designated terrorist group.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's use of false documentation to procure military software and equipment at the behest of an LTTE operative, supported the inference of knowledge or wilful blindness.

The court also rejected the argument that the extradition judge erred by refusing to weigh competing inferences, noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Ferras does not require such weighing.

The appellant trustee in bankruptcy appealed an order granting the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care equitable set-off.

The Ministry sought to set off $1,000,000 owed by the Crown for occupation rent of a nursing home against $4,413,285.85 owed by the bankrupt owner for over-subsidization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge correctly applied the test for equitable set-off, as the cross-obligations were directly related and arose from the Ministry's decision to fund the operation directly rather than by subsidy.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action to discharge a 1979 debenture registered against their lands, which they claimed was unenforceable due to expired limitation periods.

The motion judge had found the debenture was not statute-barred because a receiver had been appointed and its validity was determined in a prior fraudulent conveyance action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in her legal conclusions and that the record did not support summary judgment for either party.

The cross-motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The appellant company was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a workplace accident where an employee was injured using a table saw.

The trial judge stayed the charges, finding the appellant's right to a fair trial under s. 11(d) of the Charter was irreparably prejudiced because a potential defence witness (a supervisor) died before charges were laid.

The provincial offences appeal court lifted the stay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to establish actual prejudice, as there was no evidence the deceased witness would have materially assisted the defence, and actual prejudice cannot be presumed from the mere fact of lost evidence.

The appellant, an elector, swore a private information against a city councillor alleging breaches of the Municipal Elections Act regarding campaign expenses.

The application judge quashed the summons, finding the appellant was required to follow the compliance audit procedure under the Act rather than proceeding by private information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the statutory scheme supersedes an elector's general right to lay a private information.

The Court also addressed the respondent counsel's failure to inform the lower court of the pending appeal, which led to the underlying charges being dismissed, but exercised its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

In an addendum to a sentence appeal decision, the Court of Appeal corrected an illegal probation order it had previously imposed.

The appellant's new sentence of two years was consecutive to a previous sentence of five years and nine months.

Because the total merged sentence exceeded two years, a probation order was not legally available under the Criminal Code.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to correct the accidental error and struck the probation order.

The appellant corporation appealed an order requiring it to indemnify a former director for costs and fines incurred in Ontario Securities Commission proceedings.

The director had admitted to the OSC that he failed to disclose a material change regarding a disputed contract, but maintained he honestly and reasonably believed the contract was not in jeopardy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 124(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, the corporation bears the onus of proving the director did not act honestly and in good faith, or lacked reasonable grounds to believe his conduct was lawful.

The application judge made no error in finding the corporation failed to meet this burden.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing minutes of settlement that vested a property in the respondent after the appellant defaulted on lump sum support payments.

The appellant argued for an extension of time to sell the property, challenged the respondent's standing to seek a vesting order, and contested the motion judge's reference to the continuing record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's proposed sale agreement was too conditional and uncertain, and rejected the standing argument as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

The respondent's cross-appeal was also dismissed as it dealt with matters not before the motion judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his request for an adjournment to retain counsel was improperly denied.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge who initially refused the adjournment made four material factual errors regarding the procedural history of the case.

The trial judge subsequently adopted that erroneous decision.

The summary conviction appeal judge erred by failing to address these factual errors.

Because the refusal of the adjournment was based on an erroneous factual foundation and the appellant was forced to proceed unrepresented in a case where the Crown sought a custodial sentence, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, vacated the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation.

During deliberations, the jury asked a question about whether they should decide each charge strictly on the evidence presented for that charge, or if disbelief of one incident should influence their decision on another.

The trial judge restricted his answer to the question of evidence, instructing the jury not to use evidence from one charge on another, without addressing the issue of credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's answer was not responsive and may have misled the jury into thinking they could not apply a credibility assessment across counts.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.