Susan E. Lang

Following the release of reasons for judgment, the parties submitted written costs submissions.

The respondent consented to an award of costs in favour of the appellant Board in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The Crown appellants did not seek costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs in the agreed amount.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that its Oil and Gas Lease and Gas Storage Lease with the respondent had terminated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the termination of the Gas Storage Lease, finding the requirement to apply to the Ontario Energy Board within 10 years was a true condition precedent.

However, the Court reversed the decision regarding the Oil and Gas Lease, holding that a 'deemed production' clause in the Unit Operating Agreement kept the lease in full force and effect as long as the appellant continued to make annual rental payments, which it had done.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The respondent employee was pushed by her supervisor during a confrontation and subsequently placed on a performance improvement plan.

She sued for constructive dismissal and various torts.

The trial judge found the employer and supervisor liable for battery, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and negligent infliction of mental suffering.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the tort of negligent infliction of mental suffering is not available in the employment context.

The Court also found the elements for intentional infliction of mental suffering were not met.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the tort damages to $15,000 for battery, but upholding the constructive dismissal and awarding $45,000 for mental distress under the Honda framework.

The parties separated and signed Minutes of Settlement regarding the family business.

The husband sold the business years later and refused to pay the wife her share, arguing her rights expired after four years under paragraph 5 of the Minutes.

The trial judge found the paragraph ambiguous, admitted parol evidence, and ruled in favour of the wife.

The husband appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the provision was ambiguous and her use of parol evidence to determine the parties' intentions.

The appellant was committed to stand trial on charges of conspiracy to traffic in narcotics and conspiracy to traffic in association with a criminal organization.

The charges arose from his involvement in collecting payment for a drug deal after the drugs had already been delivered.

The appellant argued that the offence of trafficking was complete upon delivery, and therefore he could not have conspired to traffic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sale of drugs is a continuing transaction that includes the payment of consideration, and the appellant's involvement in arranging payment constituted participation in the conspiracy.

The appellants (majority directors) appealed a costs order of $213,380.64 made against them personally following an application by the respondents (minority directors).

The Court of Appeal upheld the quantum of costs but found the application judge erred in ordering costs against the directors personally without a finding of mala fides.

The court noted the corporation's constitution provided for indemnification of directors acting in the execution of their duties.

The appeal was allowed in part, varying the order to make the corporation responsible for the costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault by maiming and his sentence of six years' imprisonment.

He argued there was no evidence of maiming.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the complainant's nearly severed toe, which left him permanently without feeling, was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the brutal, premeditated, and prolonged torture justified a sentence near the top end of the range.

The appellant sued her former family law solicitor for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty regarding a matrimonial settlement.

At trial, the solicitor admitted negligence concerning the treatment of a cottage as a matrimonial home and advice on spousal support, resulting in a damages award.

On appeal, the appellant argued the negligence permeated the entire settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most of the appeal but found the trial judge erred in setting the commencement date for spousal support damages by double-counting a line of credit debt.

The Court adjusted the commencement date, increasing the spousal support damages by $6,210.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing his arrest was unlawful and merely a ruse to search his backpack.

He also argued the trial judge failed to provide clear reasons for accepting one officer's evidence over another's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge explicitly rejected the appellant's position and had a legitimate basis for the arrest.

The Court further held that there was likely no section 8 Charter breach regarding the backpack search, and even if there was, the evidence was properly admitted under section 24(2) applying the Grant framework.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal decision, arguing the trial judge failed to find the officer had objectively reasonable and probable grounds to believe the roadside screening device was working before demanding a blood sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the need for both subjective and objective grounds, and that such a finding was implicit in the reasons.

The summary conviction appeal judge also correctly found a basis for reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judge's decision to strike his pleadings and preclude his participation at a family law trial, as well as the resulting corollary relief orders.

The trial judge struck the pleadings after finding the appellant committed egregious and continuing breaches of non-depletion and restraining orders, and failed to meet disclosure obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to impose the severe sanction given the appellant's intransigence and the likelihood that his participation would only prolong the trial without advancing its truth-seeking purpose.

The Court also dismissed a motion to introduce fresh medical evidence and upheld the trial judge's substantive awards for equalization, child support, and spousal support.

The appellant appealed the summary dismissal of his claim for negligent investigation against the Toronto Police Services Board.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial, accepting the police officer's affidavit detailing the reasons for laying charges.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the police relied on a constellation of factors and that the standard of a reasonable police officer is not one of perfection.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their 1991 motor vehicle accident action for delay.

The motion judge found inordinate delay, triggering a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, which the appellants failed to rebut.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge should have considered the respondents' materials to rebut the presumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the respondents' materials were considered, they were inadequate to rebut the presumption of prejudice, particularly regarding the injured appellant's medical condition and income loss.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge erred in using certain evidence to confirm the complainant's testimony, allowed improper cross-examination by the Crown, and misapplied the W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge misapprehended one entry in a medical report, there was ample other confirmatory evidence.

The Court also held that improper Crown questioning did not taint the trial judge's reasoning and that the W.(D.) principles were correctly applied.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder in the death of his wife by strychnine poisoning.

He argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to lead reply expert evidence regarding fatal doses of strychnine and homeopathic remedies, and by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of demeanour in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding the reply evidence was admissible to respond to the appellant's unexpected testimony, and the demeanour instruction was adequate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal from an in absentia trial.

The Court of Appeal held that both the trial judge and the summary conviction appeal judge erred by failing to consider section 24(2) of the Charter when addressing the Charter issues.

The appeal was allowed, the judgments below were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellants were awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale for both the appeal and the proceeding below.

The costs were fixed at $45,000 for one group of appellants, $20,000 for another group, and $60,000 for a single appellant, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering them to pay $364,266.92 in an accounting and $50,000 in punitive damages to the respondent, a creditor of a bankrupt company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellants failed to provide a reliable accounting or preserve necessary documents.

The court also upheld the punitive damages award, noting the appellants operated the bankrupt company's business without authority and charged criminal rates of interest.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that the appellant driver was partially liable in negligence for a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge found that the appellant driver failed to slow his vehicle sufficiently after observing the respondents' vehicle enter his lane under icy conditions, which increased the speed of impact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding was supported by the evidence, as the appellant had put his foot back on the accelerator instead of continuing to slow down.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding custody, divorce, property claims, and spousal support.

The parties delivered a joint factum consenting to a new trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on all issues, finding that the trial judge failed to properly address the best interests of the child, did not give reasons for refusing the divorce claim, and failed to deal with property and spousal support claims.