Stephen Geoffrey Aylward

The appellants appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board which determined that the current value assessment of a landfill site should exclude the value of a facility used to generate electricity from landfill gas.

The appellants argued the facility was a commercial activity, not used exclusively for landfilling activities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the generation of electricity from landfill gas is an environmental control activity required by the site's environmental compliance approval, and thus falls within the definition of landfilling activities under O. Reg. 282/98.

The defendant David Smith was successful on a motion for a permanent stay of the action against him due to the plaintiffs' failure to disclose settlement agreements.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The defendant sought full indemnity costs, arguing the plaintiffs' conduct was an abuse of process.

The court found the plaintiffs' conduct was misguided but not in bad faith, and awarded partial indemnity costs of $27,000 for the motion and $5,238.20 for the action.

The defendant moved to permanently stay the action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiffs failed to immediately disclose settlement and cooperation agreements reached with co-defendants.

The court found that the agreements fundamentally changed the litigation landscape from an adversarial to a cooperative relationship.

Applying the principles from Aecon and Handley Estate, the court held that the failure to immediately disclose these agreements constituted an abuse of process.

The action was permanently stayed against the moving defendant.

The Ontario Integrity Commissioner brought a motion to quash nine applications for judicial review commenced by Democracy Watch.

Democracy Watch sought to challenge decisions made by the Commissioner under the Lobbyists Registration Act, 1998 regarding investigations into alleged lobbyist wrongdoing.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that Democracy Watch lacked public interest standing because the applications did not raise a serious justiciable issue and were not a reasonable and effective way to bring the issues before the courts, as they conflicted with the private interests and statutory privacy protections of the investigated lobbyists.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for court approval of four settlements totaling over $25 million with TD, RBC, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank in a class action alleging price-fixing in the foreign exchange market.

The plaintiffs also sought approval of Class Counsel's fees of approximately $10.2 million.

The court found the settlements to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting the significant litigation risks and the substantial results achieved.

The court also approved the requested Class Counsel fees, recognizing the risk undertaken and the successful outcome.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify the action as a class proceeding for settlement purposes against TD, RBC, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank in a case alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in the futures exchange market.

The court found that the criteria for certification under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met and granted the motion, approving the settlement agreements and the plan of dissemination.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in a brief endorsement.

The moving party was ordered to pay costs to the responding parties in the agreed amount of $10,000.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Chief Electoral Officer to refer complaints to the Attorney General as apparent contraventions of the Elections Finances Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision did not affect the legal rights, interests, property, privileges, or liberty of any person.

Applying the Court of Appeal's reasoning in PC Ontario Fund, the court held the decision was not susceptible to judicial review and did not engage section 2(b) Charter rights.

This complex motion involved the defendants, Dr. Saad and the Canadian Companies, seeking to set aside ex parte Mareva injunctions, Norwich orders, and receivership orders previously granted to the plaintiffs.

The defendants argued material non-disclosure by the plaintiffs, particularly regarding the political motivations behind the litigation and the legitimate commercial relationships between the parties.

The plaintiffs sought to continue and vary the orders.

The court found no material non-disclosure sufficient to set aside the Mareva order against Dr. Saad, continuing it.

However, the Norwich and Receivership orders against the Canadian Companies were set aside due to non-material but impactful non-disclosure that changed the factual landscape, making the orders overly broad.

The court also addressed the application of the deemed undertaking rule for documents obtained through Norwich orders.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a prior decision of the Superior Court of Justice dated September 30, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs fixed at $4,000 to the responding parties.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario's decision to take no further action regarding her complaint against a physician.

The applicant, an autism advocate, complained about the physician's use of chelation therapy for children with autism spectrum disorder.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the College's investigation was adequate and its decision not to refer the matter to discipline was reasonable, given the lack of patient-specific evidence of harm and the statutory protections for alternative medicine.

Class Counsel brought a motion for approval of a further instalment of fees in an ongoing competition law class action regarding alleged price-fixing in the foreign exchange market.

The plaintiffs had settled with fourteen groups of defendants and the action continued against the remaining non-settling defendants.

The court reviewed the risks undertaken, the results achieved, and the docketed time, finding the requested fees of $6,325,000, plus costs and disbursements, to be fair and reasonable.

The fee request was approved.

The plaintiffs in a class action regarding foreign exchange price fixing brought a motion to amend the Distribution Protocol for the $110 million settlement proceeds.

The proposed amendments included transferring unused funds from the Indirect Claims Fund to the Direct Claims Fund, setting a minimum $1,000 payout for approved Direct Claimants, and removing the requirement to consider compensation received in other jurisdictions.

The court granted the motion, finding the amendments were administrative, imposed no additional burden on the defendants, and fell within the court's broad discretion under section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Integrity Commissioner's refusal to issue public determinations regarding the conduct of several public servants under the Public Service of Ontario Act, 2006.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant lacked public interest standing because the statutory scheme does not include a public complaints mechanism and is strictly employment-oriented.

The court also held that the application did not raise a justiciable issue, as the Commissioner's functions under the Act relate to private employment relationships and do not involve the exercise of a statutory power subject to judicial review.

The appellant, a young Indigenous woman, pleaded guilty to importing cocaine.

The sentencing judge rejected her s. 15 Charter challenge to s. 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code, which precluded a conditional sentence for her offence, and imposed a 17-month custodial sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that s. 742.1(c) and (e)(ii) violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the provisions violated s. 15 by discriminating against Aboriginal offenders and s. 7 by being overbroad.

The provisions were struck down, and a sentence of time served was substituted.

Case management endorsement setting the schedule and procedural directions for an application for judicial review of a report by the Ontario Integrity Commissioner concerning Premier Doug Ford.

The court directed that the hearing proceed by video conference and established deadlines and formatting requirements for electronic document filing.

The respondent, a re-elected city councillor, filed a supplementary financial statement showing he exceeded the allowable campaign spending limit for expressions of appreciation.

Under s. 88.23(2) of the Municipal Elections Act, this triggered automatic forfeiture of his office.

The application judge granted relief from forfeiture, finding the error was inadvertent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act because s. 88.23(2) is a statutory penalty and the legislative scheme deliberately precludes such relief.

The appellants, a real estate agent and broker, appealed a trial judgment ordering them to pay damages to the respondents (purchasers) for water and mould damage to a residential home, due to the agent's negligence.

The appeal primarily concerned the measure of damages.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by applying the cost of repair measure, as the appellants' negligence did not cause the property defect itself, but rather caused the respondents to enter into a transaction they would have otherwise avoided.

In such cases, the proper measure of damages is the diminution in value of the property.

The Court upheld the trial judge's findings on mitigation of damages and the foreseeability of frost heave damage.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge for reassessment of damages based on diminution in value and for a redetermination of costs from the first trial.