Stacey D. Young

In a sentencing appeal arising from guilty pleas to sexual assault, uttering threats, and unlawful confinement, the Court addressed whether anticipated completion time for institutional programming may be considered in fixing a fit sentence and when delay-related conduct can justify denying enhanced pre-sentence credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court held that programming and treatment timelines may be considered where supported by an adequate evidentiary record, provided the sentence remains proportionate to offence gravity and moral blameworthiness.

The Court further held that delay alone is insufficient to constitute wrongful conduct; conduct must be intended to frustrate the proper operation of the criminal justice system.

Applying the sentencing standard of review, the custodial term was upheld as fit, but the denial of enhanced credit for confinement in a mental health facility was varied because the offender’s delay-related conduct was materially linked to mental and cognitive impairment.

The appeal was allowed in part with additional enhanced credit awarded.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's decision not to designate the respondent, who pleaded guilty to child pornography offences, as a dangerous or long-term offender.

The sentencing judge erred by requiring a "direct" or "root cause" of psychological harm for Serious Personal Injury Offence (SPIO) designation and by misinterpreting the risk of re-offending for long-term offender status.

The Court of Appeal clarified that child pornography offences can constitute SPIOs based on a broader causation standard and that the long-term offender criteria do not necessarily require a risk of violent re-offending.

The appeal was allowed, and a new hearing was ordered.

The Crown appealed a dangerous offender sentence, arguing the sentencing judge applied the wrong legal standard ("reasonable possibility" instead of "reasonable expectation") when determining if a lesser measure than indeterminate detention would adequately protect the public.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in law by applying a less rigorous standard and by relying on speculative evidence of treatability and manageability.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence of indeterminate detention was substituted.

The Crown appealed a decision granting the accused a preliminary inquiry.

The accused was charged with offences carrying a maximum 10-year sentence, but the Crown indicated intent to seek a dangerous offender designation, which could lead to indefinite detention.

The lower courts held that this potential indefinite detention entitled the accused to a preliminary inquiry under s. 535 of the Criminal Code, interpreting "punishable by 14 years or more of imprisonment" to include the overall penal jeopardy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 535 unambiguously refers to the maximum sentence of the *offence charged*, not the potential outcome of a subsequent dangerous offender proceeding.

The court emphasized that dangerous offender proceedings are separate and relate to the offender, not the offence, and that the lower courts' interpretation contradicted Parliament's intent to restrict preliminary inquiries and would lead to absurd results contingent on prosecutorial discretion.

This is a decision on an application for leave to intervene by the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario (CLA) in a Crown appeal.

The underlying appeal concerns the interpretation of section 535 of the Criminal Code regarding an accused's entitlement to a preliminary inquiry when facing potential dangerous offender proceedings or increased penalties under section 718.3(8)(c).

The court granted the CLA leave to intervene on the argument that a preliminary inquiry should be granted if an accused faces a potential total sentence of 14 years or more, approaching the calculation from a totality perspective.

However, the court denied intervention on arguments related to the direct applicability of section 718.3(8)(c) as a gateway to a preliminary inquiry and the requirement for pre-election Crown notice, deeming these new issues outside the scope of the appeal and lacking a proper factual record.

O.P., suffering from end-stage glioblastoma, applied for a declaration that his planned physician-assisted death was permitted by law under the criteria established in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5.

The applicant argued that court authorization was not legally required but sought a declaratory order for practical reasons due to healthcare providers' concerns about civil, criminal, or disciplinary liability, and issues with the Coroners Act.

The court rejected the premise that physician-assisted death was permissible without court order pending federal legislation, asserting that judicial authorization remained a constitutional remedy under s. 24(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to ensure the rule of law and safeguard vulnerable persons.

The court ultimately granted an authorization order for physician-assisted death, finding that O.P. met all the Carter criteria, and provided ancillary relief regarding the Coroners Act and Family Law Act.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated sexual assault arising from his failure to disclose his HIV-positive status before engaging in unprotected anal intercourse with two complainants.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to acquit if they found the complainants were reckless or prepared to assume the risks of unprotected sex.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a complainant's past risky sexual behaviour does not negate an accused's legal duty to disclose a significant risk of serious bodily harm.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge's failure to give a Vetrovec warning, his jury instructions on the evidence, or his failure to give a limiting instruction regarding the appellant's text messages.

The Ontario Review Board granted the respondent an absolute discharge.

The hospital appealed, relying entirely on fresh evidence of the respondent's conduct following his release, which included resuming marijuana use, engaging in threatening behaviour, and facing new criminal charges.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it overwhelmingly demonstrated that the respondent remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing before the Board was ordered.

The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated November 21, 2014.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ordering the Board to conduct a new and expedited hearing within 60 days and make a new disposition order.

The interim disposition order dated March 30, 2015, remains in effect until the new order is made.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death and driving without insurance after driving his motorcycle while intoxicated and crashing, resulting in the death of his passenger.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in treating his guilty plea, assessing aggravating factors, and calculating pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found an error in the pre-sentence custody calculation and increased the credit, but otherwise dismissed the appeal, finding the six-year sentence fit given the gravity of the offence.

The appellant, a permanent resident, pleaded guilty to robbery and was subsequently deported.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, as his lawyer allegedly failed to advise him of the immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was already subject to a stayed deportation order and knew that further criminal convictions could lead to deportation.

Even if counsel's performance was deficient, there was no miscarriage of justice because the appellant understood deportation was a potential consequence of his plea.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and extortion against an employee.

He appealed the convictions, arguing that the Crown's cross-examination was improper, the trial judge erred in refusing a mistrial after a courtroom interruption, and the trial judge erred in preventing the jury from questioning a DNA expert.

He also appealed his 27-month sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on the victim impact statement as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no miscarriage of justice in the cross-examination, no error in the trial judge's discretionary rulings, and no error in principle regarding the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of fraud over $5,000 after persuading victims to give him money to invest, which was never returned.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing his Charter application regarding alleged police misconduct without a voir dire, and by improperly assessing his father's defence evidence.

He also appealed his 12-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Kutynec threshold to the Charter application and made no error in assessing the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit for a large-scale fraud involving exploitation of relationships.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assaults, sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and assault simpliciter involving his three daughters.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the evidence, particularly regarding credibility, demeanour, the application of the W.(D.) principles, and the reliability of child witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided comprehensive reasons, properly applied the burden of proof, and made credibility and reliability findings that attracted deference.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, but the court held the disposition was reasonable, supported by the evidence, and involved no error of law or miscarriage of justice.

Relying on the attending psychiatrist's evidence, the Board had properly found that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety.

Deference was owed to the Board's risk-management decision, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed sentence after pleading guilty to criminal harassment and multiple breaches of no-contact court orders involving his former wife.

The Court of Appeal agreed that denunciation and specific deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives, but held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by using the case to criticize appellate sentencing guidance rather than focusing on the offence and offender.

Accepting the Crown's trial position that the proper range was 12 to 15 months, the court fixed a 15-month sentence and reduced it to 14 months after credit for pre-trial custody.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences, arguing that the warrantless search of his vehicle's trunk violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The police stopped the vehicle, and after the driver failed a roadside screening test, the vehicle was to be towed.

The appellant's nervous demeanor and dissociation from the vehicle led police to search the trunk, where they found a handgun.

The Court of Appeal assumed a s. 8 breach but applied the Grant framework, concluding that the firearm was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the officers' good faith, the reduced expectation of privacy in an impounded vehicle, and society's interest in adjudicating serious gun offences.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had set aside the accused's conviction for first degree murder and substituted a conviction for second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the first degree murder conviction, adopting the dissenting reasons of MacPherson J.A. at the Court of Appeal, which found that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury on the relationship between planning and deliberation and murder.

The appellants appealed their convictions for first-degree and second-degree murder arising from a fatal group assault in a mall parking lot.

The Court of Appeal allowed the first appellant's appeal in part, finding the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on the relationship between planning and deliberation and the mental element for murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

A conviction for second-degree murder was substituted.

The second appellant's appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in his instructions regarding the pathologist's evidence, the voluntariness of police statements, or the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and criminal harassment.

He argued the trial judge erred by providing supplementary reasons four days after oral reasons and by improperly assessing the complainant's delayed disclosure of the sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the provision of supplementary reasons and holding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's explanation for her delayed disclosure.