Stacey D. Young

The appellants appealed their convictions for first-degree and second-degree murder arising from a fatal group assault in a mall parking lot.

The Court of Appeal allowed the first appellant's appeal in part, finding the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on the relationship between planning and deliberation and the mental element for murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

A conviction for second-degree murder was substituted.

The second appellant's appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in his instructions regarding the pathologist's evidence, the voluntariness of police statements, or the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and criminal harassment.

He argued the trial judge erred by providing supplementary reasons four days after oral reasons and by improperly assessing the complainant's delayed disclosure of the sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the provision of supplementary reasons and holding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's explanation for her delayed disclosure.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching, as well as his 15-month custodial sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding a sexual purpose for a massage, drawing inferences about access to a residence, rejecting his evidence, and refusing to admit counselling records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's comprehensive reasons and concluding the sentence was at the low end of the range.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and improperly curtailed cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment was sound and entitled to deference, and noting that defence counsel had agreed to use a written transcript instead of playing the complainant's video statement.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board.

At the Board hearing, the appellant's counsel did not challenge the expert report of Dr. Gojer, which was filed and accepted.

On appeal, the self-represented appellant sought to challenge the underlying basis of the report but did not raise ineffective assistance of counsel or file fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board's decision was not unreasonable and dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant would have the opportunity to challenge the report at his upcoming Board hearing.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal decision, arguing the trial judge failed to find the officer had objectively reasonable and probable grounds to believe the roadside screening device was working before demanding a blood sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the need for both subjective and objective grounds, and that such a finding was implicit in the reasons.

The summary conviction appeal judge also correctly found a basis for reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge gave insufficient reasons regarding the common sense inference that people consume alcohol at a normal pace.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge had properly considered the inference but found insufficient evidence to assess its implications based on the Crown expert's report.

The appellant, who suffers from schizoaffective disorder and was found not criminally responsible, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention in a minimum-secure facility.

He argued the Board erred by failing to adequately consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board did err by failing to consider whether the appellant would consent to medication conditions and by failing to properly analyze the mechanisms under the Criminal Code and Mental Health Act for returning him to the hospital if he decompensated.

However, the appeal was dismissed due to fresh evidence showing the appellant had stopped taking his medication, decompensated, and been returned to a medium-secure unit.

The accused was discharged at a preliminary inquiry on charges of conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault.

The Crown successfully brought a certiorari application to quash the discharge, and the application judge committed the accused for trial.

The accused appealed the committal order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a superior court judge on a certiorari application does not have jurisdiction to commit an accused for trial.

The appropriate remedy is to quash the discharge and remit the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge for further consideration.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, uttering threats, unlawful confinement, and failure to comply with probation, as well as his 12-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider evidence of collusion regarding other charges on which he was acquitted when assessing the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the totality of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range and the appellant's recent good behaviour was a matter for the parole board.

The appellant appealed his conviction, designation, and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's decisions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his 38-month sentence for break and enter, arguing disparity with his co-accused's 23-month sentence, improper discounting of his guilty plea, and disproportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity justified by the appellant's worse record and additional charges.

The court also held the trial judge properly considered the timing of the guilty plea and that the sentence was not manifestly excessive given the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed following guilty pleas to multiple historical sexual assaults against the respondent's daughters and nieces, together with assaults against family members.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge materially misapprehended the evidence by treating repeated sexual abuse counts as isolated incidents, thereby minimizing the seriousness of the offences and the prolonged breach of trust.

The court distinguished the authority relied on below and held that a conditional sentence could not satisfy denunciation and general deterrence for repeated child sexual abuse in a parental and familial context.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a total custodial sentence of 28 months with six months' credit, resulting in 22 months' imprisonment.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of failing to comply with a probation order and breaching a prohibition order relating to children.

The accused, who was subject to an order prohibiting him from attending public swimming areas where children might be present, went swimming in his condominium complex's pool.

The trial judge acquitted him, finding the pool was not a 'public swimming area'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the pool, which was accessible to 8,000 residents and outside members, fell within the definition of a public place.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a brutal assault.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentence was substantial, it was not unfit given the brutal nature and duration of the assault.

The sentencing judge properly balanced the appellant's personal circumstances with the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

Fresh evidence showing some progress did not render the sentence unfit.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed sentence, arguing that a conditional sentence was unfit given the seriousness of the offence and the need for denunciation.

The court held that a community-based sentence should not originally have been imposed, but declined to incarcerate the respondent because of the passage of time, hardship, remorse, rehabilitation, employment, family support, and ongoing community service.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the conditional sentence was increased to two years less one day, with the curfew extended for the full duration of the sentence.

The probation order was left undisturbed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting prior consistent statements, bad character evidence, and undisclosed evidence from his wife, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding no serious errors and applying the curative proviso where necessary.

However, applying the Kienapple principle, the court stayed the convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, leaving the incest conviction to stand.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.