Sean Dewart

The defendants, the Law Society of Ontario and several of its employees, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, alleged that the defendants acted with malice and deliberately suppressed evidence during a disciplinary investigation against him.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were genuine issues of credibility regarding what the defendants knew and when they knew it, which could not be resolved on a summary judgment motion even with enhanced fact-finding powers.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel answers to outstanding undertakings and refusals from a judgment debtor examination, and to extend the time for service of a 2017 statement of claim alleging improper transfers intended to defeat collection of a 2011 judgment.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to strike the 2017 statement of claim for lack of particularity.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, finding the defendants' efforts to fulfill undertakings were insufficient and their claims of prejudice regarding the delay in service were weak and speculative.

The defendants' motion to strike was dismissed as premature.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellants failed to respond to the respondents' requests for costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and found the partial indemnity costs sought by The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, Mary McConville, Janice Robinson, Rena Knox, and The Hospital for Sick Children to be reasonable.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs to these respondents.

The moving defendants (the Vuletics) sought a stay of the action, alleging an abuse of process because the plaintiffs (the Carotis) failed to immediately disclose a settlement agreement reached with a co-defendant (Kegalj).

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the settlement agreement did not entirely change the adversarial landscape.

The settling co-defendant was already adverse in interest to the moving defendants prior to the settlement, and the agreement merely required him to act as a truthful witness, which did not fundamentally alter the litigation's adversarial orientation.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 31.11(6) to read in the discovery transcripts of its deceased corporate representative.

In response, the plaintiff brought a cross-motion seeking production of communications between the deceased representative, the defendant, and its lawyers, as well as documents relating to a consulting agreement between the representative and the defendant.

The court dismissed the request for general communications, finding it was too late to seek discovery documents and that the communications were privileged.

However, the court ordered the production of documents relating to the formation of the consulting agreement, as they were relevant to the credibility of the deceased witness's evidence for the pending Rule 31.11(6) motion.

The defendants (appellants) appealed a motion judge's order that dismissed their motion to dismiss a solicitor's negligence action for lack of legal capacity.

The plaintiff (respondent) had sued the appellants in his personal capacity, alleging negligence in an appeal they handled for his late brother's Estate.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by not addressing who retained the appellants; it was the Estate, not the plaintiff personally.

Therefore, the plaintiff lacked the personal capacity to bring the solicitor's negligence claim.

The appeal was allowed, and the action dismissed.

The Appellants appealed a motion judge's decision to enforce a settlement in a failed real estate transaction.

The Appellants argued the motion judge erred by refusing to exercise discretion not to enforce the settlement, claiming new expert evidence changed the case and their new counsel was unaware of the outstanding offer.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding he properly exercised his discretion by considering all relevant factors and concluding it was not a "rare case" warranting non-enforcement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, parents whose children were made Crown wards, appealed the dismissal of their action against multiple defendants involved in the child protection proceedings.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious, being an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues already decided.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the lower court's decision that the action constituted an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs, members of a local union, brought a motion to amend the style of cause in their action against their international and local unions, which were unincorporated associations.

The plaintiffs sought to exclude themselves from the defendant class, arguing that a litigant cannot be both a plaintiff and a defendant in the same action.

The court granted the motion, allowing the plaintiffs to file an amended statement of claim with the proposed style of cause, which explicitly excluded the plaintiffs from the defendant class, and formally appointed the union presidents as representative defendants nunc pro tunc.

The moving party sought leave to appeal from a lower court order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $2,500.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a motion for summary judgment, the successful defendants sought costs of $26,814.39 against the plaintiff and his lawyer on a joint and several basis.

The court awarded the requested amount against the plaintiff on a substantial indemnity basis due to the claim being without merit and pursued for delay.

However, the court declined to order costs personally against the plaintiff's lawyer, finding no bad faith or deliberate malicious behaviour.

The defendant brought a motion for a nunc pro tunc order to retroactively authorize communication with his counsel during cross-examination, which was in contravention of a direct court order.

The plaintiffs opposed, denying they had consented to such communication.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that no consent was proven and, more importantly, that leave of the court was required regardless of any alleged consent, especially given the explicit court order.

The court determined that the breach would be considered when assessing the weight of the defendant's evidence, particularly concerning the alleged unlawful appropriation of gold.

The plaintiff moved to extend the timetable for procedural steps in an action alleging historic sexual assault while in foster care.

The defendant Children's Aid Society cross-moved to dismiss the action for delay.

The court found that while the plaintiff's counsel initially caused delay by unilaterally cancelling discoveries, the defendant subsequently engaged in 'scorched earth' tactics that actively obstructed the litigation's progress.

Applying the Reid criteria, the court granted the extension, dismissed the cross-motion, and ordered the action into case management.

A lawyer sought leave to intervene in an appeal of a costs decision that made adverse findings against him regarding his duty to the court and ordered his former client to pay substantial indemnity costs.

The underlying action had settled, rendering the appeal moot.

The court granted the lawyer leave to intervene, finding he had an interest in protecting his professional integrity, especially since his former client was relying on the costs decision in a separate collection action for legal fees.

The court also exercised its discretion to depart from the doctrine of mootness, finding that the issues regarding a lawyer's duty to the court and the costs consequences for a client were of public importance and could otherwise evade review.

The appeal was allowed to proceed on limited issues with amicus curiae appointed to argue the opposing position.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to amend their statement of defence to plead section 8 of the Interest Act.

The appellants argued they had a right to amend as a matter of law because the respondents had amended their claim, and that statutory defences do not need to be pleaded.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that affirmative and statutory defences must be pleaded to avoid trial by ambush.

The Court also upheld the Master's finding that the appellants' unexplained four-year delay in raising the defence resulted in presumed and actual non-compensable prejudice to the respondents, who lost opportunities to strategize and settle.

The plaintiff's lawyers brought a motion to remove the defendants' lawyer of record, alleging an actual or perceived conflict of interest in her joint representation of all three defendants.

The plaintiff was never a client of the challenged lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a possibility of real mischief or that the proper administration of justice required the removal.

The court also found that the motion was brought for a tactical advantage, given the nearly two-year delay in bringing it after the issue was first raised.

The plaintiffs requested a three-month adjournment of a scheduled mini-trial following the discharge of their counsel due to a breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship.

The defendants opposed the adjournment, citing a history of delay and prejudice.

The court balanced the interests of the parties and the administration of justice, noting the lengthy procedural history, the plaintiffs' familiarity with the case, and the prejudice of further delay.

The court dismissed the adjournment request, ordering the mini-trial to proceed as scheduled.

The appellants sued their former lawyers for solicitor's negligence following a finding of securities fraud by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).

The motion judge dismissed the majority of the claims as an abusive collateral attack on the OSC decision, relying on the doctrine of issue estoppel, but ordered a mini-trial under Rule 20.04(2.2) for the remaining claim regarding negligent settlement advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that civil claims depending on showing a conviction would not have occurred but for a lawyer's conduct constitute an improper collateral attack.

The Court also held there is no basis to appeal an order directing a mini-trial as part of a summary judgment process.

During a legal strike, graduate student teaching assistants engaged in picketing and protests.

Following the strike, the university disciplined them under the Student Code of Conduct.

The students sought judicial review, arguing that under the Back to Class Act and the Labour Relations Act, a labour arbitrator had exclusive jurisdiction over discipline related to strike activities.

The Divisional Court agreed and quashed the university tribunal's decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the university's appeal, confirming that the specific, strike-ending legislation mandated that any dispute concerning discipline for activities during the strike be determined through grievance arbitration.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrator to direct the withdrawal of disciplinary proceedings against a police officer.

Following case management teleconferences, the parties agreed in principle to a schedule for the application and a tentative resolution regarding a stay.

The court issued a case management endorsement setting the hearing for October 27, 2020, and providing procedural directions for the filing of materials.