Sean Dewart

The moving defendants sought an order staying the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process due to the plaintiff's alleged failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with other defendants (Catlin Canada Inc., The Regional Municipality of York, and The Regional Municipality of Durham).

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for leave to amend its Statement of Claim to reflect the settlement and limit claims against non-settling defendants to their several share of liability.

The court dismissed the motion to stay, finding that the partial settlement did not entirely change the litigation landscape in a way that significantly altered the dynamics, and that the disclosure made was sufficient given the circumstances.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to amend was granted.

The defendants brought motions seeking to remove the plaintiffs' counsel, Julian Falconer and Falconers LLP, and for the production of portions of their file concerning advice given to plaintiff Bradley Blair regarding a complaint to the Ombudsman and a related judicial review application.

The defendants argued that counsel was a potential witness, an "unsworn witness" or had a conflict of interest based on a duty of loyalty, and that solicitor-client privilege had been waived.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no deemed waiver of privilege, no likelihood of counsel being a material witness, no "unsworn witness" concern given the nature of prior interactions, and no duty of loyalty conflict.

The appellants, former truck drivers for the corporate respondent, initiated a public campaign alleging unpaid wages while their Canada Labour Code complaints were ongoing.

The respondents sued for defamation, trespass, and other torts.

The appellants moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in his s. 137.1(3) analysis by focusing on motive rather than the expression's subject matter, but ultimately upheld the dismissal under s. 137.1(4), finding the respondents' claims had substantial merit, the appellants had no valid defence, and the harm to the respondents outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff estate to produce unredacted solicitor files of the deceased, William Waters, arguing that the "wills exception" to solicitor-client privilege should extend to determine the deceased's intent regarding inter vivos transfers.

The estate claimed the transfers were impressed with a resulting trust, while the defendants asserted they were gifts.

The court found that the previous order allowed for disputes over privilege and that applying res judicata to informal case management directions would inhibit the process.

The court extended the "wills exception" from Geffen v. Goodman Estate to this case, finding ambiguity in the deceased's will regarding the nature of the transfers.

It ordered the production of all information shedding light on whether the transfers were gifts, including information on the deceased's capacity and susceptibility to undue influence, subject to a protective order to prevent a fishing expedition for claims against the solicitor.

The Law Society of Ontario appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division, which upheld a nine-month suspension for a lawyer convicted of possessing child pornography.

The appellant argued the original hearing panel lacked jurisdiction because it did not include a lay adjudicator, contrary to O. Reg. 167/07.

The Divisional Court majority agreed, finding the panel was improperly constituted and lacked jurisdiction, as there was no evidence the Chair exercised discretion to depart from the mandatory requirement.

The appeal was granted and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The plaintiffs sued their former lawyer and his law firm for professional negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty arising from the sale of their business.

The plaintiffs alleged the lawyer failed to properly advise them on the definitions and objection provisions in the share purchase agreement, resulting in a lower purchase price.

The court found that the action was not statute-barred but dismissed the claims on the merits.

The court held that the lawyer met the standard of care by explicitly advising the sophisticated plaintiff to obtain independent accounting advice on the business terms, which the plaintiff failed to do.

The court also found no breach of contract or fiduciary duty, and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove their damages or causation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to remove the defendants' counsel and their law firm from the record for an upcoming pending motion.

The plaintiffs argued that because partners of the law firm had sworn affidavits for the pending motion, the firm's continued representation created a conflict of interest and an appearance of impropriety.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it premature and noting that the practice of lawyers appearing on motions where their colleagues have filed affidavits is common and acceptable in Ontario civil litigation.

The court awarded costs of $11,580 to the defendants.

The defendants, Municipality of North Middlesex and Vic Stellingwerff, brought a motion to stay the action as an abuse of process, alleging the plaintiffs failed to disclose a Pierringer agreement.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to amend their Statement of Claim to explicitly limit their claim against the non-settling defendants to several liability.

The court dismissed the motion to stay, finding that the existence of the Pierringer agreement was disclosed promptly and did not significantly alter the litigation landscape.

The court granted the cross-motion to amend the Statement of Claim.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss or permanently stay the plaintiff's construction lien action, arguing that the plaintiff failed to immediately disclose a settlement and assignment agreement with the original lien claimant, contrary to the rule in Handley Estate.

The court found that the settlement and assignment did not fundamentally alter the adversarial orientation of the litigation, as the assignee and the defendants were already adverse in interest and the original claimant's role in providing evidence did not constitute a reversal of its pleaded position.

The motion was dismissed.

The moving defendants sought to dismiss or stay the action because the plaintiff failed to immediately disclose a settlement agreement reached with a co-defendant.

The court found that the settlement did not fundamentally change the litigation landscape, as it was a simple release without costs and did not involve the settling defendant switching sides or cooperating with the plaintiff.

Furthermore, the moving defendants had not asserted cross-claims against the settling defendant before the limitation period expired.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellants (plaintiffs in the underlying action) appealed a motion judge's decision to permanently stay their proceedings against the respondent (David Smith) due to their failure to immediately disclose partial settlement agreements with other co-defendants.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed that failure to immediately disclose settlement agreements that fundamentally alter the litigation landscape, by changing adversarial relationships into cooperative ones, constitutes an abuse of process.

The court reiterated that the sole remedy for such non-disclosure is an automatic stay of proceedings, regardless of whether prejudice is proven or if pleadings have been exchanged.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the permanent stay.

The appellants sought a permanent stay of the plaintiffs' action, arguing that the plaintiffs' failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with a former defendant, Sean Antonello, fundamentally altered the litigation landscape.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the settlement did not significantly change the adversarial relationship between the parties.

The court held that the motion judge's determination was entitled to deference and that the drafting of affidavits by plaintiffs' counsel and a non-disparagement clause did not, by themselves, demonstrate an improper cooperative relationship.

The plaintiff and the defendant were in a common law relationship and owned a home as joint tenants.

After they separated, the defendant retained lawyers to sever the joint tenancy by transferring her interest to herself as a tenant-in-common.

The plaintiff brought multiple actions against the defendant and her lawyers, alleging conspiracy, deceit, and fraudulent conveyance.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the claims against the lawyers and the conspiracy/fraudulent conveyance claims against the defendant, finding no unlawful act, no agreement to injure, and no damages suffered by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's cross-motions, including for criminal contempt and constitutional declarations, were also dismissed.

This appeal addressed the scope of the "immediate disclosure" rule for litigation-altering agreements, specifically a Pierringer agreement, as established in *Handley Estate*.

The appellant (non-settling defendants) sought to stay the action, arguing the respondent (plaintiff) failed to immediately disclose the agreement's terms.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the respondent's disclosure of the agreement's existence and essential terms, coupled with an immediate intent to seek court approval, satisfied the disclosure requirement.

The court clarified that not every term needs immediate disclosure, only those affecting the litigation landscape, and that the rationale for an abuse of process finding was not engaged where the court was informed and the disclosure was incremental within the context of seeking approval.

The appellant sought to continue the assessment of solicitor accounts, which the application judge dismissed due to a jurisdictional issue (late requisition under the Solicitors Act).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, emphasizing that courts should facilitate account assessment and that procedural defects should not be treated as nullities, especially when parties have consented and participated for years.

The court ordered the Assessment Officer to issue a decision on the merits without delay.

The appellant sought judicial review and appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) which found her accident benefits claim statute-barred.

The Divisional Court dismissed both, stating judicial review was only available in "exceptional circumstances" given the statutory appeal right.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the further appeal, clarifying that while judicial review is always available, it is a discretionary remedy and will only be exercised in rare cases where alternative remedies (like reconsideration and statutory appeal) are inadequate.

The Court affirmed the LAT's finding on the limitation period as reasonable and provided guidance on handling concurrent appeal and judicial review proceedings.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Myers J. dated March 2, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $1,095.99.

The defendant David Smith was successful on a motion for a permanent stay of the action against him due to the plaintiffs' failure to disclose settlement agreements.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The defendant sought full indemnity costs, arguing the plaintiffs' conduct was an abuse of process.

The court found the plaintiffs' conduct was misguided but not in bad faith, and awarded partial indemnity costs of $27,000 for the motion and $5,238.20 for the action.

The remaining defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for abuse of process, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with a co-defendant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the settling defendant did not switch sides or alter the adversarial orientation of the parties.

The settlement merely let a minor player out of the lawsuit in exchange for further documentary disclosure, which did not change the litigation landscape entirely.

The defendant moved to permanently stay the action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiffs failed to immediately disclose settlement and cooperation agreements reached with co-defendants.

The court found that the agreements fundamentally changed the litigation landscape from an adversarial to a cooperative relationship.

Applying the principles from Aecon and Handley Estate, the court held that the failure to immediately disclose these agreements constituted an abuse of process.

The action was permanently stayed against the moving defendant.