Sean Dewart

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims against a solicitor and other defendants, as well as the award of substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility regarding the solicitor.

The court also rejected the claim against the other defendants, noting that any vendor's lien was extinguished when the bank exercised its security.

The award of substantial indemnity costs was upheld due to the appellant's attack on the respondent's character.

The appellants, owners of hotels and other businesses, brought a civil action for defamation, interference with economic relations, and conspiracy to injure against an employee and union steward who delivered a speech to customers.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding that the dispute was essentially a workplace dispute governed by the collective agreement, thereby ousting the court's jurisdiction under the Weber framework.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the facts and context of the dispute were overwhelmingly employment-related and that the appellants had initially treated the matter as a workplace incident by taking disciplinary steps.

The appellant was wrongfully convicted of robbery after a police investigation.

He was later acquitted and sued the police for negligent investigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada recognized the tort of negligent investigation, holding that police owe a duty of care to suspects under investigation.

However, applying the standard of a reasonable police officer in similar circumstances, the Court found that the police conduct in this case, while flawed, did not breach the standard of care.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Health's approvals regarding the privatization of hospital facilities.

A non-party, THICC, asserted that certain documents in the Minister's record were confidential.

A Master heard a motion regarding the content of the record and ruled the documents should be publicly filed.

THICC appealed, arguing the Master lacked jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court held that while a Master does not have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory motion in a judicial review application, a judge may refer an interlocutory issue to a Master acting as a referee.

The Court found that the case management judge had directed such a reference and that the Master made no reversible error in applying the Sierra Club test to deny the sealing order.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving defendant, an assistant Crown Attorney, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing her motion for summary judgment in a malicious prosecution action.

The plaintiff had been charged with murder, but the charges were withdrawn after new evidence surfaced implicating another individual.

The motion judge found that while reasonable and probable grounds existed initially, there were disputed facts regarding the reasonableness of continuing the prosecution after the new evidence emerged.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflict of principle or good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The appellant was successful on appeal and was awarded costs for both the appeal and the original application.

The respondent sought leave to make further submissions regarding the quantum of the costs award for the application.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the appellant's bill of costs and determined that the original $18,000 award should be reduced by $2,015 to account for a refusals motion that the parties agreed would attract no costs and for the attendance of two counsel.

The costs for the application were fixed at $15,985 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant, a union official who became a member of the respondent charitable corporation, requested a copy of the corporation's membership list under s. 307(1) of the Corporations Act to communicate with other members about labour relations and management issues.

The corporation refused, and the application judge dismissed the appellant's application, finding his purpose was to benefit the union rather than the corporation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge applied an overly restrictive test.

The Court found that the phrase 'purposes connected with the corporation' requires only a good faith reason related to or associated with the corporation, which includes advocating for changes to management and labour relations policies.

The appellants appealed paragraph 4(d) of an order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the issue of jurisdiction, finding that the order was not made under section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Costs were fixed at $7,000 all inclusive.

The moving party, THICC, sought a stay of a Master's order requiring the Minister of Health to file a section 10 record that included THICC's allegedly confidential information, pending an appeal of that order.

The underlying judicial review challenged the Minister's approval of hospital infrastructure plans.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the interpretation of a prior consent confidentiality order, irreparable harm if the information was disclosed before the appeal, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay to preserve the appeal's utility.

The appellant, an Aboriginal man, was wrongfully convicted of robbery and spent 20 months in prison before being acquitted at a second trial.

He sued the police for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed that the tort of negligent police investigation exists in Ontario, rejecting UK precedent that denies a duty of care.

However, the majority upheld the trial judge's finding that the police officers' conduct, including the use of a photo line-up with only one Aboriginal person, did not fall below the standard of care or amount to malicious prosecution.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Royal Crest Lifecare Group Inc. was petitioned into bankruptcy and Ernst & Young was appointed as trustee.

The trustee sought an order that it not be bound by the collective agreements and not be deemed a successor employer.

The unions brought a cross-motion seeking leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to pursue an application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board to designate the trustee as a successor employer.

The bankruptcy judge dismissed both motions as premature.

The unions appealed the dismissal of their cross-motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the bankruptcy judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion by deciding that the cross-motion was premature.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment and dismissing the claim against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's analysis that there was no genuine issue for trial on the question of malice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring that the sale of Hydro One shares by the Crown contravened s. 48(1) of the Electricity Act.

Before the appeal was heard, the government withdrew the public offering and enacted new legislation repealing s. 48(1) and expressly authorizing the sale of the shares.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the legal and factual foundation of the dispute had disappeared and that the circumstances did not justify an exception to the general rule against hearing moot appeals.

The purchasers (respondents) entered into an agreement to buy a residential property from the vendor (appellant), conditional upon a satisfactory home inspection in the purchasers' sole and absolute discretion.

After receiving an inspection report identifying several deficiencies, the purchasers decided not to waive the condition and requested the return of their deposit.

The vendor refused, arguing the purchasers did not act reasonably or in good faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision ordering the return of the deposit, finding that the inspection condition imported both objective and subjective elements, and that the purchasers exercised their discretion honestly, in good faith, and reasonably based on the inspection report.