Health Law - SCJ

The defendants, Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences and Dr. Omar Ghaffar, brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss a medical malpractice action.

The plaintiff, Donald Jameson Whitehead, failed to file any expert evidence or affidavit evidence in response, despite being self-represented and advised of the requirements.

The court found that the defendants had discharged their evidentiary burden by providing expert opinions that their care met the standard of care and that consent was properly obtained.

Given the plaintiff's failure to adduce expert evidence, which is generally fatal in medical malpractice cases except in the clearest of circumstances, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The motions for summary judgment were granted, and the action was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society applied under s. 161 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, to commit the child, A.R.P., to a secure treatment program for 180 days due to severe mental health issues, high-risk behaviours, and a history of self-harm and substance abuse.

The child, represented by the Office of the Children's Lawyer, opposed the application.

The court found that all six criteria under s. 164(1) of the CYFSA were met, including the child suffering from a mental disorder (FASD, intellectual disability, borderline personality disorder), having caused or attempted serious bodily harm within 45 days and 12 months of the application, and that the proposed secure treatment program was effective, appropriate, and the least restrictive option given the child's complex needs and lack of success with less restrictive alternatives.

The defendants brought a motion to address two issues: the admissibility of opinions in two plaintiff expert reports (Miyanji and Levin) and the admissibility of evidence from five lay witnesses.

The court ruled that portions of the Miyanji and Levin reports that did not respond to specific "Defence Expert Reports" or introduced new standard of care issues were inadmissible due to late service and lack of reasonable explanation.

The motion to exclude the lay witnesses was dismissed as premature, with the court stating that the admissibility of their evidence, particularly any opinion evidence, should be assessed at the time it is tendered at trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking several orders before trial, including dismissal of claims against certain defendants, leave to amend their statement of claim, preliminary determination of jury questions, and exclusion of expert evidence.

The court granted the dismissal of claims against the "Released Defendants" without costs, as it was previously agreed upon.

Leave was granted to file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, as the proposed amendments were extensive and did not remove admissions.

The court also determined the format for jury questions, largely adopting the plaintiffs' approach for damages and requiring explanations for answers, emphasizing standard of care and "but for" causation.

The issue of expert evidence was adjourned to a later date.

The Defendant Physicians sought an extension of time to serve three expert reports under Rule 53.03(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Plaintiffs opposed, seeking to exclude the reports due to late service.

The court found that the lawyer's inadvertence constituted a reasonable explanation for the delay.

The court also determined that granting leave would not cause uncompensable prejudice to the Plaintiffs or undue delay, noting that liability was always a live issue despite the Plaintiffs' trial preparations.

The motion was granted, extending the time for service of the expert reports, and the Plaintiffs were granted leave to file reply reports.

The appellant, G.H., appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that upheld a physician's finding of her incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication and a Community Treatment Plan (CTP), and confirmed the renewal of a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's determination that G.H. was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions due to her mental disorder, and that the CTO criteria were met.

The court also upheld the Board's dismissal of preliminary objections.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to preclude the defendants from introducing evidence from fifteen expert reports served late in a medical malpractice action.

The court considered the admissibility under Rule 53.08, assessing whether there was a reasonable explanation for the late service and if granting leave would cause irreparable prejudice or undue delay.

The court allowed some reports as supplementary or responding reports, finding a general reasonable explanation for delay due to discovery issues and prior party understanding.

However, it excluded a vocational report that introduced new scenarios without prior notice and a neuropsychological report, reiterating a previous ruling that no neuropsychological impairment issue was pleaded or supported by evidence, and its introduction would cause significant prejudice and necessitate trial adjournment.

The defendant, Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack, brought a motion to dismiss a certified class action for delay under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The class action, initiated in 2003 by the representative plaintiff Anna Barbiero, alleged medical negligence and battery related to Dr. Pollack's injection of Injectable Grade Liquid Silicone (IGLS) for lip augmentation.

The court found the 21-year delay inordinate and inexcusable, with significant periods of unexplained inactivity.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice, and actual prejudice was established due to the loss of the IGLS sample, which was crucial for the defendant's ability to test its composition and defend against liability and causation claims.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the class action for delay, and ordered that notice be provided to class members.

The plaintiff, Nino Kotorashvili, sued the defendant, Dr. Moo Hyung Lee, for medical negligence following a re-fracture of her clavicle after hardware removal surgery.

The court found Dr. Lee negligent for breaching the standard of care by prematurely removing the hardware without updated imaging and failing to obtain informed consent regarding the increased risk of re-fracture.

The re-fracture led to a malunion and a third reconstructive surgery.

The court awarded the plaintiff $35,000 in general damages for the re-fracture, prolonged recovery, and the need for the third surgery, plus pre-judgment interest at 2%.

The plaintiffs brought eight proposed class actions against various long-term care (LTC) home owners and operators in Ontario, alleging systemic negligence and gross negligence in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered whether the claims met the certification criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, particularly in light of the statutory immunity provided by the Supporting Ontario's Recovery Act (SORA).

The court certified six of the actions against the main corporate groups, finding that the pleadings disclosed a viable cause of action in gross negligence and that a class action was the preferable procedure.

However, the court dismissed the certification motions against independently owned homes and municipalities due to the lack of a collective enterprise and missing representative plaintiffs.

The appellant appealed an order from the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) confirming his involuntary patient status and incapacity to consent to treatment.

The appeal regarding involuntary status became moot as the appellant was discharged.

The court focused on the finding of incapacity.

The CCB found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment, relying on his repeated denial of a mental disorder despite exhibiting symptoms.

The court applied a palpable and overriding error standard of review to the CCB's factual conclusions.

The appeal was dismissed, as the court found no palpable and overriding error in the CCB's conclusion that the appellant's condition prevented him from appreciating the consequences of his treatment decisions.

The representative plaintiffs in a certified class action against Cook (Canada) Inc., Cook Incorporated, and William Cook Europe APS moved for court approval of a notice plan for a proposed settlement.

The class action concerned optionally retrievable inferior vena cava filters.

The court reviewed the proposed short-form and long-form notices and the dissemination plan, finding them compliant with the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The motion for approval of the notice plan was granted.

BIE Health Products brought a motion seeking production of expert instructions, communications between the Attorney General (AG) and its experts (Dr. Barbara Menzies and Errol Soriano), expert notes and draft reports, an updated AG List of Documents, and the unredacted version of an inadvertently disclosed document.

The court dismissed all aspects of BIE's motion, finding that expert instructions were adequately disclosed, no reasonable grounds existed to suspect undue interference with expert independence to warrant disclosure of communications or drafts, and the inadvertently disclosed document was subject to solicitor-client privilege.

Costs were awarded to the AG.

The defendants Kenneth LeDez and Ron Linden brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), or alternatively, to strike certain pleadings under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The plaintiff, a hyperbaric medicine specialist, sued after LeDez accused her of unethical conduct and orchestrated her removal from a professional association, stemming from her "off-label" use of hyperbaric procedures.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the plaintiff's defamation claim had substantial merit and the defendants lacked a valid defense, and that the public interest in allowing the suit to continue outweighed protecting the defendants' expressions, which were found to exceed privileged occasions and potentially be malicious.

The alternative motion to strike pleadings was granted in part, striking claims for unlawful interference with economic relations, conspiracy, bad faith, and breach of fiduciary duty, but allowing the corporate oppression remedy claim to stand as it was based on specific corporate acts rather than expressions.

The plaintiffs, Vincent and Rosemary Tookenay, brought a motion to extend the time for service of their statement of claim in a medical malpractice action against the Estate of Dr. Michael O’Mahony and others, and to validate irregular service.

The statement of claim was issued in April 2021 but not properly served until January 2023, well beyond the six-month deadline.

The plaintiffs attributed the delay to a "miscommunication" within their lawyers' office.

The defendant Estate opposed the motion, arguing significant and uncompensable prejudice due to the unavailability of two key witnesses: Dr. O’Mahony, who suffered severe cognitive decline and later passed away, and nurse practitioner Melissa Georgiou, who died of cancer.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding an unexplained one-month delay after the plaintiffs' lawyers realized the claim had not been served, and actual prejudice to the defendant Estate due to the loss of crucial witness testimony.

The applicant sought removal of her sister as attorney for personal care and property for their elderly mother, a declaration that later powers of attorney were invalid, and appointment of herself as guardian.

The court found the grantor incapable of making personal care and financial decisions, held that the 2021 powers of attorney were executed in suspicious circumstances, and concluded that the evidence did not establish capacity at execution.

The court further found that the respondent failed to meet fiduciary and personal care obligations, including arrears in long-term care rent, utility disconnections, deficient disclosure, and exclusion of supportive family members.

The applicant was appointed guardian for property and personal care, subject to conditions including no removal from Ontario without further court order.

The College of Dental Technologists of Ontario brought an application for an order directing the respondent to cease engaging in the practice of dental technology.

The respondent, who was not a registered member of the College, operated a dental laboratory and performed metal framework for dental prosthetic devices without on-site supervision.

The court found that the respondent's activities fell within the statutory definition of the practice of dental technology and violated the requirement for supervision by a registered member.

The application was granted, and the respondent was ordered to comply with the legislation, though no costs were awarded due to his cooperation and cessation of the activities.

The plaintiff sued the defendant plastic surgeon for medical malpractice, alleging he breached the standard of care by failing to assess her and obtain x-rays within 7 to 10 days following surgery for a fractured finger.

The plaintiff claimed this delay prevented an immediate repeat surgery and necessitated a more complex corrective procedure months later.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding no established standard of care requiring a general plastic surgeon to conduct a post-operative assessment and x-rays within the 7 to 10-day window.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against an emergency room physician following the death of their 27-year-old daughter from a cerebellar stroke.

The patient had presented to the emergency department with nausea, vomiting, and weakness, and was discharged with a diagnosis of intoxication.

The next day, she was found at home with severe trauma and a massive stroke, from which she died.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the physician met the standard of care, as the patient exhibited no focal neurological signs warranting a gait assessment or CT scan.

The court also found that causation was not proven, accepting expert evidence that the stroke likely occurred the following day due to trauma.

The plaintiff, a person with a severe neurodegenerative condition, brought an action against multiple defendants alleging Charter violations, public law breaches, and private law duties related to his hospital care, home care funding, and the constitutionality of the medical assistance in dying (MAID) provisions of the Criminal Code.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court struck the statement of claim in its entirety, finding it failed to plead material facts, asserted causes of action unknown to law (such as a freestanding Charter right to health care), and constituted an abuse of process by collaterally attacking binding Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The action was dismissed against the federal and provincial Crown defendants without leave to amend.

Leave to amend was granted on strict terms for specific claims against the hospital, the local health integration network, and the independent living centre.