Health Law - SCJ

The applicants sought to remove their brother as their mother's Power of Attorney for Personal Care, alleging he failed to fulfill his duties by restricting their access to her, relocating her without consultation, and failing to act in her best interests.

The court found no evidence of misconduct or neglect, noting the respondent acted in accordance with the mother's wishes for privacy and made reasonable decisions regarding her care.

The application to remove the respondent was dismissed, but the court ordered him to provide an informal accounting of the mother's finances to reduce family conflict.

The self-represented plaintiff commenced an action against a hospital, its CEO, a local health integration network, and retirement homes, claiming $10 million in damages for negligence, 'kidnapping for profit', and murder relating to his mother's care and subsequent death.

The hospital defendants moved to strike the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court allowed the motion to proceed despite the defendants having already filed a statement of defence.

The court struck the claim without leave to amend, finding no basis for personal liability against the CEO, no duty of care owed to the plaintiff in his personal capacity by the hospital defendants, and that the alleged torts of murder and kidnapping are not recognized in civil law.

Costs of $7,500 were awarded to the hospital defendants.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding a physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board erred by relying on outdated medical history and by conflating his disagreement with the proposed treatment with incapacity.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the appellate standards of review from Vavilov, finding that the Board's treatment of medical history was a question of mixed fact and law entitled to deference.

The court concluded the Board correctly applied the legal test for capacity without resorting to a best interests analysis.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a medical negligence action against her family physician, alleging he failed to obtain informed consent regarding the increased relative risks of blood clots associated with the birth control pill Yaz.

The plaintiff suffered a stroke shortly after taking sample packs of Yaz provided by the physician.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the physician met the standard of care for disclosure and that the plaintiff would have taken the medication even if fully informed of the statistical risks.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove factual causation, as medical evidence indicated her stroke was cryptogenic and not caused by the medication.

The applicant sought to be appointed as guardian of property and person for her 80-year-old grandmother, who was suspected of having dementia.

The application could not be heard on its merits due to late filing of materials and a lack of sufficient information regarding the respondent's assets.

The court adjourned the hearing, suspended the existing Power of Attorney, and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as temporary guardian of property to investigate the respondent's financial affairs.

This motion concerned a claim for damages against a nurse, Lindsey Coyle, who falsified medication orders and failed to administer medication to patient Hermina Fletcher, leading to Ms. Fletcher's death from morphine toxicity.

Coyle had pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death.

The plaintiffs, Ms. Fletcher's Estate, her son, and granddaughter, sued Coyle for damages.

Coyle did not defend the action.

The court found that the common law doctrine of fraudulent concealment suspended the limitation period, making the action timely.

Coyle was found liable.

The court assessed general damages for the Estate at $25,000 and damages for loss of care, guidance, and companionship under the Family Law Act for the son at $40,000 and the granddaughter at $25,000.

The motion also granted a sealing order, a bar order preventing Coyle from seeking contribution or indemnity, and awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis ($40,000), with the balance of the motion adjourned for the determination of punitive damages.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to produce unredacted copies of the plaintiff's hospital records relating to a recent psychotic episode.

The plaintiffs had redacted portions containing false, delusional allegations of criminal conduct against third parties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the redacted information was irrelevant to the personal injury claim and its disclosure would cause significant harm to the plaintiff and innocent third parties.

The plaintiffs' cross-motion for a sealing order and anonymization was adjourned to allow compliance with the Practice Direction regarding notice to the media for discretionary publication bans, with an interim publication ban granted.

Randy Hillier, a former Member of Provincial Parliament, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's COVID-19 Gathering Restrictions (O. Reg. 82/20 and O. Reg 265/21), arguing they violated his Charter right to peaceful assembly under s. 2(c).

He faced charges for attending political protest rallies during the spring 2021 lockdown.

While Ontario conceded the s. 2(c) infringement, it argued the restrictions were justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court, applying the Oakes test and relying on the precedent set by Ontario (Attorney General) v. Trinity Bible Chapel, found that the restrictions served a pressing and substantial objective (reducing COVID-19 transmission and protecting the healthcare system), were rationally connected to that objective, minimally impaired Charter rights given the urgent and uncertain circumstances, and were proportionate.

The court emphasized the application of the precautionary principle in public health emergencies.

The application was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

The appellant, Brandon Mott, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that found him incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

Mott, diagnosed with schizophrenia, denied his illness and argued the Board failed to consider reported side effects and the role of substance use in his mental health history.

The Board had concluded Mott was unable to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of declining treatment due to his inability to recognize the manifestations of his mental condition, a finding upheld by the court.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's decision.

This was a Rule 7.08 motion for court approval of a $5 million settlement for a minor, Ethan Ajayi, in a medical negligence action.

Unusually, the plaintiffs' counsel did not support the settlement terms but was instructed by the litigation guardian to seek approval.

The court approved the settlement and the associated legal fees, finding it to be in the minor's best interests given the inherent risks of litigation, particularly concerning causation and liability.

The decision also addressed the granting of a partial sealing order to protect solicitor-client privileged information, while declining the request for an in camera hearing, thereby balancing the principle of open courts with the need to preserve fair trial rights.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the Government of Ontario regarding the psychiatric treatment of patients detained in the PST Unit of the St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital between 1976 and 1992.

The plaintiffs alleged that the 'PST Program' was an experimental, abusive therapeutic community that improperly delegated treatment and punishment decisions to 'patient-teachers', resulting in physical and psychological harm.

The court granted certification, finding that the pleadings disclosed causes of action for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, vicarious liability, and breaches of sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

However, the court narrowed the common issues, certifying questions related to systemic negligence, fiduciary duty, vicarious liability, and limitation periods, while directing that Charter breaches, causation, and damages must be determined at individual issues trials.

The court concluded that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure to advance the claims of the highly marginalized class members.

A self-represented plaintiff, suffering from multiple health conditions including Asperger's and PTSD, sued the Government of Canada challenging the exclusion of mental illness from Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) eligibility.

Following a prior ruling by Centa J. that the claim was not frivolous or vexatious, the Government of Canada sought to schedule a motion under Rule 21 to strike the claim for failing to plead a constitutional cause of action with sufficient specificity.

The court, acknowledging the plaintiff's self-represented status, declined to schedule the motion to strike at this stage.

Instead, the court directed the plaintiff to amend his Statement of Claim within 30 days to provide specific details regarding his illnesses, the Charter section relied upon, the specific legislation challenged, and any prior MAID applications or refusals.

The plaintiff was also directed to name "The Attorney General of Canada" as the defendant.

A further case conference was scheduled.

The plaintiff brought a motion to prohibit Dr. John Bohnen from testifying as an expert for the defence, alleging issues with his expert reports (unsigned, invalid contact information) and potential bias due to his past relationship with a defendant and frequent retention by the defence law firm.

The court applied the two-stage test for expert admissibility from *White Burgess* and *Mohan*.

The judge found that the initial failure to sign a report was not a material omission, the contact information provided was valid, and the expert's professional relationships did not demonstrate a lack of independence sufficient to disqualify him.

The motion was dismissed, with the court concluding that the issues raised by the plaintiff pertained to the weight of the expert's evidence rather than its admissibility.

This motion concerned the finalization of a genetic testing requisition form.

Following previous orders for genetic testing, the plaintiffs objected to the defendants' initial requisition form, alleging bias and incompleteness.

The defendants subsequently provided revised forms incorporating the plaintiffs' expert's suggestions.

The court, noting the experts' agreement on the clinical content of the latest form, ordered the requisition form to be finalized consistent with the defendants' third proposed version, along with a prenatal history.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' objections regarding the form's content and the governing law/subcontracting terms, finding them without merit.

This motion for directions concerned the care and property of incapacitated parents, whose powers of attorney were disputed.

Section 3 counsel for the parents sought directions due to alleged interference by one respondent, Mei Chu Sylvia Hsieh, who was the attorney for care and property.

Despite a prior court order, Mei Chu Sylvia Hsieh allegedly stopped auto-pay for pharmaceuticals, withheld OHIP codes, and took the parents to the bank, leading to frozen accounts.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, Rules of Civil Procedure, and its parens patriae authority to protect the parents' best interests.

The court granted the requested order for directions to prevent further interference and ordered disclosure of medical records, emphasizing the need for cooperation among parties.

The respondents (Stewart and her business) brought a motion seeking an order to cross-examine the applicant's affiants and for leave to file their own affidavit evidence at a later time.

They argued that their right to silence in ongoing Provincial Offences Act proceedings justified delaying the filing of their evidence.

The applicant (Health Unit) did not oppose cross-examination but contended that the respondents must first file their affidavits as required by Rule 39.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents failed to meet the test for advance leave under Rule 39.02(2).

The judge held that the right to silence in quasi-criminal proceedings did not outweigh the prejudice to the applicant or justify circumventing the civil procedural rules, which require parties to put all relevant evidence forward before cross-examination to ensure fundamental fairness and efficiency.

The plaintiff brought an unopposed motion for approval of a negotiated settlement and class counsel fees in a class action arising from the defendant's failure to follow public health standards in sterilizing medical instruments at its wound care clinics.

The court approved the settlement, which established a $195,000 fund to compensate the Infected Persons Class, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved class counsel fees of $112,078.93 and a representative plaintiff honorarium of $1,500.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found the appellant incapable of making treatment decisions regarding antipsychotic medications and a Community Treatment Plan.

The appellant challenged the Board's findings on three grounds: error in appreciating foreseeable consequences of treatment decisions, misapprehension of evidence, and error in finding likelihood of substantial mental deterioration without treatment.

The court upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant's inability to recognize the severe psychotic symptoms of her condition prevented her from appreciating the consequences of treatment or lack thereof.

The court also found no misapprehension of evidence and confirmed the Board's assessment of the likelihood of deterioration based on the Mental Health Act criteria, dismissing the appeal on all grounds.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with a schizophrenic disorder, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming he lacked capacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued he was not provided adequate information about the treatment and that the Board failed to recognize his capacity fluctuated.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board made no palpable and overriding error.

The evidence supported the Board's conclusion that the appellant's inability to recognize his illness prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the proposed treatment.

In a medical malpractice action arising from hernia procedures, the defendants brought a motion during trial to exclude certain evidence the plaintiff sought to introduce.

The plaintiff sought to admit decisions from the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) regarding his complaint, as well as anonymous online reviews of the defendant physician.

The court ruled the CPSO documents were strictly inadmissible under s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The court also excluded the online reviews, finding they were hearsay and did not meet the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled exception.