Robert F. Goldstein

The court imposed sentence following a second finding of civil contempt for breach of a prior sentencing order that required the contemnor to remain within Ontario.

Despite a stay expiring and an obligation to return to Canada, the contemnor chose to remain in Europe to complete a vacation, making only minimal efforts to alter travel arrangements.

The court found significant aggravating factors, including the repeat contempt and a demonstrated disregard for court authority, while identifying minimal mitigation.

Emphasizing denunciation and specific deterrence, the court imposed a seven‑month conditional sentence and extended probation with strict travel restrictions and community service.

The plaintiff brought a second contempt proceeding against the defendant for breaching the terms of a prior sentencing order arising from an earlier finding of contempt for violating a permanent injunction in a libel action.

The sentencing order required the defendant to remain in Ontario during the currency of a conditional sentence once the stay pending appeal expired.

The defendant remained in Europe beyond the date he was required to return, arguing that he attempted to change flights and believed reasonable efforts to comply were sufficient.

The court held that civil contempt requires knowledge of the order and intentional commission of the prohibited act, regardless of intent to defy the court.

Finding that the defendant knowingly and wilfully failed to return to Ontario despite having reasonable opportunities to do so, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in contempt.

Following a civil contempt conviction and the imposition of a conditional sentence of imprisonment with probation, the court addressed allegations that the contemnor had breached the conditional sentence order.

The court considered the appropriate procedure for dealing with alleged breaches of conditional sentences imposed for civil contempt.

It held that a breach constitutes a fresh contempt that may be pursued through a motion supported by evidence under Rule 60.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the Criminal Code conditional sentence breach framework may provide guidance for available remedies, the court held that the breach must still be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in civil contempt proceedings.

The court outlined procedural options, including a fresh contempt motion or investigation by the conditional sentence supervisor.

Following a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ action alleging forgery and fraud in relation to a vehicle lease, the court determined the issue of costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the plaintiffs had advanced serious but unsubstantiated allegations of fraud.

The court held that such allegations justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

While accepting that the defence costs outlines reflected some minor over-lawyering and partial duplication of effort, the court concluded that the defendants were nonetheless entitled to significant costs.

The amounts claimed were modestly reduced and substantial indemnity costs were awarded.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had acquitted after finding reasonable doubt as to whether the accused actually had alcohol in her system.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge erred by conflating the requirement of reasonable suspicion for a roadside demand with proof that alcohol was actually present.

The proper inquiry was whether the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to suspect alcohol in the accused’s body at the time of the demand.

Because the officer testified that he smelled alcohol on the accused’s breath and the trial judge accepted that evidence, the reasonable suspicion threshold was met.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving arising from a single-vehicle crash.

At trial, breath samples and incriminating statements were excluded due to Charter breaches, including violations of ss. 8 and 10(b), but police observations of intoxication and erratic driving were admitted.

The appellant argued that all evidence obtained during detention should have been excluded and that the trial judge misapprehended the identification evidence and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The appeal court held that there is no automatic exclusion of all evidence following an unlawful arrest and that the remaining evidence, including civilian and police observations, supported the conviction.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence and upheld the guilty verdict.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from an impaired driving incident involving a multi‑vehicle collision and breath samples taken outside the statutory two‑hour window.

The defence advanced an intervening drinking theory, asserting that alcohol was consumed after the accident but before the breath tests.

The trial judge rejected the defence as incredible and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant alleged misapprehension of toxicological evidence, improper judicial notice of surrender times for intermittent sentences, and improper use of compelled statements.

The court held that any errors were not material to the verdict and that the trial judge’s credibility findings were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

An interpleader motion sought a declaration that a property transferred into the son’s name was held in trust for the mother and therefore not exigible by the son’s judgment creditors.

The responding bank argued the declaration of trust lacked evidentiary support and questioned its authenticity.

The court found the record contained deficiencies but also some evidence suggesting a possible trust, raising credibility issues unsuitable for determination on the motion record.

As a result, the motion for declaratory relief was dismissed and a trial of an issue was directed to determine beneficial ownership and the priority of competing writs of execution.

The requesting state sought an order committing the person sought for extradition in relation to alleged importation and distribution of more than 130,000 ecstasy pills.

The responding party argued that the cooperating witness’s evidence was manifestly unreliable and that the identification evidence was weak.

Applying the Shephard test under the Extradition Act, the court held that the evidence need only disclose a case upon which a properly instructed jury could convict and must not be manifestly unreliable.

The court found corroboration through intercepted communications and law enforcement evidence, and concluded that although the identification evidence was weak, it was not manifestly unreliable.

The court ordered committal for extradition, leaving surrender to be determined at the ministerial stage.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement arising from a dispute over a boat that the defendant had taken possession of after the parties’ relationship ended.

Through email exchanges, the defendant accepted the plaintiff’s offer to settle the action for $20,000 inclusive of costs and later requested an extension of time to pay.

The defendant later argued that no binding agreement existed because no settlement agreement or release had been signed.

The court held that the email correspondence clearly demonstrated agreement on all essential terms and that a signed document was not required for a binding settlement.

Finding no genuine issue regarding the parties’ intention to be bound and no policy reason to refuse enforcement, the court enforced the settlement.

The appellant appealed convictions for attempting to disarm a police officer, assaulting a police officer, assaulting a police officer to prevent arrest, and two counts of breach of probation.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest contrary to the principles in R. v. W.D., and that the judge shifted the burden of proof by drawing adverse inferences from the absence of defence evidence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, rejected the appellant’s testimony with reasons, and then considered whether the remaining evidence left a reasonable doubt.

The judge’s comments regarding the absence of corroborating evidence merely observed the evidentiary record and did not shift the burden of proof.

The convictions were upheld.

The appellant appealed convictions for refusing to comply with a breath demand, assault with intent to resist arrest, four counts of assaulting a police officer, and carrying a concealed weapon following a roadside stop for speeding.

The appellant argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, erred in dismissing Charter claims alleging violations of s. 10(b), s. 7, and s. 12, and incorrectly found that police had grounds to demand a breath sample.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s reasons were adequate and that credibility findings rejecting the appellant’s evidence were entitled to deference.

The court further held that police were justified in delaying access to counsel due to safety concerns and that reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption supported the roadside demand.

The convictions were upheld.

The Crown applied for mandamus after a trial judge declined to correct an erroneous sex offender registry order made following conviction for two counts of sexual assault.

The sentencing judge had imposed a 10‑year registration order under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act when the Criminal Code mandated a lifetime order for multiple designated offences.

The court held that the sentencing judge possessed inherent jurisdiction to correct the error because the duration of a SOIRA order is determined by a mechanical statutory calculation rather than a substantive sentencing discretion.

As the trial judge declined jurisdiction and no clear appeal route existed for such an order in summary conviction proceedings, the Superior Court granted mandamus.

The matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice to correct the order.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code for an order directing an assessment to determine whether the offender should be designated a dangerous offender or long‑term offender following a guilty plea to assault causing bodily harm.

The offender previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter arising from an earlier violent assault and committed the new offence while on parole and under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

The court considered the low threshold applicable to ordering an assessment and whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the offender might meet the criteria under s. 753 or s. 753.1.

Finding evidence of a pattern of unprovoked violent behaviour associated with substance abuse and a failure to restrain conduct, the court concluded the statutory threshold was met.

An assessment order was therefore granted.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for assault with a weapon and breach of probation, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant argued that counsel failed to properly advise him about the decision not to testify and inadequately cross‑examined Crown witnesses.

Fresh evidence was admitted including affidavits from the appellant and trial counsel, 911 recordings, and the appellant’s criminal record.

The court applied the three‑part test for ineffective assistance of counsel and found the appellant failed to establish incompetence or resulting miscarriage of justice.

Trial counsel’s tactical decisions regarding testimony and cross‑examination were within the range of reasonable professional judgment, and there was no reasonable probability the verdict would have differed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on charges of possession of marijuana, assaulting a police officer, and failing to comply with bail.

The trial judge had concluded that the accused’s Charter rights were violated, apparently based on racial profiling, unlawful arrest, and excessive force, and excluded the marijuana evidence.

The appeal judge held that the trial reasons were inadequate and failed to explain the path to the conclusions, preventing meaningful appellate review.

The decision also contained legal errors, including conflation of Charter concepts relating to detention, arrest, and search, and failure to resolve critical credibility issues regarding the police officer’s evidence.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiffs, judgment creditors following a default judgment in earlier litigation, commenced a new action alleging that the original defendants and related parties were dissipating or concealing assets to defeat execution.

On an ex parte motion, they sought a Mareva injunction, a Norwich order directed at major banks, a certificate of pending litigation over property allegedly improved using misappropriated assets, leave to amend the notice of action to add further defendants, and a sealing order.

The court found a strong prima facie case and a real risk of asset dissipation based on prior findings of dishonesty and non‑compliance with court orders in related proceedings.

The court granted the Mareva injunction, the Norwich order requiring banks to search for and produce records at the plaintiffs’ expense, the certificate of pending litigation, and leave to amend pleadings.

A temporary sealing order was also granted under the Dagenais/Mentuck framework pending the return of the Mareva injunction.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce minutes of settlement reached in a wrongful dismissal action.

After signing the settlement, the defendant discovered evidence suggesting the plaintiff had performed work for competitors during employment using company resources and had attempted to delete related computer files.

The defendant repudiated the settlement and commenced its own action for damages.

The court held that although a settlement existed, it should not be enforced where enforcement would create a real risk of clear injustice.

Given newly discovered evidence of alleged misconduct that was not reasonably discoverable prior to settlement, the motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg under the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had excluded the breathalyzer evidence after finding the Crown failed to prove the samples were taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(c)(ii), because police facilitated a 30‑minute telephone call between the accused and his mother before testing.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard and effectively required testing “as soon as possible.” The Superior Court held the trial judge applied the correct legal test and that the determination regarding the reasonableness of the delay was a factual finding entitled to deference.

As there was evidence supporting the finding that the delay rendered the samples not taken as soon as practicable, no palpable and overriding error was established.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for prowl by night and assaulting a peace officer.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant’s evidence as not credible and accepted the arresting officer’s testimony despite minor inconsistencies.

On appeal, the appellant raised arguments concerning credibility assessment, alleged failure to consider motive, the absence of a witness connected to a 911 call, and alleged procedural irregularities.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the principles in R. v. W.(D.) and that appellate courts owe deference to findings of fact and credibility.

No errors of law or findings unsupported by the evidence were demonstrated, and the appeal was dismissed.