Peter Thorning

During a murder trial, the deceased's family brought an urn containing the deceased's ashes into the overflow courtroom.

The trial judge ruled that the urn must be removed from the courthouse.

The court found that leaving the urn overnight posed practical and security concerns, and carrying it in and out risked the jury seeing it, which could prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial.

The court also noted that the presence of the remains could adversely impact the appearance of neutrality.

In a first-degree murder trial involving an East Indian accused and a white victim, the court ruled on jury selection procedures following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan.

The court established specific anti-bias instructions and challenge for cause questions addressing conscious and unconscious bias regarding race, drug use, and the Indigenous status of Crown witnesses.

The court determined that the trial judge, rather than counsel, would ask the challenge for cause questions, and that prospective jurors would be given advance notice of the questions.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking offences, applied under s. 462.34(1) of the Criminal Code to access approximately $133,000 in restrained funds held in their corporation's bank account to pay for living and legal expenses.

The court found the applicants had an interest in the funds and lacked sufficient other means to pay their legal fees, though they did not need the funds for living expenses.

However, because the corporation owed approximately $67,000 in unremitted HST, which is deemed to be held in trust for the Crown under the Excise Tax Act, the court only released the remaining $66,000 to the applicants' counsel to fund their defence.

The applicant, charged with multiple sexual offences, applied for a stay of proceedings alleging abuse of process.

He argued that the Crown improperly adjourned his bail hearing, police violated his right to silence, and a correctional officer directed another inmate to assault him while in pre-trial custody.

The court found that while the bail adjournment was improper, it was done in good faith and did not warrant a stay.

The court also found no violation of the right to silence and insufficient evidence that the correctional officer directed the assault.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, Adib Ibrahim, was found guilty of manslaughter after intentionally driving his taxi into a skateboarder, Ralph Bissonnette, causing his death.

This decision addresses the sentencing.

The Crown sought a four-year penitentiary term, DNA order, weapons prohibition, and driving prohibition.

The defence requested a conditional sentence, citing the accused's lack of criminal record, family support, health issues, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation, finding a high degree of moral blameworthiness due to the intentional aggressive act.

The accused was sentenced to 3 years and 11 months incarceration, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

A further driving prohibition was declined given existing bail conditions and the term of incarceration.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and sexual assault, brought a motion to introduce evidence suggesting an alternate perpetrator.

The proposed evidence included trace DNA found on the deceased, social media posts by the deceased expressing fear of her neighbours, and evidence of criminal activity at the neighbouring rooming house.

The Crown opposed the admission, arguing it was speculative and prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it relevant as circumstantial context that could raise a reasonable doubt, and held that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to exclude DNA evidence obtained under a warrant.

The defence argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied on unlawfully obtained information, specifically banking records from a US bank and a cast-off DNA sample seized by US Homeland Security Investigations.

The court found the banking information was obtained unlawfully and the extraction of the DNA profile from the cast-off sample potentially violated s. 8 of the Charter.

While bound to excise this information from the ITO, rendering the warrant invalid, the court ultimately admitted the DNA evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, a taxi driver, was charged with manslaughter following a fatal collision with a longboarder.

The Crown alleged the accused intentionally veered into the victim in a fit of road rage, while the accused claimed he was unaware of the victim's presence and the collision resulted from a momentary lapse of attention or a mechanical 'bump steer'.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding that he intentionally steered his taxi into the curb lane knowing the victim was beside him.

The court concluded this conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person, finding the accused guilty of manslaughter based on the unlawful acts of assault and dangerous driving.

The appellant, Vu Truong, appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal raised two issues: whether the trial judge properly determined the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether the trial judge unevenly scrutinized the appellant's evidence compared to the police officer's.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof and did not unfairly scrutinize the evidence.

The court noted numerous inconsistencies and implausibilities in the appellant's testimony, contrasting with the consistency and common-sense nature of the police officer's evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal raised two grounds: (1) that the conviction was unreasonable given the inconsistency with a co-accused's acquittal, and (2) that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application regarding trial delay.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable, as the co-accused testified and was believed while the appellant's witness was rejected as untruthful.

The trial delay of 27 months fell within the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The sentence of ten years was upheld as fit given the large quantity of cocaine involved and the appellant's prior conviction for the same offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual assault, and incest relating to sexual abuse of his daughter.

The appellant claimed the Crown breached its disclosure obligations by failing to produce therapeutic records obtained by the victim in New York.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant failed to establish that the Crown decided to use the records before disclosure and that any non-disclosure did not impair his right to full answer and defence.

The Court allowed the sentencing appeal on consent, setting aside a conviction for sexual assault relating to the 1997/1998 incident to avoid double jeopardy under the Kienapple principle, and adjusted the sentences accordingly.

The accused was tried for trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime following a major drug investigation involving intercepted cell phone communications.

The Crown relied on expert evidence to interpret guarded language and slang used by the accused and others to establish that the drug being trafficked was cocaine.

The court accepted the expert's opinion that terms like 'half B' and specific pricing structures referred exclusively to cocaine, rejecting the defence argument that the communications could have been about marijuana.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and refusing to re-open the application after the release of R. v. Jordan.

He also argued the trial judge erred by admitting in-car video evidence of his impairment after finding a s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly characterized a 4.5-month delay caused by a judge's recusal as a discrete event/neutral delay.

The court also held the trial judge properly exercised his discretion not to re-open the delay application and correctly admitted the video evidence, which merely confirmed the officers' lawful observations of impairment.

The defendant, Muhammad Madbouli, brought an application to exclude evidence seized from an apartment, alleging breaches of sections 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The police unlawfully seized keys during arrest, used them to locate and enter an apartment without a warrant, and significantly delayed the defendant's access to counsel for six hours.

The Crown conceded the Charter breaches.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court found the breaches serious, significantly impacting the defendant's rights, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application was granted, and the evidence was excluded.

The accused was charged with trafficking in heroin, possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, and 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all applications.

The section 11(b) delay application was dismissed on the basis that while the total delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months, exceptional circumstances justified a deduction of approximately 4 months, bringing the net delay to 17 months.

The court also found that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied.

The sections 8 and 7 applications challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and search were dismissed based on findings that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest based on information provided by a witness, and that the search incident to arrest was therefore lawful.

The court rejected the accused's abuse of process application.

The applicant was charged with possession of forged credit cards and child pornography after the CBSA intercepted a package of blank payment cards addressed to him.

After a Justice of the Peace refused to issue a search warrant due to insufficient grounds, police conducted a controlled delivery and arrested the applicant in his home without a warrant.

The police subsequently obtained a search warrant based partly on evidence found during the unlawful arrest and misleading information.

The applicant brought a Charter motion to exclude the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice found severe violations of the applicant's s. 8 and s. 9 Charter rights, noting the officers lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest and relied on a mere suspicion.

The evidence, including the child pornography found on the applicant's computer, was excluded under s. 24(2).

The appellant, Andrew Kirk, appealed his conviction for impaired driving, raising two issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, and (2) whether the trial judge erred in finding that the identity of the accused had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal court found that despite uncertainty regarding which specific officer made the arrest, each officer present had sufficient subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

On the issue of identity, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that there was overwhelming evidence from multiple witnesses, including in-dock identification, to prove the accused's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

P.B. was found guilty by a jury of sexual interference, two counts of sexual assault, and incest against his daughter.

The court considered the statutory purpose and principles of sentencing, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse.

Aggravating factors included a gross breach of parental trust, prolonged and escalating abuse, grooming, and the devastating impact on the victim, including an alleged pregnancy and abortion.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record and credit for stringent bail conditions.

The court applied case law regarding sentencing ranges for such offences and the totality principle for consecutive sentences.

A total sentence of 8 years was imposed, reduced by 6 months for pre-sentence bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 7.5 years.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, Sex Offender Information Registration for life, and a communication ban with the victim.

During a trial for second degree murder arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, the accused requested a jury instruction on consciousness of innocence based on his post-offence conduct, including calling 911, asking about the victim's condition, and suggesting police check his vehicle for forensic evidence.

The trial judge declined to give the instruction, finding that the accused's actions were equally consistent with guilt or innocence and therefore lacked probative value to support an inference of a consciousness of innocence.

The accused was arrested for dangerous driving after striking and killing a skateboarder with his taxi.

The charge was later upgraded to second degree murder.

The Crown applied to admit the accused's video-recorded statement to police, while the accused applied to exclude it, alleging it was involuntary due to an atmosphere of oppression and that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached.

The court found the statement was voluntary, as the police treated the accused courteously and no oppressive conditions existed.

Although the court found an implementational breach of s. 10(b) due to a 1 hour and 50 minute delay in facilitating contact with duty counsel, the police made a "fresh start" by allowing the accused to consult duty counsel twice before taking the statement.

The police also made diligent efforts to contact the accused's counsel of choice before resorting to duty counsel.

The court dismissed the Charter application and ruled the statement admissible.