Peter Thorning

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on an 'Over 80' charge.

The trial judge had excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach because the arresting officer failed to turn his mind to the issue of mouth alcohol before administering an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in concluding the officer's grounds could not be assessed objectively, materially misapprehended the evidence by interrupting the Crown's re-examination, and erred in her s. 24(2) Grant analysis by drawing unwarranted inferences about police training.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused brought an application for a change of venue in a criminal proceeding.

The written reasons for decision were subject to a publication order and therefore omitted from the publicly available decision.

However, the court issued an order under s. 599(1)(a) of the Criminal Code directing that the trial be moved from Barrie to another location.

The precise location of the trial was to be determined by the Regional Senior Justice pursuant to the protocol of the Council of Regional Senior Justices of the Superior Court of Ontario.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and failure to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded the second charge and it was dismissed.

The court found the defendant guilty of the first charge.

The central issue was whether the defendant had care and control of the vehicle.

The court found that the defendant's actual operation of the vehicle—moving it from a gas pump to a parking spot—established care and control.

The defendant's intoxication was established through witness testimony and video evidence.

The accused was charged with two counts under s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on the accused's involvement in a motor vehicle collision with a police officer's vehicle, physical observations of impairment, and a toxicology report projecting the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident.

The defence challenged the reliability of the toxicology report's assumptions, particularly regarding the timing of the incident and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the essential factual underpinnings of the toxicology report beyond a reasonable doubt and that the physical evidence of impairment was insufficient to meet the threshold for conviction.

Both charges were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg, arguing the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him and demand breath samples, contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

The arrest followed observations of excessive speeding, a dangerous ramp maneuver, the odour of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and an admission of recent drinking.

The court held that the trial judge correctly concluded that the officer had objectively reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of the circumstances.

Even if a Charter breach had occurred, the breath sample evidence would have been admissible under s. 24(2) applying the Grant framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking after drugs were discovered beneath the driver’s seat of a vehicle.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the accused had knowledge or possession of the drugs, particularly with respect to the driver who was not directly linked to incriminating text messages.

The court considered circumstantial evidence including text messages arranging a drug transaction, the presence of six cell phones, the planned meeting location, and cash found in another vehicle connected to the transaction.

Applying the definition of possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code as incorporated into the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court concluded that both accused had knowledge of the drugs and intended to use them in a drug deal.

The Crown proved possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused were charged with possession of methamphetamine and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

In a pre-trial application, they argued their Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10 were violated during a police stop in a parking lot, and sought exclusion of the seized drugs and cell phones under s. 24(2).

The court found that the accused were arbitrarily detained and their rights to counsel were violated, rendering the subsequent searches unreasonable.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police acted in good faith and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits outweighed the breaches.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.