Peter Thorning

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for driving 'over 80', alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

She argued that trial counsel failed to request maintenance and calibration records for the approved instrument and that his failings caused adjudicative unfairness.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel provided reasonable professional assistance by retaining an expert, considering defences, and holding the Crown to its burden of proof, and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and uttering forged documents for her role in a mortgage fraud scheme.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge's decision to hear evidence from a Crown witness before ruling on her s. 11(b) Charter application, and the 15-month delay in delivering reasons for that ruling, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

She also appealed the $25,000 restitution order, arguing the trial judge failed to consider her ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no cogent evidence of bias and noting the trial judge explicitly considered the appellant's financial circumstances.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code following a roadside demand during a RIDE program.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.) and improperly relied on demeanour evidence when rejecting her explanation that nervousness prevented her from providing an adequate breath sample.

The appellate court held that the trial judge correctly applied the W.(D.) principles and reasonably preferred the officer’s testimony that the appellant repeatedly provided inadequate breath samples despite clear instructions and numerous opportunities.

The reasons demonstrated that the credibility assessment was based on the totality of the evidence, not solely on demeanour.

No error in law or misapprehension of evidence was established.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting intoxilyzer results after finding breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge had concluded the investigating officer unlawfully arrested the accused but admitted the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter after applying the Grant framework.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to decide whether roadside sobriety tests occurred, by considering irrelevant factors in the s. 24(2) analysis, and by ruling on the impaired driving charge before determining the Charter application.

The summary conviction appeal court held the trial judge properly applied the Grant factors and was entitled to admit the breath evidence.

No reversible error was found.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation, operation over 80, and dangerous driving arising from an incident on April 9, 2013.

The central issue was the admissibility of medical information and a blood sample obtained via search warrant and production order.

The court found that while a technical breach of Section 8 of the Charter occurred regarding the manner in which information was obtained from hospital staff, the warrants could have issued based on the remaining information.

The court applied the Grant analysis and admitted the evidence, finding the breach was technical in nature and that society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on an 'Over 80' charge.

The trial judge had excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach because the arresting officer failed to turn his mind to the issue of mouth alcohol before administering an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in concluding the officer's grounds could not be assessed objectively, materially misapprehended the evidence by interrupting the Crown's re-examination, and erred in her s. 24(2) Grant analysis by drawing unwarranted inferences about police training.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that evidence obtained during a search of his stash house should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter and that the search warrant was unlawfully obtained.

He also appealed his sentence of six years' imprisonment, a $500,000 fine, and delayed parole eligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Charter breaches were minor and the warrant was validly issued.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part: the delayed parole eligibility order was removed for the proceeds of crime conviction, and the fine was reduced to $75,000 due to a lack of evidence regarding the appellant's ability to pay.

On a summary conviction appeal from an assault conviction arising from a roadside altercation between a driver and a cyclist, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapplied the reasonable doubt framework and improperly intervened throughout the trial.

The appeal court held that the trial judge misstated and failed to apply the principles in W.D., disbelieved the accused without properly considering whether his evidence nonetheless raised a reasonable doubt, and impermissibly usurped the role of Crown counsel through repeated interventions.

The interventions included urging resolution after a not guilty plea, effectively conducting the complainant's examination-in-chief, and asking improper questions of the accused after cross-examination.

Because there was evidence on which a properly instructed judge could convict, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of assault with a weapon and possessing a dangerous weapon following a street fight.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal either did not raise questions of law alone, lacked general significance to the administration of justice, or did not reflect a clear error amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter alleging breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

They were charged with cocaine trafficking offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and faced a projected delay of over 50 months from charge to the anticipated completion of trial.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin, assessing the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

Significant portions of the delay were attributed to the Crown’s failure to provide timely disclosure and inadequate case management.

The court concluded that the applicants’ s. 11(b) rights were breached and that a stay of proceedings was the appropriate remedy.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of assault with a weapon and one count of possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace arising from a street altercation involving multiple participants.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended key identification evidence, improperly relied on hearsay to support continuity of identification, and failed to consider self-defence.

The appeal court held the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of eyewitness testimony, applied the W.(D.) framework, and did not rely on hearsay for a prohibited purpose.

The court further found no air of reality to a self-defence claim given the defence theory that the appellant did not possess the knife.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence was found to be within the acceptable range.

The accused brought an application for a change of venue in a criminal proceeding.

The written reasons for decision were subject to a publication order and therefore omitted from the publicly available decision.

However, the court issued an order under s. 599(1)(a) of the Criminal Code directing that the trial be moved from Barrie to another location.

The precise location of the trial was to be determined by the Regional Senior Justice pursuant to the protocol of the Council of Regional Senior Justices of the Superior Court of Ontario.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and failure to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded the second charge and it was dismissed.

The court found the defendant guilty of the first charge.

The central issue was whether the defendant had care and control of the vehicle.

The court found that the defendant's actual operation of the vehicle—moving it from a gas pump to a parking spot—established care and control.

The defendant's intoxication was established through witness testimony and video evidence.

Several accused charged with robbery with a firearm, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and attempted murder brought applications to exclude or edit numerous text and BBM messages that the Crown sought to introduce at trial.

The applicants argued the messages constituted impermissible similar fact evidence and risked unfair prejudice by suggesting involvement in multiple robberies.

Applying the principles governing similar fact evidence from R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of each message outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court held that references suggesting multiple robberies or unrelated criminal activity should generally be edited or excluded, while messages directly relevant to the planning or execution of the charged robbery were admissible.

The court therefore ordered specific edits or exclusions for numerous messages and permitted others with potential limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking exclusion of evidence relating to firing‑pin indentations on three cartridges recovered from the scene of an alleged robbery and attempted murder.

Police had test‑fired two of the cartridges during the investigation, which obliterated the original firing‑pin impressions and prevented later forensic comparison with a handgun recovered a year later.

The accused argued that the loss of the original impressions constituted unacceptable negligence and breached their right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter, warranting exclusion of the evidence.

The court found that the police conduct amounted to unacceptable negligence and therefore constituted a breach of s. 7.

However, the court held that exclusion of the evidence was not an appropriate remedy because the potential prejudice was speculative and could be addressed through cross‑examination and a jury instruction regarding the Crown’s failure to preserve evidence.

The appellant was convicted of production, conspiracy to produce, and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking in connection with two rural grow operations.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay evidence from a Ministry of Transportation database, admitting real estate documents protected by solicitor-client privilege, and failing to exclude search evidence obtained under invalid general warrants pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant also argued the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of the evidence and concluding that the cumulative circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the convictions.

The accused was charged with two counts under s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on the accused's involvement in a motor vehicle collision with a police officer's vehicle, physical observations of impairment, and a toxicology report projecting the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident.

The defence challenged the reliability of the toxicology report's assumptions, particularly regarding the timing of the incident and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the essential factual underpinnings of the toxicology report beyond a reasonable doubt and that the physical evidence of impairment was insufficient to meet the threshold for conviction.

Both charges were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg, arguing the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him and demand breath samples, contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

The arrest followed observations of excessive speeding, a dangerous ramp maneuver, the odour of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and an admission of recent drinking.

The court held that the trial judge correctly concluded that the officer had objectively reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of the circumstances.

Even if a Charter breach had occurred, the breath sample evidence would have been admissible under s. 24(2) applying the Grant framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking after drugs were discovered beneath the driver’s seat of a vehicle.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the accused had knowledge or possession of the drugs, particularly with respect to the driver who was not directly linked to incriminating text messages.

The court considered circumstantial evidence including text messages arranging a drug transaction, the presence of six cell phones, the planned meeting location, and cash found in another vehicle connected to the transaction.

Applying the definition of possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code as incorporated into the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court concluded that both accused had knowledge of the drugs and intended to use them in a drug deal.

The Crown proved possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed a net sentence of 10 months' imprisonment and 18 months' probation imposed on the respondent for possession of child pornography, making child pornography available, and breach of probation.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge minimized the gravity of the offences and imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors, and noting the custodial portion of the sentence had already been served.