Peter Thorning

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking after drugs were discovered beneath the driver’s seat of a vehicle.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the accused had knowledge or possession of the drugs, particularly with respect to the driver who was not directly linked to incriminating text messages.

The court considered circumstantial evidence including text messages arranging a drug transaction, the presence of six cell phones, the planned meeting location, and cash found in another vehicle connected to the transaction.

Applying the definition of possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code as incorporated into the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court concluded that both accused had knowledge of the drugs and intended to use them in a drug deal.

The Crown proved possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in his analysis of past signification by misapprehending the evidence and failing to provide clear reasons.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to make a necessary ruling under s. 10(b) of the Charter, rendering his s. 24(2) analysis invalid.

The accused were charged with possession of methamphetamine and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

In a pre-trial application, they argued their Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10 were violated during a police stop in a parking lot, and sought exclusion of the seized drugs and cell phones under s. 24(2).

The court found that the accused were arbitrarily detained and their rights to counsel were violated, rendering the subsequent searches unreasonable.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police acted in good faith and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits outweighed the breaches.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction for 'over 80'.

He argued the trial judge improperly intervened in eliciting evidence and erred in relying on the presumption of accuracy in a non-certificate case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the appeal judge properly applied the standard for assessing judicial intervention and that the presumption of accuracy issue did not raise an arguable ground of appeal.

The moving party brought a motion to dismiss the appellant's appeal of a disciplinary penalty on the basis that the notice of appeal was filed 11 days after the 30-day statutory deadline.

The appellant did not oppose the motion.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission found that section 70(1) of the Police Services Act imposes a strict 30-day time limit and that the 1997 amendments to the Act removed the Commission's discretion to extend the time for filing appeals.

The motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed a finding of guilt for discreditable conduct and a penalty of demotion after he was arrested and convicted of impaired driving in Ohio while off-duty.

The appellant argued the Hearing Officer erred by relying on his no-contest plea in Ohio, admitting breathalyzer evidence that did not meet Canadian standards, and failing to stay the proceedings due to the destruction of audio and video tapes by Ohio authorities.

The Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services dismissed the appeal, finding no manifest error in the Hearing Officer's evidentiary rulings or application of Canadian law to the foreign conduct.

The penalty of demotion from First-Class to Third-Class Constable for two years was upheld as reasonable given the seriousness of the misconduct and the need for general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence.

He argued the conviction was unreasonable, the jury charge on self-defence was inadequate, and challenged his involvement in trafficking marijuana.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding evidence of violence and theft supported the robbery conviction, the jury charge was clear, and his presence to assist in trafficking evidenced his guilt as an aider or abettor.

The court found no error in principle in the sentence.

With consent, a stay on a conviction for possession of a firearm while prohibited was vacated, a conviction entered, and a concurrent six-month sentence imposed.

The applicant police officer, facing disciplinary charges under the Police Services Act, sought judicial review of a designated hearing officer's refusal to recuse himself for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant also sought to prohibit the Chief of Police from appointing a former police officer to preside over the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the legislative scheme allows for the appointment of retired police officers and that there was no evidence of institutional or personal bias.

The appellant appealed a Hearing Officer's decision that he lacked jurisdiction to proceed with a disciplinary charge of discreditable conduct against a police officer.

The Commission had previously directed the Chief of Police to initiate a hearing within 60 days, but the charge was served 256 days later.

The Commission found that the Hearing Officer's decision was a final decision subject to appeal.

The Commission granted leave to appeal and held that the 60-day direction was not a mandatory condition that invalidated the proceedings if breached.

The Commission revoked the Hearing Officer's decision, found no abuse of process due to delay, and ordered the Chief of Police to proceed with the charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that police unlawfully entered his apartment, lacked reasonable grounds for his arrest, and that the trial judge erred in applying the burden of proof and failing to declare a mistrial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant invited the police inside, that objective grounds supported the arrest after the appellant fled and discarded crack cocaine, and that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and followed the agreed-upon blended hearing procedure.

The appellant appealed his convictions, which included a charge of endangering the safety of an airplane.

The parties made a joint fresh evidence application on appeal.

Based on the fresh medical evidence, the Court of Appeal found the appellant was not criminally responsible.

The convictions were set aside, findings of not criminally responsible were substituted on all three counts, and the matter was referred to the Review Board for disposition.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for possession of child pornography and a concurrent 6-month sentence for breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended a joint submission, improperly punished him for past lenient sentences, and sought to introduce a psychiatric report as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no joint submission existed regarding the sentence range, the trial judge properly applied the jump principle for repeat offenders, and the proposed fresh evidence failed the Palmer test for admissibility.