Owen Macmillan Goddard

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of aggravated assault and firearms offences, arguing the trial judge misapprehended surveillance video evidence, failed to assess evidence holistically, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law in the trial judge's factual findings or assessment of the circumstantial evidence, and that the reasons were sufficient.

The court reiterated that Crown appeals from acquittals are limited to questions of law alone and cannot challenge the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine, based largely on the testimony and eyewitness identification of a co-conspirator who had already been convicted.

On appeal, the appellants argued the verdicts were unreasonable and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts were not unreasonable but allowed the appeals and ordered new trials due to errors in the jury charge.

Specifically, the trial judge provided an inadequate Vetrovec caution that distracted the jury from the witness's motive to cooperate with police, and gave boilerplate instructions on eyewitness identification that failed to highlight the specific frailties of the witness's evidence.

Two consolidated appeals arising from dial-a-dope drug investigations in which undercover officers, acting on unsubstantiated tips, telephoned phone numbers alleged to be associated with drug trafficking and arranged purchases of cocaine.

The majority affirmed the entrapment framework established in R. v. Mack and R. v. Barnes, holding that police must form reasonable suspicion — whether individualized to a person or tethered to a sufficiently particularized virtual location such as a phone number — before offering an accused the opportunity to commit a criminal offence.

In the first appellant's case, the majority upheld his convictions, finding that reasonable suspicion had crystallized during the call before the opportunity to traffic was extended, as the accused's use of drug-subculture slang corroborated the tip.

In the second appellant's case, the majority found entrapment had occurred because the opportunity to traffic was provided before reasonable suspicion was established, and accordingly reinstated the stay of proceedings.

The minority would have revised the bona fide inquiry prong to require only a factually-grounded investigation into a tightly circumscribed location motivated by genuine law enforcement purposes, under which both appeals would have been dismissed.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the defence sought to have the jury instructed to consider the post-event actions of paramedics and hospital staff when assessing the accused's intent.

The defence argued that these post-offence consequences were relevant to the common sense inference of intent, relying on R. v. Pittman and R. v. Boone.

The Superior Court of Justice rejected this request, holding that third-party post-offence conduct has no bearing on the accused's subjective intent at the time the firearm was discharged.

The court concluded that the common sense inference must be based on the natural and probable consequences of the act itself, not subsequent medical interventions.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought a Corbett application to edit his extensive criminal record before testifying.

The accused argued that Gladue principles should be applied to the Corbett analysis, given his Indigenous background and the systemic discrimination faced by Indigenous persons.

The court agreed, holding that an accused's Indigenous background and the systemic factors contributing to their criminal record are relevant to balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record.

The application was granted, and the court excluded the accused's prior crimes of violence and older youth offences, while permitting cross-examination on crimes of dishonesty.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the transcript of an Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) from a witness's prior guilty plea for substantive use.

The witness, who had pled guilty to attempt to obstruct justice, claimed a lack of memory regarding the events when testifying.

The court found that necessity was established by the witness's recantation and that procedural reliability was met because the ASF was sworn under oath, adopted during a guilty plea with counsel present, and subject to cross-examination at trial.

The application was granted, allowing the edited transcript to be used for the truth of its contents.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on historical sexual offence charges arising from allegations made decades after the alleged events, the court acquitted the accused on all counts.

Applying the W. (D.) framework and general principles governing credibility, reliability, delayed disclosure, and the avoidance of sexual assault myths, the court found significant concerns with the reliability of the complainants' memories and with aspects of their credibility.

The court accepted the accused's evidence where it conflicted with the complainants' evidence and, in any event, held that the record left a reasonable doubt.

All counts on the indictment were dismissed.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of recent Criminal Code amendments (Bill C-75) that abolished peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the repeal of peremptory challenges violated the applicant's rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter by denying him a fair trial with an independent and impartial jury, and that the repeal was overbroad.

The court struck down the repeal of the peremptory challenge provisions but upheld the amendments to the challenge for cause procedure.

The Crown and defence were permitted to exercise peremptory challenges as if the provision had not been repealed.

Sentencing following convictions for four indecent acts and one sexual invitation offence committed by a teacher against a child under 16.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as paramount under the Criminal Code because the offences involved abuse of a young person and a serious breach of trust, with extensive grooming behaviour and profound long-term harm to the victim and family.

Although the offender had no criminal record and significant community support, the court emphasized the enduring emotional and physical consequences of the abuse and the absence of remorse.

A custodial sentence of two years less a day concurrent on the indecent act counts and six months concurrent on the sexual invitation count was imposed, together with probation and multiple ancillary protective orders.

The offender was convicted of sexually assaulting and sexually exploiting his girlfriend's two young daughters over a three-year period.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence based on the offender's lack of a criminal record and positive background.

The court found that a conditional sentence would not adequately address the principles of denunciation and deterrence given the breach of trust and the profound impact on the victims.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day incarceration, consistent with the sentence imposed at the original trial.

The offender, a former teacher, was convicted of sexual exploitation of a former student.

The sexual relationship began when the victim was 16 and lasted for two years, resulting in a pregnancy and abortion.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence based on the breach of trust, while the defence sought 15 to 18 months.

The court weighed the severe impact on the victim against the offender's lack of criminal record, low risk of recidivism, and expressions of remorse.

The court sentenced the offender to 30 months' incarceration, less credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, and a 20-year SOIRA registration.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against his girlfriend's two daughters over a three-year period ending in 2004.

The complainants, now adults, testified that the accused entered their bedrooms at night while they slept and engaged in inappropriate sexual touching.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainants credible and reliable witnesses, rejected the accused's minimization of his presence in the home, and found him guilty on all four counts.

The court also addressed the admissibility of similar fact evidence and found no collusion between the complainants despite the opportunity for communication.

The accused, a former teacher of the complainant, was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation arising from a sexual relationship that developed after the complainant left his class and later worked under his supervision at a drama camp.

The court accepted that a consensual sexual relationship involving intercourse existed by March 2011, but found the complainant's evidence on timing left a reasonable doubt whether the relationship began before she turned 16.

The accused was therefore acquitted on the under-16 counts.

The court nevertheless found that the relationship flowed directly from the earlier teacher-student bond and subsequent supervisory employment relationship, and that the accused remained in a position of trust or authority toward the complainant when she was 16 to 17.

A finding of guilt was entered on the sexual exploitation count under s. 153.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault by pouring boiling water on a vulnerable adult victim.

The victim had initially recanted her allegations, claiming the injuries were self-inflicted, but later reverted to her original account during cross-examination.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on corroborating medical evidence from two treating physicians that the severe burns were inconsistent with self-infliction, combined with the victim's testimony regarding the circumstances of the assault.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: misapprehension of medical evidence, failure to exercise the gatekeeper function regarding expert evidence, misapplication of the burden of proof, and unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction.

Two separate appeals concerning the entrapment defence in dial-a-dope drug trafficking investigations.

In Williams' case, the trial judge found entrapment and stayed drug trafficking charges, but the Crown appealed.

In Ahmad's case, the trial judge rejected an entrapment application and convicted the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that police may provide opportunities to sell drugs to persons associated with phone lines reasonably suspected of being used in dial-a-dope operations, even without reasonable suspicion that those individuals are engaged in criminal activity, provided the police are conducting a bona fide inquiry.

The majority found no entrapment in either case.

The concurrence reached the same result but on the basis that police had reasonable suspicion that both accused were engaged in criminal activity.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons.

The conviction was based on an incident in a grocery store checkout line, where the complainant alleged the appellant touched her inappropriately.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to address three material inconsistencies between the complainant's testimony and the store security video.

Because the trial judge did not provide cogent reasons explaining why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite these contradictions, the appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown sought an adverse inference instruction regarding the accused's failure to call witnesses to support an alibi mentioned in his police statement.

The defence had argued in closing that the alibi was uncontradicted and raised a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge declined to give the adverse inference instruction, finding that the defence's closing submissions did not leave an unbalanced picture with the jury and that it would be unfair since the Crown had introduced the statement containing the alibi.

The accused, a nurse, was charged with sexual assault against a complainant who was brought to a hospital emergency room in a highly intoxicated and unresponsive state.

The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in multiple instances of inappropriate touching, including fondling her breasts and placing her hand on his genitals while inserting an intravenous line.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to her impaired cognitive state, internal inconsistencies, and demonstrated motive to tailor her testimony.

A credible eyewitness who observed the relevant portion of the alleged assault testified that he did not see any of the alleged inappropriate conduct.

The accused's evidence was consistent with the eyewitness account and video evidence.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused, a primary grades music teacher, was charged with one count of assault and thirteen counts of sexual assault and sexual interference involving fourteen complainants.

The Crown proceeded summarily on all counts.

The trial judge found that the evidence of the complainants was tainted by collusion arising from widespread rumours at the school following the initial accusation.

The judge found that the complainants' evidence lacked reliability, noting that none had reported any misconduct prior to the rumours, many had recanted or changed their stories significantly, and the physical circumstances of the alleged touching were improbable.

The judge acquitted the accused on all charges, finding that the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant sought judicial review of a procedural ruling made by its Discipline Committee mid-hearing.

The Committee had ruled that the applicant must comply with the notice and consent requirements of s. 35 of the Mental Health Act before tendering psychiatric records as evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify fragmenting the ongoing administrative proceeding.