Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule matters (SABS) - OCA

The moving party insurer sought an extension of time to file materials for leave to appeal and a stay of a Divisional Court order requiring it to pay $365,257 for home modifications under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The responding party, a 92-year-old woman with catastrophic injuries, required the funds to modify her daughter's home for her care.

The Court of Appeal granted the unopposed extension of time but dismissed the stay motion.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found the insurer failed to establish irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience strongly favoured the responding party given her advanced age, poor health, and immediate need for the benefits.

An appeal concerning the vicarious liability of co-owners of a motor vehicle under the Highway Traffic Act and the scope of insurance coverage under the Insurance Act.

The appellant insurance company argued that where two co-owners jointly own a vehicle, only the co-owner who consented to a third party's possession of the vehicle should be vicariously liable for negligent operation by that third party.

The court rejected this argument, holding that if either co-owner consents to possession by a non-owner, both co-owners are vicariously liable under section 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court also clarified that section 239(1) of the Insurance Act does not create liability but merely requires coverage of liabilities imposed by law.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application to quash the suspension of his driver's licence.

The suspension was imposed under section 41(1)(d) of the Highway Traffic Act following the appellant's guilty plea to impaired driving in New York State, pursuant to a reciprocal agreement between Ontario and New York.

The central issue was whether the guilty plea and conditional discharge in New York constituted a conviction under Ontario law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the application judge correctly interpreted the statutory provision and properly disposed of all issues raised, including natural justice and Charter arguments.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the absence of a transcript of the oral hearing prejudiced his appeal rights.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing an appeal from an arbitrator's decision in an insurance priority dispute.

The appellant argued the judge erred in finding the arbitrator owed no deference to the Licence Appeal Tribunal and in concluding the truck was involved in an accident.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the reasons for judgment and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $15,000 to the respondent.

This appeal concerned a severe brain injury sustained by Megan Desrochers in an ATV accident.

The trial judge found Patrick McGinnis liable for negligence, with 10% contributory negligence by Megan, but dismissed claims against Grant and Catherine McGinnis.

Patrick appealed his liability.

The Desrochers cross-appealed the dismissal of claims against Grant and Catherine, both in tort and under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed Patrick's appeal, upholding his liability.

It also dismissed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Catherine's tort liability.

However, the Court allowed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Grant's liability under HTA s. 192(2), finding that "negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle" includes the negligent transfer of care and control of the vehicle to an unfit person.

A pedestrian struck by a vehicle in 2008 received statutory accident benefits for attendant care and housekeeping until the insurer terminated them in 2010.

In 2015, after receiving a catastrophic impairment designation, the claimant reapplied for benefits.

The Tribunal and Divisional Court found the claim was out of time based on a two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the limitation period was subject to the rule of discoverability and was not a hard limitation period.

The court held that applying a hard limitation period would be contrary to the consumer protection purposes of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and would produce an absurd result by barring claims before the claimant was eligible to make them.

The appellant, a passenger injured in a motor vehicle collision, appealed a trial judgment that resulted in a nil award after the jury verdict of $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages was reduced by a statutory deductible and an advance payment made by the defendants.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's qualification of expert witnesses, aspects of the jury charge, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits and the costs appeal, finding that the trial judge properly admitted non-party expert evidence, provided a balanced jury charge, and correctly applied the costs rules given the nil judgment.

The plaintiff was pushed by the defendant Saywell, causing him to stumble into the path of a truck driven by Cloutier.

He suffered brain damage and became incapable of managing his own affairs.

He settled his statutory accident benefits (SABs) claim and his tort claim against Cloutier (a Pierringer settlement) prior to trial.

At trial, the jury apportioned liability equally among the plaintiff (contributory negligence), Saywell, and Cloutier.

The trial judge adopted the "silo" approach to deducting SABs from tort damages, rather than the strict "apples to apples" matching approach.

The trial judge also held that the non-settling defendant was only entitled to deduct 50 per cent of the SABs from his share of damages.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the silo approach and the proportionate deduction of SABs, overruling prior precedent requiring strict matching.

A motor vehicle collision occurred at an intersection in Hamilton when a vehicle operated by Ms. Safranyos failed to yield the right-of-way and was struck by a vehicle operated by Mr. McHugh, who had consumed alcohol and was speeding.

The trial judge found all three defendants liable: Ms. Safranyos at 50%, Mr. McHugh at 25%, and the City of Hamilton at 25%.

The City appealed on grounds that the trial judge misapplied the non-repair standard and improperly used adverse inferences.

Mr. McHugh appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in finding he could have avoided the collision and misused evidence regarding his intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the City's appeal but allowed Mr. McHugh's appeal, finding the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings and legal analysis regarding Mr. McHugh's liability.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his civil action as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant had been charged with stunt driving and related offences under the Highway Traffic Act, resulting in the seizure of his vehicle for seven days.

He subsequently sued for $75,000 in punitive damages and $2,100 in travel expenses, alleging the seizure constituted theft without his consent or court order.

The motion judge found the claim had no legal merit and dismissed it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the claim was incapable of success on its face and rejecting arguments that the seizure violated Charter rights or the property rights of the vehicle owner.

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle without insurance contrary to the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

He was convicted in absentia at trial and his conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, a statutory declaration from an insurance company employee established that the vehicle was covered by a valid policy of insurance at the time of the alleged offence.

The Crown conceded that the statutory declaration was admissible evidence and that it proved the appellant did not commit the offence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

Appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a negligence action brought by the estate and family members of a deceased man who died in a motor vehicle accident.

The motion judge applied the doctrine of emergency to find that the driver, who was engaged in a drug deal, acted reasonably when he drove away while the deceased was attempting to enter the vehicle, resulting in the deceased's death.

The majority upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the application of the emergency doctrine.

Justice Pepall dissented, arguing that the motion judge failed to properly analyze the elements of the emergency doctrine and that material inconsistencies in the evidence should have precluded summary judgment.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her action against her insurer for damages under unidentified motorist coverage.

The appellant claimed that an unidentified vehicle crossed the center line and caused her to lose control of her vehicle and roll into a ditch.

The jury answered "no" to the question of whether the unidentified driver's negligence caused the accident, but answered "yes" to whether the appellant's evidence of the involvement of an unidentified automobile was corroborated.

The appellant argued the jury's answers were inconsistent, that the trial judge erred in her charge on the standard of care in emergencies, the burden of proof, and that the charge was unbalanced.

The appellant also challenged the conduct of defence counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's answers were reconcilable, the trial judge's charge was adequate, and any concerns about counsel's conduct were appropriately addressed.

An appeal from a Superior Court judgment concerning vehicle possession and operation.

The trial judge found that neither the vehicle owner nor the son consented expressly or impliedly to possession or operation of the truck by Hayes.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding as being open to the trial judge on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000 payable to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing his claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The motion judge had concluded that the accident was a straightforward rear-end collision and that the appellant, as the rear-ending party, failed to discharge his onus of proving the collision did not arise from his negligence.

The appellant challenged the motion judge's findings on three grounds: improper judicial notice of scientific and technical matters, misapprehension of evidence, and erroneous conclusion that there was no genuine issue requiring trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable error in principle or palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's assessment.

Hydro One appealed an application judge's decision declining to grant a general declaration that the Ontario Provincial Police must produce accident reports containing driver and owner information to parties who suffer property loss in motor vehicle accidents.

Hydro One argued that while section 200(1) of the Highway Traffic Act requires drivers to provide such information on request, this provision is unavailable when only property loss occurs and no representative is present at the scene.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that although it may have had jurisdiction, it was not appropriate to take jurisdiction due to the absence of an active lis, lack of necessary factual record, and absence of interested parties including the Privacy Commissioner and Attorney General.

The appellant, a Minnesota resident injured in an Ontario motor vehicle accident, sued her Minnesota insurer in Ontario for statutory accident benefits.

The appeal turned on the effect of a power of attorney and undertaking signed under the reciprocal interjurisdictional automobile insurance scheme.

The Court of Appeal held that the undertaking required the insurer to accept service and appear in Ontario, and that the motions judge erred by failing to give effect to that agreement when granting a stay on forum non conveniens grounds.

Because a stay could deprive the appellant of the juridical advantage of Ontario statutory accident benefits, the stay was set aside and the appeal allowed.

The appeal concerned whether an insured who rescinded an accident benefits settlement under s. 9.1(4) of the Automobile Insurance Regulation had to first repay settlement funds before the rescission became effective.

The court held that the statutory rescission right was consumer protection legislation and operated upon delivery of written notice where the insurer had failed to provide the notice required by s. 9.1(2).

Repayment of funds was not a condition precedent to rescission, but the funds became immediately due and owing once rescission was effected.

The insured could therefore pursue a statutory accident benefits claim, while the insurer was entitled to an order declaring its right to repayment.

The appeal was allowed in part, with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed summary judgment dismissing her action for ongoing statutory accident benefits as statute-barred.

The central issue was whether the insurer's termination notice complied with s. 71 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, which required written notice of the procedure for resolving disputes under the Insurance Act.

The majority held that the provision required the insurer to inform the insured of the next procedural step, namely mediation, and did not require notice of the two-year limitation period for commencing arbitration or an action.

Because the insurer's notice was found compliant, the limitation defence under s. 281(5) was available and the appeal was dismissed.

A dissent would have required fuller notice, including the limitation period, and would have allowed the appeal.

Parents appealed from a trial judgment arising out of their son's death in a motor vehicle accident.

The court held that awards under s. 61(2)(e) of the Family Law Act for loss of care, guidance and companionship were low but within range and should not be disturbed.

Applying the deduction analysis under s. 267 of the Insurance Act, the court held that only statutory death benefits, and not no-fault wage-loss or disability benefits, were deductible from those awards because the death benefits were akin to the compensable loss.

The court also held, by reference to the companion appeal, that a loss of income claim under s. 61(1) could proceed and ordered a new trial on that issue.