Nergiz Sinjari

The applicant law firm sought a charging order on the property or proceeds recovered by a former client in relation to claims arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The court, exercising its inherent jurisdiction (as the original retainer was for an administrative tribunal, not a Superior Court action), granted the charging order.

The court found that the three criteria for a charging order were met: a fund was in existence, the firm's efforts were instrumental in recovering or preserving the property (evidenced by a fourfold increase in settlement offer), and the client demonstrated an unwillingness to pay the firm's fees.

The court also found no equitable reasons to deny the order and awarded costs to the applicant.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of s. 37(4) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) regarding an insurer's obligation to provide reasons for terminating income replacement benefits (IRBs).

The Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) found the applicant's claim time-barred, as Allstate's termination letter, which cited the applicant's return to full-time work, was deemed sufficient.

The Divisional Court overturned this, holding that s. 37(4) required medical reasons in all termination letters, interpreting "medical and any other reasons" conjunctively.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, finding the Divisional Court erred in its interpretation.

The Court of Appeal held that "and" in s. 37(4) can be interpreted in a joint or several sense, meaning medical reasons are not required if the termination is based solely on a non-medical ground, such as return to work.

The insurer's letter was found to comply with the SABS, and the limitation period was validly triggered.

This motion concerned a dispute over litigation privilege regarding handwritten notes made by the plaintiffs' representative on an email from the defendant's counsel.

The plaintiffs claimed privilege, arguing the notes were made in contemplation of litigation.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the onus to establish that the notes were created for the dominant purpose of reasonably contemplated litigation, as there was no direct evidence from the note-taker regarding his state of mind.

Consequently, the claim of privilege failed, and the plaintiffs were ordered to produce the notes.

The plaintiff brought an action for professional negligence, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty against the defendants, who acted as her paralegal consultants following two motor vehicle accidents in 2001.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to preserve the limitation periods for her accident benefits and tort claims.

The court found that the defendants were retained for the first accident but not the second.

Although the defendants breached the standard of care by failing to file a statement of claim and inform the plaintiff of limitation issues for the first accident, the court dismissed the action.

The court held that the plaintiff's claims against the defendants were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as she knew or ought to have known of the potential claim more than two years before commencing the action.

Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiff's injuries from the first accident did not meet the permanent serious impairment threshold under the Insurance Act.