Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule matters (SABS)

Dian and Aaryn Doyle moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing their action for delay, stemming from two motor vehicle accidents in 2010.

The court applied the four Reid factors (explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of motion, and non-compensable prejudice).

The court found a reasonable explanation for delay due to personal difficulties, health issues, confusion regarding undertakings, settlement discussions, and a conflict of interest with previous counsel.

The deadline was missed through inadvertence, and the motion was brought promptly.

The court found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, as no critical evidence was lost due to delay.

The motion was granted, setting aside the dismissal order for Dian and Aaryn Doyle, but not for Aiden Doyle who did not participate.

No costs were awarded due to counsel's inadvertence.

The defendant was charged with three offences under the Highway Traffic Act arising from a three-vehicle collision on June 9, 2018, in Toronto: starting from a stopped position not in safety, operating a vehicle with an illegible licence plate, and failing to report the accident.

The defendant admitted to striking two parked vehicles while attempting to adjust his parking position but characterized the contact as minor.

The court found that the defendant's vehicle was parked on a highway, that he set it in motion without ensuring safety, causing significant damage to both other vehicles.

The court also found the defendant's licence plate was not plainly visible as required by law, and that despite being informed the damages exceeded the $2,000 reporting threshold, the defendant failed to report the accident to police.

The court convicted on all three counts.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a collision on June 14, 2018, in Burlington, Ontario, in which a 94-year-old pedestrian on a mobility scooter was struck and fatally injured.

The prosecution bore the burden of proving the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that while the defendant failed to see the victim prior to impact, the evidence did not establish careless driving.

The court considered the brief timeframe involved (approximately one second for the scooter to reach the point of impact and three to four seconds for the defendant to execute his turn), the visibility conditions including shadows and bright sunlight, the victim's scooter traveling at maximum speed in a marked crosswalk, and the absence of aggravating factors such as speeding, impairment, or distraction.

The court concluded that the momentary inattention, if present, did not rise to the level of careless driving deserving of punishment under the circumstances.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a red light contrary to subsection 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to police at the scene of a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown sought to admit the statements as voluntary admissions.

The defendant argued the statements were involuntary and alternatively that they were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, thereby violating the common law principle against self-incrimination.

The court found the statements were made voluntarily and that the defendant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that she honestly and reasonably believed she was required by law to make the statements.

The statements were admitted into evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while using a handheld device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge found that the appellant held a cell phone in his hand while driving.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the officer's testimony lacked sufficient detail to establish that the object was a cell phone and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that the officer's observations were sufficient to establish that the appellant was holding a cell phone and that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or apply an incorrect standard of proof.

The Crown charged Dansway Logistics Inc., as owner of a commercial motor vehicle, with failing to ensure performance standards were met pursuant to section 107(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The charge arose from an inspection on September 18, 2017, at the Vineland truck inspection station where Officer Fear identified several mechanical defects including loose fasteners on the suspension system and an allegedly inoperative fifth axle brake.

The defendant's mechanic, Gary Nott, subsequently inspected the vehicle and found that the fasteners were not loose and that the brake specifications were within acceptable parameters.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the Crown's evidence due to incomplete notes, gaps in the officer's recollection, and conflicting expert evidence, and dismissed the charge.

Appeal of convictions and sentences for violations of the Highway Traffic Act arising from a wheel detachment incident on October 10, 2013.

Inter County Concrete Products Limited was charged under section 84.1(1) for permitting operation of a commercial motor vehicle from which a wheel became detached.

Pedrag Petkovic was charged under section 84(1) for driving a vehicle in a dangerous or unsafe condition.

The trial justice convicted both appellants and imposed substantial fines.

The appellants appealed both convictions and sentences, raising issues regarding the sufficiency of the information, the characterization of the offence, and the appropriateness of the sentences imposed.

The defendant pleaded guilty to stunt driving contrary to s. 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act after being detected driving 212 kph in a posted 90 kph zone on Highway 17.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a $3,000 fine and 30-day licence suspension.

The court rejected the joint submission as markedly out of line with public expectations and contrary to the public interest, finding the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court imposed a $7,000 fine and a maximum two-year driving suspension, emphasizing the egregious nature of the speeding (122 kph over the limit) on a dangerous two-lane highway and the need for general and specific deterrence.

The accused, Gerald Quigley, was charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 400.

The court found that the accused failed to conduct a mandatory daily inspection of the tractor-trailer's air brakes, resulting in severely compromised braking ability.

This failure constituted a wanton and reckless disregard for public safety and a marked departure from reasonable driving conduct.

The court concluded that the accused's criminal negligence was a significant contributing cause of the victim's death.

Convictions were entered for both charges, with the dangerous operation causing death charge conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving while his licence was suspended and for possession of a suspended licence contrary to sections 53(1) and 35(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant claimed he did not receive notice of the suspension and was unaware his licence had been suspended.

The court found that although the appellant likely did not receive the notice within the statutory deemed notice period, he had been suspended three times previously for unpaid fines and therefore had knowledge of how the suspension system worked.

The court held that the appellant failed to exercise due diligence by not taking any steps to verify his driving status despite knowing he had an unpaid fine and having prior experience with licence suspensions.

The appeals were dismissed.

A defendant charged with four Highway Traffic Act offences—driving while licence suspended, using an out-of-province licence while Ontario licence suspended, possessing multiple licences, and using a hand-held communication device—was convicted on counts 1, 2, and 4.

The defendant, an Alberta resident who had exchanged his Ontario licence for an Alberta licence in 2009, argued he had no knowledge of a suspension imposed in 2010 after he had already moved and obtained an Alberta licence.

The court found the defendant failed to establish the due diligence defence despite sympathetic circumstances, as he had not taken reasonable care in managing his traffic tickets before moving provinces, had not notified relevant authorities of his address change, and had not arranged for mail forwarding.

The court convicted on count 1 for the lesser offence of operating without a valid licence rather than driving while suspended, to avoid the mandatory six-month suspension.

Count 3 was dismissed as the prosecution failed to prove physical possession of two licences.

The defendant was charged with permitting a motor vehicle to be operated without insurance contrary to section 2(1)(b) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The Crown alleged that by giving the keys to the vehicle to a friend, the defendant permitted the vehicle to be driven while uninsured.

The defendant testified that he explicitly instructed the friend not to drive the vehicle, giving him the keys only to allow prospective buyers to view the interior.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant permitted the operation of the vehicle, as the defendant's instructions were clear and unequivocal.

The defendant was acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice convicted the appellant after he pled not guilty to the charge.

The appeal court found multiple serious errors: the trial justice effectively directed the appellant to testify, improperly intervened during examination, made inappropriate comments suggesting bias, and provided reasons for judgment that failed to demonstrate application of the proper legal test for credibility assessment.

The trial justice relied on inadmissible expert evidence from a witness not qualified to express the opinions given.

The court found the appellant did not receive a fair trial and that the reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while his driver's license was suspended under the Highway Traffic Act, contrary to section 53(1).

The Crown alleged the defendant drove on May 18, 2012, in Burlington while suspended for unpaid fines.

The defendant claimed he had no knowledge of the suspension, arguing he did not receive the notice of suspension and believed he had obtained an extension to pay his fines through a telephone conversation with a courthouse clerk.

The court found the actus reus proven beyond a reasonable doubt and determined the defendant failed to establish the defence of due diligence or honest and reasonable mistake of fact on a balance of probabilities.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with driving while suspended contrary to s. 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and displaying a suspended driver's licence contrary to s. 35(1)(b) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown proved the defendant was a suspended driver on the date in question.

The defendant raised a due diligence defence, claiming he was confused about remedial measures requirements and had not received notice of suspension by mail.

The court found the defendant had been personally served with notice of suspension and that his actions fell short of what a reasonable person would have done in similar circumstances.

The court rejected the defence of officially induced error and convicted the defendant on both charges.

The defendant was charged with driving while her driver's licence was suspended contrary to subsection 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution relied on certified documentation from the Registrar of Motor Vehicles showing the suspension was in effect on the date of the alleged offence, along with police officer testimony that the defendant was observed driving on that date.

The defence objected to the admissibility of the certified documentation on the grounds that it inferred a prior conviction without the defendant having put her character in issue, thereby contravening the Evidence Act.

The court found the documentation admissible, excluding only the phrases indicating the reason for suspension, and convicted the defendant on the basis that all elements of the offence had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent Michael Tsapoitis on a charge of driving an unsafe vehicle under section 84(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and the acquittal of Ontario Line Clearing and Tree Services Ltd. on a "wheel-off" offence under section 84.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice found that a wood chipper being towed behind a commercial motor vehicle was not a "vehicle" within the meaning of the Act.

The appellate court reversed, holding that a purposive interpretation of the statutory definition of "vehicle" should apply, and that the wood chipper constituted a vehicle.

The court ordered new trials rather than entering convictions.