Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and failure to remain at the scene of an accident.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding circumstantial identification and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehensions of evidence and concluding that a properly instructed jury could have found the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death after striking and killing a pedestrian while driving at a high rate of speed in a residential neighbourhood.

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and a ten-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding causation without determining the victim's exact location, misapprehended evidence, failed to give credit for strict pre-trial bail conditions, and imposed an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's factual findings or exercise of discretion, and concluding that the five-year sentence was not a substantial and marked departure from sentences customarily imposed for similar offences.

The appellants, Gavra and Karl Largie, were convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter, respectively, following a joint trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on private communications intercepted with the consent of an informant under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that s. 184.2 violates s. 8 of the Charter because it does not require the state to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that s. 184.2 satisfies the minimum constitutional requirements of s. 8 and is not unconstitutional despite the absence of an investigative necessity requirement.

The Court also dismissed several grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.

The appellant appealed a six-year sentence imposed following convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats against his separated spouse.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by denying credit for strict pre-trial bail, improperly using a victim impact statement, rejecting remorse as a mitigating factor, and imposing a sentence outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and concluding the sentence was fit given the egregious and horrific circumstances of the domestic assault.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and designated a dangerous offender after rejecting a pre-trial plea offer from the Crown.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in excluding the entirety of his spontaneous exculpatory statements made upon arrest, in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt and automatism, and in failing to stay the dangerous offender application as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that while spontaneous exculpatory statements upon arrest may be admissible if the accused testifies, the trial judge's exclusion of the statements did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court also found no errors in the jury instructions and held that the dangerous offender application was not an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug and gun charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found that the police breached the respondent's s. 10(b) rights by asking an officer safety question after he requested counsel, which led to the discovery of marijuana and a gun in the trunk.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed material errors in his s. 24(2) analysis, including failing to consider the respondent's own testimony, the reason for the delay in the search, and the context of the officer safety question.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the principle in Browne v. Dunn to discount his evidence and in finding him evasive during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in concluding there was a breach of the Browne v. Dunn principle, as the complainant was not cross-examined on significant contradictory details later testified to by the appellant.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial judge misapprehended defence expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's failure to prepare the appellant for cross-examination on his police statements, the ill-advised decision to call certain defence witnesses, and the failure to cross-examine the complainant on prior inconsistent statements constituted ineffective representation that prejudiced the defence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in her treatment of the defence urologist's expert evidence by misapplying the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondents were acquitted of operating a commercial motor vehicle in a dangerous or unsafe condition under s. 84(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown appealed, arguing that a regulation defining 'critical defects' for the purpose of vehicle impoundment under s. 82.1 should also apply to the offence provision in s. 84(1.1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation explicitly applies only to s. 82.1 and that the legislature intended a higher threshold of danger for a conviction under s. 84(1.1) than for an impoundment under s. 82.1.

The appellant, bound by a s. 161(1)(a) prohibition order preventing him from attending a public park where children under 14 could reasonably be expected to be present, was arrested while working at a game booth at the Super Ex fair at Lansdowne Park.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that a paved fairground is not a 'public park'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'public park' under s. 161(1)(a) focuses on the recreational activities available to the public and the likelihood of children being present, rather than the physical geography or presence of green space.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal for assaulting a police officer.

He argued that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in concluding that fresh evidence regarding a wrist injury would not have affected the verdict.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the issues raised were not questions of law of general application and that the appellant failed to demonstrate a clear error of law.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a child but acquitted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

The trial judge rejected the complainant's evidence but convicted the appellant based on portions of his statement to the police.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable because the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's statement in its entirety, ignoring exculpatory portions.

The Court also found the conviction inconsistent with the acquittal on the sexual interference charge and held that the trial judge impermissibly drew an adverse inference from the appellant's silence during the police interview.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was stopped for stunt driving and his vehicle was impounded under the Highway Traffic Act.

During an inventory search of the vehicle, police opened a bag and found cocaine and marijuana.

The appellant appealed his drug convictions, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights because inventory searches should be limited to itemizing visible property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that police are entitled to search and itemize the contents of bags and containers during an inventory search to properly safeguard the property.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including aggravated sexual assault and overcoming resistance by choking, arising from two separate brutal attacks on two different women approximately five weeks apart.

He was sentenced to a total of 22.5 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the counts, failing to give a propensity instruction, and imposing a sentence that offended the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in his severance ruling or jury instructions, and that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was fit given the callous nature of the offences and the appellant's lack of remorse.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of robbery, assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by excluding certain medical evidence due to alleged non-disclosure, refusing to allow the Crown to admit the accused's statement to police, and failing to correct improper comments made by defence counsel during the jury address.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in excluding the medical evidence and defence counsel made improper comments regarding wrongful convictions and the Crown's integrity, these errors did not render the trial unfair or necessarily affect the verdict.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple sexual assaults and his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued that a saliva sample used for DNA comparison was obtained in violation of his Charter rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant provided a valid, informed waiver that severed any connection between the prior s. 10(b) breach and the taking of the sample.

The court also found no error in the jury instructions regarding expert DNA evidence or in the trial judge's dangerous offender designation, which properly assessed the appellant's treatability and risk to the community.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a first offender, pleaded guilty to attempted murder, forcible confinement, robbery, and sexual assault after a brutal and prolonged attack on a young woman.

He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was excessive and that the judge failed to apply the principle that first offenders should receive the shortest possible sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the shortest sentence principle does not apply to very serious and violent offences, and that the 15-year sentence was proportionate given the severe aggravating factors and the devastating, permanent injuries inflicted on the victim.

The applicant was committed for extradition on a charge of second degree murder after the extradition judge found no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Minister subsequently ordered the applicant surrendered on the foreign charge of first degree murder, which requires premeditation under Arizona law.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Court of Appeal held that the Minister's decision was unreasonable because there was a total absence of evidence at the committal stage on an essential element of the foreign offence.

The surrender order was quashed and the matter remitted to the Minister.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 13 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's ante-mortem statements and evidence of his prior discreditable conduct, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the use of this evidence.

He also appealed the period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that the sentence was fit given the history of domestic abuse.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, assault with a weapon, assault, unlawful confinement, and uttering a death threat against a 12-year-old complainant.

The Crown cross-appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in his treatment of prior consistent statements, the reasons were adequate, and inconsistencies were properly addressed.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, finding the conditional sentence illegal under the Fice principle and manifestly unfit given the gravity of the offences, substituting a sentence of 3.5 years' imprisonment.