Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, convicted of multiple counts of sexual interference and sexual assault against his nieces and great-nieces, appealed his convictions.

The primary grounds of appeal were that the trial judge erred by admitting similar fact evidence without properly considering collusion among complainants and by applying a different standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of collusion, credibility, or the application of similar fact principles.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the mens rea required for attempted murder by wrongly attributing the actions of other shooters to him, and that the verdicts on four of the five convictions were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's specific intent.

The court held that the evidence amply supported the findings that this was a pre-planned, deliberate attack by shooters working in concert, and that the only reasonable inference was that all shooters had the specific intent to kill the victims.

D.L. brought a motion to bifurcate the Crown's sentence appeal from his conviction appeal and the Crown's appeal from his acquittals.

The court dismissed the motion, reiterating the general principle that conviction and sentence appeals should be heard together for efficiency and to avoid contradictory outcomes, unless there are compelling reasons.

The court found no such compelling reasons, noting that potential complexities could be addressed by remitting sentencing to the trial court if necessary, rather than requiring pre-emptive bifurcation.

The appellant, convicted by a jury on three counts of sexual assault, appealed his convictions.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury charge by improperly expressing opinions, overemphasizing the Crown's theory, and instructing on vitiation of consent through abuse of authority.

He also contended that the verdict on one count was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge fair and balanced, and the verdict reasonable, particularly in light of the similar fact evidence.

The appellant, previously declared a dangerous offender and subject to a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO), appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed for breaching LTSO conditions.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the sentencing judge's decision, finding no error in failing to consider the principle of proportionality.

The court reiterated that dangerous offender proceedings prioritize public protection and require a thorough inquiry into managing offender risk, with less coercive options considered before an indeterminate sentence.

The sentencing judge's detailed reasons, which highlighted the appellant's history of non-compliance with treatment and continued risk, were upheld.

The appellant, J.P., appealed convictions for three counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment of the appellant, particularly regarding inconsistencies in testimony, and the assessment of the complainant's reliability, including the relevance of her failure to call for assistance during the incidents.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's elaborations were deliberate embellishments and that the complainant's failure to call for help was irrelevant to her credibility in the circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to eight years in jail.

He appealed the conviction, raising three grounds: the trial judge erred by not applying Vetrovec principles to a witness's evidence and failing to provide sufficient reasons for relying on it, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a Vetrovec caution is not mandatory in judge-alone trials and the trial judge was aware of the witness's credibility issues, relying only on corroborated aspects of his testimony.

The court also found the verdict reasonable, as the circumstantial evidence, viewed holistically, amply supported the conclusion that the appellant knowingly possessed the package.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant's text message as a spontaneous utterance.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors and errors of law by improperly concluding that the parties agreed on the immediate timing of the text message, failing to consider the risk of "bootstrapping" (using the statement's content to prove its spontaneity), and not resolving conflicting evidence regarding the timing of the message.

The Court held that the text message was inadmissible hearsay and a prior consistent statement, and its improper admission materially affected the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility on both counts.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sought leave to appeal his sentence for offences related to the possession of a loaded handgun.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination of reasonable suspicion for investigative detention or the subsequent pat-down search of a satchel.

While the trial judge erred in considering discoverability under the first branch of the Grant analysis for a s. 10(b) Charter breach, the Court found this error did not impact the s. 24(2) analysis, as the evidence would still be admissible.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, agreeing that the trial judge erred in relying on a confidential informant tip for an aggravating factor but concluding this error did not impact the sentence imposed, which was at the low end of the range.

The appellant, Akshay Prasad, sought to reopen his appeal from conviction for cocaine trafficking, based on fresh expert evidence concerning the unreliability of digitally enhanced audio recordings and transcripts due to "priming" and listener bias.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the motion, finding the proposed expert evidence inadmissible at trial as it was not necessary and usurped the trier of fact's role.

The court also found the evidence not cogent and that due diligence was not met for its admission as fresh evidence on appeal, concluding there was no clear and compelling case of a miscarriage of justice to warrant reopening the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard motions for leave to adduce evidence and for a confidentiality order in the context of a reference regarding the legality of an online provincial lottery scheme permitting international play.

The court granted leave to the Attorney General of British Columbia and the Canadian Lottery Coalition Members to file their proposed evidence, finding it potentially helpful for the reference panel.

The court dismissed the Canadian Gaming Association's motion for a confidentiality order, ruling that alleged reputational harm was a private interest insufficient to override court openness, especially as the information was largely public.

The appellant, Nicholas Jenkins, appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's error in admitting lay opinion evidence from five police surveillance officers, who opined that the appellant's observed conduct was consistent with drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found this evidence inadmissible as neither expert nor proper lay opinion.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, emphasizing the heightened risk of prejudice in a jury trial, the prominence of the inadmissible evidence, and the lack of an overwhelming case against the appellant.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, David Lanktree, appealed his 5-year prison sentence for drug and weapons offences, arguing the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence, treating community drug problems as an aggravating factor, and failing to consider Duncan credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge correctly determined a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the appellant's history of re-offending and breaches.

The court also found the judge did not err in principle by considering the community impact of drug trafficking for denunciation and deterrence, and that the discretion regarding Duncan credit was properly exercised.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder of his intimate partner, arguing he lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent due to a cocaine-induced psychosis.

The trial judge rejected the defence psychiatric expert's opinion, finding it lacked objectivity and was inconsistent with the appellant's purposeful actions before, during, and after the shooting.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the expert evidence and dismissed the appeal.

This endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario addresses a non-publication order under s. 517 of the Criminal Code that was imposed at a bail hearing in the court below.

The endorsement states that the full decision, which contains information covered by this order, will not be published online until the non-publication order ceases to be in effect.

In the interim, a physical copy of the decision is available at the Court of Appeal Registry.

The underlying matter is an application to set aside a detention order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assaulting his former intimate partner on three occasions, breaking and entering, and criminal harassment.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing that the complainant's evidence was contradicted by text messages and photographs suggesting an ongoing relationship and lack of fear.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, affirming that a trial judge can accept parts of a witness's testimony and that victim behaviour does not always conform to stereotypes.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of four counts related to sexual luring of a child and sentenced to 3.5 years, appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued his Asperger's Syndrome affected his testimony, but the trial judge had already considered this.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error.

The court also addressed a Kienapple conditional stay issue, correcting the trial judge's error by quashing the conviction on count 3 and entering a conditional stay, while lifting the stay on count 4 and entering a conviction, confirming the original sentence on count 4.

The appellant, Michael Loiselle, sought leave to appeal his 18-month sentence for four counts of fraud, arguing the sentencing judge erred by misunderstanding the effect of his 436 days of house arrest.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge should have acknowledged the house arrest, this oversight did not impact the sentence, as the imposed term was at the lowest end of the appropriate range.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his three-year imprisonment sentence.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable due to forensic evidence contradicting the complainant's account and that the trial judge erred in sentencing by attempting to reconstruct the jury's path to conviction and providing insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's fact-finding for sentencing to be independent and sufficiently reasoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising two grounds: an alleged error in the severance application regarding charges involving two complainants, and serious errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the high deference owed to severance decisions and credibility findings.

The court found no error in the application judge's decision to not sever the charges, noting the low threshold for similar act evidence at the severance stage and the lack of injustice given the judge-alone trial and partial acquittal.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment, finding no impermissible reasoning or unequal scrutiny.