Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance based on a police officer's observation of an alleged hand-to-hand transaction with a third party.

The third party testified that he acquired the drugs from another source prior to the encounter.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanation but failed to address the third party's exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that this failure required a new trial, as the reasons did not indicate whether the evidence was rejected or considered.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to conspiring to traffic cocaine and oxycodone, committing an indictable offence for the benefit of a criminal organization, and failing to comply with probation orders.

He was sentenced to a global term of seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of parity with a co-accused's sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was fit given the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the differences in his offences compared to the co-accused.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for uttering threats to cause bodily harm and to damage property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was supported by testimony and extensive audio recordings.

The court also refused leave to appeal the sentence of one month imprisonment and three years' probation, finding it fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the standard of proof, subjected the complainant's evidence to a different standard of scrutiny, and failed to consider his mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge provided detailed reasons, properly scrutinized both parties' evidence, and correctly concluded there was no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief in consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for uttering a threat to cause death, criminal harassment, and breach of probation.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding the defence theory, the independence of confirmatory evidence, the examples of confirmatory evidence provided, and the instruction on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions to the jury.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender on bail, killed a police officer while fleeing arrest in a stolen vehicle.

He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment and a 10-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was unfit and the sentencing judge erred in her findings of fact, admission of a video tribute, and application of sentencing principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit given the paramountcy of denunciation and deterrence in these circumstances.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order of surrender, arguing a denial of natural justice because the order was made without his written submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the applicant was aware of his right to make submissions but failed to do so, and did not attempt to make late submissions or ask for reconsideration.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition, arguing that the extradition judge's refusal to grant an adjournment to allow him to seek court-appointed counsel violated the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the extradition judge properly balanced the necessary factors, including the history of the proceeding, the lack of legal complexity, and the overwhelming case for committal.

The Crown appealed a 12-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for arson of his own property.

The Crown argued the offence should have been designated a serious personal injury offence (SPIO), making a conditional sentence illegal, and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the SPIO argument as it was not raised at trial.

The Court upheld the sentence, finding the sentencing judge properly balanced the gravity of the offence with the respondent's attenuated moral blameworthiness due to mental health challenges.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding when he knew of the allegations and failed to address all evidence concerning recent fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interpretation of the evidence was not unreasonable and noting the trial judge properly relied on independent evidence from a social worker to reject the recent fabrication claim.

The appellant fired a sawed-off shotgun at an intended victim following an altercation, missing the target but seriously injuring three innocent bystanders.

He was convicted of attempted murder for both the intended target and the bystanders, with the bystander convictions based on the trial judge's instruction regarding the common-law doctrine of transferred intent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the inchoate crime of attempted murder.

The convictions for the attempted murder of the bystanders were quashed and substituted with convictions for aggravated assault.

The conviction and sentence for the attempted murder of the intended target were upheld.

The young person appealed their conviction, arguing that their s. 11(b) Charter rights were infringed due to two periods of delay: time taken by the original trial judge to render a decision, and a two-month delay due to the judge's illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the time taken to craft reasons was reasonable and part of the inherent time requirements of the case.

The court also held it was not unreasonable to wait two months to see if the ill judge could resume duties before rescheduling, and noted the appellant suffered no special prejudice as they were in custody on other serious charges.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for a series of sexual assaults and extortion against his son's 17-year-old girlfriend.

The Court of Appeal found the conditional sentence manifestly inadequate given the gravity of the offences, which included videotaping an attempted sexual assault and using the tape to extort further compliance.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to 15 months' imprisonment, taking into account pre-trial custody and time served on the conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for smuggling heroin into a correctional facility.

The sole issue on the conviction appeal was the alleged lack of proof of continuity of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that continuity was established by direct and circumstantial evidence, and refused leave to appeal the sentence, holding that it was fit for the serious offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault of a young girl.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, applying the curative proviso to find that the appellant's brief absence from the courtroom and pre-charge conference caused no prejudice.

The Court granted the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's recommendation of four to six months to ensure treatment without an evidential foundation.

The sentence was varied from nine months to four months' imprisonment, followed by two years' probation with a treatment condition.

The respondent attended a church service to protest same-sex marriages and intentionally pushed the pastor when he asked her to stop disrupting the service.

The trial judge acquitted her of assault, applying the principle of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles), and the summary conviction appeal court affirmed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the application of the de minimis principle to undisputed facts is a question of law alone, and that the respondent's intentional push in the context of disrupting a church service was not a trifling matter.

A finding of guilt was entered and the respondent was granted an absolute discharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding there was no section 8 Charter violation, as the appellant was detained and should have been given his section 10(b) rights before consenting to the search.

However, the Court held that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2).

The Court also found the verdict was reasonable given the overwhelming evidence that the appellant and his companion were drug couriers.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexual assault and aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to interview a nurse and cross-examine the complainant on a statement that supported the defence of consent.

The court quashed the sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The court also reviewed the five-year concurrent sentence for aggravated assault, reducing it to four years in light of fresh evidence showing the appellant's progress with rehabilitation, while noting the serious domestic context of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for historical sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found the jury's verdict was not unreasonable despite inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, which were typical for historical sexual assaults.

The Crown conceded the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's refusal to accept responsibility as an aggravating factor.

However, the Court held that the six-month custodial sentence was not unfit.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant challenged only his attempted murder conviction arising from a jury trial, arguing that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of an earlier assault complaint by the complainant and failed to give a limiting instruction respecting that evidence and the evidence on other counts.

The court held that the 1990 complaint was admissible to show the state of the marriage and rebut the appellant's claim that the marriage had been good at that time.

While a limiting instruction should have been given for that purpose, the court found the evidence supporting the attempted murder conviction overwhelming and applied the curative proviso.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.