Nancy J. Spies

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to strike the respondent's wrongful dismissal claim.

The respondent, a former CSIS employee, alleged wrongful dismissal based on the revocation of his security clearance.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction because the CSIS Act provides a comprehensive administrative procedure for redress, precluding a civil action under the Public Service Labour Relations Act.

Furthermore, the respondent's claims for pre-termination salary and benefits were an abuse of process as they attempted to re-litigate issues already addressed through grievances.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

The applicant, a medical resident, sought judicial review of a decision by the Academic Appeals Committee upholding his dismissal from the anesthesia residency program.

He argued that deviations from his remediation plan, including timeline errors and lack of baseline testing, made the process manifestly unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Appeals Committee's conclusion that the deviations were not significant enough to invalidate the remediation process was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant father appealed an order striking his pleadings for failing to comply with multiple costs orders in a high-conflict family law proceeding.

The motion judge found the father's non-compliance was willful and that his conduct was harming the children.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's factual findings but found an error in principle in failing to consider alternative remedies to completely barring the father from the trial.

The appeal was allowed in part; the pleadings remained struck, but the father was granted limited participation rights at the custody and access trial to cross-examine the joint assessor and make closing arguments.

The applicant, a town councillor, brought an application for judicial review regarding a sexual harassment investigation.

The Integrity Commissioner subsequently concluded the complaint could not be determined, rendering the application moot.

The applicant amended his application to seek a declaration of mootness and costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no unusual circumstances to award costs to the applicant for a moot proceeding, and awarded $15,000 in costs to the respondent Town.

The appellant, a black man, was unlawfully stopped, punched, searched, and left handcuffed on ice by police officers.

The trial judge found breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter but declined to find racial profiling under s. 15.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found that the circumstantial evidence clearly established racial profiling.

The court increased the Charter damages against the Police Services Board to $50,000 to vindicate society's interest and deter future breaches, and increased punitive damages against both the Board and the offending officer to $25,000.

The plaintiffs, a married couple, sued their insurer for the balance of a contents claim after their house was destroyed by fire.

The insurer appealed an interlocutory order that permitted the plaintiffs to attend each other's examinations for discovery.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in applying a strict test from a Court of Appeal decision dealing with the exclusion of witnesses at trial.

The Court held that for discoveries, the onus is on the party seeking exclusion to demonstrate it is necessary to meet the ends of justice.

Given that the plaintiffs had identical interests, shared counsel, and their credibility was the central issue, there was a risk of tailoring evidence.

The Court ordered the plaintiffs to be examined individually.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board upholding the revocation of his hospital privileges.

The revocation followed a series of incidents involving workplace harassment of a nurse and unauthorized access to her personal health records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appeal Board applied the correct test under the Public Hospitals Act, did not improperly reverse the burden of proof regarding the appellant's mental health claims, and reached a reasonable and proportionate decision given the egregious nature of the past misconduct.

The appellants appealed a case management judge's order requiring them to reimburse the respondent for the costs of a forensic review of backup tapes containing email communications.

The motion judge found that the appellants had failed to comply with their documentary discovery obligations and had made misstatements about their review of the backup tapes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings and concluding that the relief granted was procedurally fair and within the scope of the motion.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Energy Board decision requiring it to pay a $1,287,548 penalty to Union Gas for failing to meet contractual balancing requirements, with most of the penalty to be paid by shareholders due to a finding of imprudence.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal.

The Court found that the OEB had jurisdiction to impose a punitive penalty to maintain system integrity, properly grounded its decision in deterrence, and reasonably concluded the appellant's conduct was imprudent despite uncontradicted evidence.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court who had refused to extend the time to appeal.

The applicants argued the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error of fact by finding no evidence was filed, but the panel noted the motion record contained no affidavits.

The court refused to admit fresh evidence, noting the self-represented applicant was a sophisticated litigant and the evidence could have been adduced earlier with due diligence.

The motion was dismissed as devoid of merit, and costs of $53,000 were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity scale.

The tenants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision requiring them to pay the landlord for electricity arrears.

The landlord had installed suite metering and, when the tenants refused to pay the provider directly, averaged their usage and added it to their rent.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision, finding that the tenancy agreements requiring tenants to pay for electricity were not void for uncertainty.

The court also agreed that the landlord was entitled to increase the rent for a prescribed service under the Residential Tenancies Act, and that the agreements did not violate provisions prohibiting contracting out of the Act.

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its application under s. 23 of the Solicitors Act to enforce written retainer agreements for unpaid legal fees.

The application judge had ruled that the firm could only enforce its retainer via an assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal but clarified the law, holding that simple or usual written fee agreements do not fall within the scope of s. 16(1) of the Act.

Consequently, they are not subject to the requirement for assessment under s. 17 or the prohibition against commencing an action under s. 23.

Lawyers may commence an action to recover fees under such agreements, though clients retain the right to request an assessment.

The applicant police officer sought judicial review of an Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) decision that ordered a new discipline hearing.

The OCPC had found that the Hearing Officer breached procedural fairness by failing to provide minimum assistance to the unrepresented public complainant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, upholding the OCPC's refusal to admit fresh affidavit evidence about off-the-record events.

The Court also rejected the applicant's argument that the complainant needed to prove actual prejudice, affirming that a breach of procedural fairness carries inherent prejudice and denies a meaningful role in the proceeding.

In a criminal trial for possession for the purpose of trafficking, the defendant alleged police planted drugs.

The Crown did not call Officer Dobbs, a search team member facing an outstanding assault charge (ABH) from an unrelated incident where a prior judge made negative credibility findings against him.

The defence sought to call Officer Dobbs and cross-examine him on the ABH charge details to impeach his credibility.

The court ruled that the defence could call Officer Dobbs and cross-examine him from the outset, citing the interests of justice and the Crown's strategic decision not to call him.

However, the scope of cross-examination on the ABH charge details was limited by the collateral fact rule and the principle against introducing prior judicial credibility findings (Ghorvei), preventing the jury from inferring guilt or prior disbelief.

The appellant tenant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board requiring him to pay rent arrears.

The tenant argued the Board erred by failing to explicitly determine the respondent was the landlord and by failing to adjourn the hearing when the tenant did not appear.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the landlord identity issue was never raised before the Board and lacked merit, and the tenant's representative had not requested an adjournment.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner denying a fee waiver for a freedom of information request made to the Ministry of the Environment.

The Adjudicator had reduced the fee but found it was not fair and equitable to waive it entirely, noting the applicant did not work with the Ministry to narrow the request.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard and dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator's decision fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory decision granting the plaintiff's motion to add a receptionist at the Ocular Health Clinic as an individual defendant.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the proposed pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against the receptionist personally for either negligence or wilful misrepresentation.

The court emphasized that employees are generally protected from personal liability unless their actions are tortious in themselves or exhibit a separate identity or interest from the employer.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages for assault, negligence, and Charter breaches against the police.

The appellant argued the officer, who was driving an unmarked vehicle, was not readily identifiable and lacked reasonable grounds to arrest him for failing to stop.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings that the officer was identifiable and had reasonable grounds to arrest under the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to restore a construction lien action to the trial list and denying it the right to deliver a defence to the respondents' counterclaim.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence explaining the delay, which was largely due to the parties focusing on a companion action and the respondents' own delays in fulfilling undertakings.

The Court found the appellant met both the 'ready for trial' test and the test for explaining delay without causing non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the action was restored to the trial list, and the appellant was permitted to file a defence to the counterclaim.

The appellant brought a motion to admit fresh evidence on appeal.

The respondents opposed the motion on the basis that the appellant could not meet the due diligence criterion of the Palmer test.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion, finding that the interests of justice favoured admitting the evidence despite the lack of due diligence, given the uncertainty in the law, the nature of the evidence (procedural history), and the potential serious effect of denying admission.