Michael Perlin

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The complainant testified that the appellant overpowered her, pinned her on a bed, and touched her sexually without consent.

The appellant provided a contradictory account, claiming the complainant initiated sexual contact and that he ended it after thinking of his girlfriend.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on acceptance of the complainant's evidence, supported by corroborating evidence including a torn bra, a mark on the complainant's neck, and text messages.

The appellant raised five grounds of appeal challenging the trial judge's credibility findings and evidentiary rulings.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no legal error or overriding error of fact in the trial judge's decision.

Application for bail pending appeal from convictions for bribery, attempt to obstruct justice, criminal breach of trust, and trafficking cocaine, with a sentence of 13 years' imprisonment less 6 months' credit.

The applicant sought to establish that his appeal was not frivolous, that he would surrender himself into custody, and that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court found that while the applicant's grounds of appeal were not frivolous and he would likely surrender himself, his detention was necessary in the public interest given the gravity of the offences, the aggravated circumstances of their commission, and the weakness of the grounds of appeal.

The application was dismissed and the appeal was expedited.

A Toronto police officer was convicted of attempted murder for firing a second volley of six shots at a knife-wielding man lying on a streetcar floor, 5.5 seconds after an initial volley that had fatally wounded the victim.

The officer was acquitted of second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and the six-year sentence, finding the verdicts were not inconsistent and that the mandatory minimum sentences for attempted murder with a firearm do not violate the Charter.

The court rejected the officer's constitutional challenges under sections 7 and 12 of the Charter and dismissed his application to adduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's declaration that section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, specifically the "bail misconduct exclusion" was unconstitutional.

The bail misconduct exclusion restricts pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1 (rather than the enhanced 1.5:1 credit) where an accused's bail was cancelled due to alleged misconduct while on release.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the provision violates section 7 of the Charter as overbroad.

The court found that the legislative purpose of the bail misconduct exclusion—to deter misconduct while on release—is not rationally connected to all of its impacts, particularly where individuals are punished for alleged (rather than proven) misconduct, or where detention results from inability to satisfy a reverse onus rather than actual misconduct.

The appellant was convicted of five firearms offences arising from allegations that he transferred a firearm while on bail for unrelated robbery charges.

He was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months' custody, less 3.92 years' credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable and sought leave to appeal his sentence, challenging the denial of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit under section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code on Charter grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but granted leave to appeal sentence and adjusted the credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with assault causing bodily harm following the arrest of an intoxicated suspect.

The officer used a 'grounding' technique, resulting in a facial laceration to the suspect.

The court reviewed video evidence and found that the suspect was compliant at the time force was applied, contradicting the officer's testimony that the suspect was reaching for his waist.

The court concluded the use of force was unnecessary, disproportionate, and unlawful, and that the resulting injury constituted bodily harm.

The accused was found guilty.

A police sergeant was charged with assault causing bodily harm after using force to arrest a highly intoxicated individual with a lengthy criminal history and known propensity for violence.

The sergeant employed a "grounding" technique that resulted in the arrestee's face striking the ground, causing a laceration to the cheek.

The court found that while the sergeant had reasonable grounds to arrest and was entitled to use necessary force, the force employed was unnecessary, disproportionate, and unlawful.

The arrestee had become compliant before the sergeant applied force, and the sergeant's stated justifications for the use of force were contradicted by video evidence.

The court convicted the sergeant of assault causing bodily harm, finding that the injury met the statutory threshold for bodily harm.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds following a jury trial where he was convicted of failing to stop after an accident, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and attempt to obstruct justice.

The appellant's main defense was that a third party, Derek Rego, was the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions regarding the third party suspect defense, treatment of the sister's evidence, and comments concerning another witness's evidence were adequate when read as a whole.

The court also found the impaired driving conviction was reasonable based on evidence of alcohol on the appellant's breath, bloodshot eyes, unsteady gait, and erratic driving.

Both the appellant and Crown abandoned their sentence appeals.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants were impoverished offenders with mental and physical disabilities, unemployment, and substance abuse issues.

The trial judges had refused to impose the surcharge, finding it unconstitutional.

The Crown appealed and the Superior Court judges overturned these decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge, finding that while it engages the appellants' liberty interests, it does not violate section 7 because impoverished offenders cannot be imprisoned for non-payment (inability to pay is a reasonable excuse), extensions of time to pay are available, and the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate to the important objectives of the surcharge regime.

The court also found the surcharge does not violate section 12 of the Charter as it is not cruel and unusual treatment, being disproportionate but not grossly disproportionate.

The appellant was convicted after a 21-day jury trial of 32 charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The convictions arose from a pattern of domestic abuse spanning over 10 years, including facilitation of sexual assault by strangers and assaults with various weapons.

The appellant appealed on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and multiple errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no merit to the claims of ineffective assistance or errors in the charge to the jury.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The trial judge had excluded breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach because the police officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the respondent's body, despite smelling alcohol and an admission of consumption 10 hours prior.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the odour of alcohol and admission of consumption were sufficient to form reasonable suspicion, and the absence of impairment signs or the possibility of alcohol elimination did not negate that suspicion.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated sexual assault and forcible confinement.

During and after the trial, the jury foreperson participated in a radio broadcast where he made derogatory and homophobic comments about the trial participants and discussed the case.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the juror's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias, necessitating a new trial.

The concurring judge found no reasonable apprehension of bias but agreed a new trial was required because the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury against using evidence from one count to support findings on other counts.

The applicant, a day care provider convicted of manslaughter in the death of an infant, sought a review of a single judge's order denying her bail pending appeal.

The single judge had found that while her grounds of appeal were arguable, they were weak, and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Chief Justice, applying the 'reasonable prospect of success' standard, agreed that the grounds of appeal regarding the admissibility of a statement and the trial judge's use of good character evidence were not sufficiently strong.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for robbery arising from a drug transaction where the complainant was stabbed multiple times.

At trial, there was conflicting evidence regarding who was buying and selling the drugs, and what type of drugs were involved.

The trial judge convicted the appellant but failed to make specific findings of fact regarding what was stolen, which was necessary as the Crown had particularized the charge as stealing money.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because they did not address the charge as particularized.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and breach of probation arising from a drug transaction.

The trial judge had stayed an aggravated assault charge under the Kienapple principle.

The Court of Appeal quashed the robbery conviction but applied section 686(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code to dismiss the appeal by lifting the stay and entering a conviction for aggravated assault.

The court upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's self-defence claim, finding that stabbing the victim eight times was disproportionate to the threat.

The weapons dangerous conviction was stayed, and the matter was remitted for sentencing on the aggravated assault conviction.

The applicant, a daycare provider convicted of manslaughter in the death of a 14-month-old infant and sentenced to six years in prison, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender into custody, but argued detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal assessed the strength of the applicant's grounds of appeal, which included challenges to the trial judge's use of good character evidence and the admission of an unrecorded police statement.

Finding the grounds of appeal to be arguable but weak, and given the extreme seriousness of the offence, the court concluded the applicant failed to establish that her detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of fraud-related offences arising from a large-scale internet fraud scheme operated from his home involving stolen and altered corporate cheques.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions for similar cheque frauds as similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the similarities between the prior conduct and the alleged offences were sufficient to overcome the objective improbability of coincidence, and noting the Crown's case was formidable even without the similar act evidence.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder in a gang-related shooting.

At their joint trial, they advanced cut-throat defences, each blaming the other.

On appeal, they raised numerous grounds relating to the jury charge, including instructions on eyewitness description evidence, bad character evidence, party liability, and the W.D. framework.

They also challenged the admission of gang expert opinion evidence that relied on confidential informants and the trial judge's refusal to review the informant files.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a physical altercation at a restaurant where he placed the victim in a headlock, causing the victim to lose consciousness and hit his head.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's jury instructions on consent were inadequate and that the proceedings should have been stayed due to appellate delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that while s. 11(b) does not apply to appellate delay, the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the law of consent, potentially leading the jury to believe the victim had to consent to every specific act for the defence to apply.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in finding him a party to the offence.

During a concerted beating of the complainant by three men, one of the appellant's co-assailants stabbed the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence that the appellant was the lead attacker, continued the beating after the co-assailant announced his intention to use the knife, and did nothing to stop the stabbing.

The court held this conduct fell within the scope of party liability under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.