Michael K. McKelvey

A former police informant, John Doe (previously Cecil Kirby), sued the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) for breach of contract, breach of privacy, and negligence after the CBC rebroadcast a 1984 interview in 2015.

The plaintiff alleged an oral agreement that the interview would only be shown once.

The CBC moved for summary judgment, asserting the written contract granted them full rights to the content and denying any oral agreement.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no admissible evidence to support the alleged oral agreement and that the written contract provided lawful justification for the rebroadcast, thereby dismissing all claims.

The accused applied for a review of her detention order on charges including robbery with a firearm and kidnapping, arguing a material change in circumstances based on a new release plan with two sureties and a delay in medical treatment.

The court admitted the new sureties as fresh evidence but found the accused failed to meet her reverse onus on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court held that the proposed release plan could not adequately address the risk of reoffending given the accused's extensive criminal record and history of breaching bail conditions.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the jury notice in a motor vehicle accident action, arguing that civil jury trials would be unavailable for the foreseeable future due to the COVID-19 pandemic and that a jury would not represent a cross-section of the community.

The court dismissed the motion, adopting a 'wait and see' approach to allow the newly implemented Central East Region protocol for civil trials to evolve.

The court found no evidence that jury composition had deteriorated and held that striking the jury based on anticipated delay was premature.

The plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury after being hit by a golf ball hit by the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion to increase the damages claimed and to strike the jury notice due to anticipated trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the amendment to damages on consent.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice, adopting a 'wait and see' approach to determine if the region's new civil trial protocol could accommodate urgent civil jury trials, without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to renew the motion later.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondents $3,000 for a defective used truck with a cracked frame.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay evidence, failing to apply caveat emptor, and piercing the corporate veil to hold him personally liable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that hearsay is admissible in Small Claims Court, caveat emptor did not apply due to implied warranties under the Sale of Goods Act, and the appellant failed to adequately disclose he was acting on behalf of a corporation.

The defendants, A.M. and M.P., were charged with ten offences including human trafficking, exercising control or influence over a person, drug trafficking, uttering threats, and advertising sexual services.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the complainant, A.K., whose credibility and reliability were significantly challenged due to inconsistencies between her trial, preliminary inquiry, and police statements, and her admitted attempt to protect the accused.

The court found A.K. to be generally an honest witness but cautioned against relying solely on her testimony.

A.M. was found guilty of advertising sexual services (Count 5), exercising control over movements for sexual services (Count 4), receiving financial benefit from sexual services (Count 3), and trafficking Molly (Count 8).

M.P. was found guilty of advertising sexual services (Count 5), exercising control over movements for sexual services (Count 4), and receiving financial benefit from sexual services (Count 3).

All other charges, including human trafficking (Count 1), receiving financial benefit from human trafficking (Count 2), uttering threats (Count 6), assault (Count 7), and trafficking cocaine and cannabis (Counts 9 and 10), were dismissed for both defendants due to insufficient evidence or credibility concerns.

The plaintiff, a former radio host, brought a defamation action against the defendants over a magazine article detailing his criminal harassment of a former partner.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court found that the article related to a matter of public interest (gender-based harassment).

While the plaintiff showed the action had substantial merit and the defence of justification might not succeed, he failed to prove that the harm he suffered from the article outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court noted the plaintiff's career damage occurred prior to the article's publication due to the criminal charges themselves.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The defendants, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought a pre-trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant on her history in the sex trade.

The Crown alleged the defendants used drugs to coerce the complainant into sex work.

The court applied the two-stage s. 276 framework, ruling that evidence of the complainant's prior sex work and subsequent sex work was inadmissible as it engaged the twin myths.

However, the court permitted cross-examination regarding the complainant's initial meeting with a third party and her independent sex work during the time of the allegations, finding this evidence relevant to the issue of coercion and not barred by s. 276.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding sufficient grounds for the roadside test, accepting the breathalyzer results despite an unreliable breath technician, and finding the delay caused by a forced consultation with duty counsel was reasonable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the first two grounds but found the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider whether the police acted reasonably in requiring the appellant to consult with duty counsel after she had waived her right to counsel.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after striking and kicking the victim in the face, causing severe injuries including a broken jaw and orbital bone.

The Crown sought a 12-month sentence less pre-trial custody, while the defence sought time served.

The court considered the offender's guilty plea, pre-trial custody conditions, and house arrest as mitigating factors, but found the gravity of the offence and the offender's prior record required a custodial sentence.

The offender was sentenced to 1 year in custody less 307 days credit, plus probation, a weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and restitution of $14,296.63.

The defendant breached an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential home.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for the difference between the contract price and the market value at closing, plus forfeiture of the deposit.

The defendant argued the plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages and that the deposit should be credited against any damages.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no failure to mitigate as the defendant provided no evidence that the loss could have been minimized.

The court also held that the deposit must be credited against the damages, awarding the plaintiff the diminished value less the deposit amount.

The applicant, charged with cocaine trafficking offences, brought a Garofoli application seeking to quash search warrants for two residences and exclude the seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found sufficient grounds for the warrant at the applicant's current residence, but insufficient grounds for his former residence due to stale information, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the s. 8 breach was at the less serious end of the spectrum and the reliable evidence was crucial to the prosecution of serious offences, thus admitting the evidence and dismissing the application.

The applicant municipality sought an order under s. 38 of the Building Code Act for the removal or demolition of buildings placed on the respondent's property without a permit.

The property was subject to a holding provision in the zoning by-law, which restricted use to existing uses until a site plan agreement was entered into, requiring the construction of a road to municipal standards.

The court found the respondent violated the zoning by-law and the Building Code Act, and granted the order for removal or demolition, along with an injunction against occupying the buildings.

The plaintiff brought an action for payment on a promissory note, damages for fraud, and to set aside a transfer of a matrimonial home as a fraudulent conveyance, following the defendant's criminal conviction for fraud related to the same loan.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding the assessment of damages, the credibility of the defendant's explanation for the property transfer, and whether the limitation periods had expired or were extended by restitution payments and the ongoing criminal proceedings.

The plaintiff's insurance policy for a rental property was cancelled in 2007 due to non-payment.

A fire occurred in 2015, and the insurer denied the claim.

The plaintiff sued for negligence, alleging failure to notify him of the policy cancellation or non-renewal.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court found the plaintiff's credibility questionable and the insurer's evidence reliable, concluding that the plaintiff was aware of the policy termination.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff recovered only $2,000 after the application of the statutory deductible and a successful defence threshold motion.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of over $230,000, while the defendants argued they were the successful party and sought $25,000 in costs.

The court found that the plaintiff achieved some success and was entitled to costs, noting the defendants' failure to make any settlement offers and their conduct which unnecessarily lengthened the trial.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $40,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Hakeem Mohamed was charged with firearms offences after photos allegedly showed him holding a Glock handgun, which was later seized from a co-accused.

Initial charges of sexual assault and human trafficking were dismissed.

The trial focused on whether the object in the photos was a restricted firearm, if Mohamed possessed it with the requisite knowledge, and whether he carried it for a purpose dangerous to public peace.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object was a real restricted firearm or that Mohamed knew it was, or that he carried it for a dangerous purpose.

Consequently, Mohamed was acquitted on all remaining firearms charges.

The defendant, Hakeem Mohamed, objected to the late disclosure of enhanced photographs by the Crown during his firearms trial.

The court considered the principles of late disclosure under s. 7 and s. 24(1) of the Charter, as well as the general exclusionary discretion.

The court found a s. 7 Charter breach due to actual prejudice to the defendant's ability to make full answer and defence, exacerbated by his in-custody status and the significant adjournment required.

The court also found that the introduction of the evidence would involve an inordinate amount of time not commensurate with its value.

Consequently, the enhanced photographs were excluded from evidence.

The defendants, David Brown and Daimian Johnson, pleaded guilty to cocaine trafficking offences.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the substantial quantities of cocaine involved and their high-level involvement in the drug trade, and mitigating factors such as their guilty pleas, personal circumstances, restrictive bail conditions, and the anonymous surrender of firearms.

For Johnson, the court also considered his testimony at another trial.

The Crown proposed sentences of five years for Brown and seven years for Johnson.

The court imposed sentences of four years and seven months for Brown and six years and five months for Johnson, granting modest additional credit for restrictive bail conditions and the surrender of firearms, and limited credit for Johnson's testimony, which was found to be of little assistance to the prosecution.

Ancillary orders for DNA samples and firearm prohibitions were also imposed.

The appellant, Matthew Ruscica, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

He alleged breaches of his Charter rights under s. 10(b) (right to counsel of choice) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the s. 10(b) advice given by police met the required Charter standard and that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of arbitrary detention for the post-investigation delay.