Marie Deschamps

The appellant obtained student loans under the Quebec Act respecting financial assistance for students.

His loan certificate provided for an interest exemption period after completing his studies.

Subsequent legislative amendments reduced and then eliminated this exemption period.

The financial institution charged the appellant interest based on the new legislation.

The appellant brought a class action against the government.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant had a vested right to the interest exemption period specified in his contract, and the legislative amendments did not clearly indicate an intention to interfere with vested rights or apply retroactively to existing contracts.

The appeal was allowed.

The accused, a black man, was charged with robbing an East Indian man.

At trial, the judge permitted the defence to challenge potential jurors for cause based on potential bias against a black accused, but refused to extend the challenge to include the race of the complainant.

The accused was convicted and appealed, arguing he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion.

The Court declined to take judicial notice of a general theory of race-based 'natural sympathy' between jurors and complainants of the same race.

The appellant was fired from her position as bookkeeper and office manager of the respondent trade union after reporting alleged financial misconduct by her supervisors to the International Union of Iron Workers.

The trial judge found she was terminated for reporting the misconduct but held that the union was not a 'lawful authority' under s. 74 of The Labour Standards Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'lawful authority' includes individuals within the employer organization who exercise lawful authority over the employee or the activity, thereby protecting employees who report misconduct 'up the ladder'.

The federal government approved the construction of a winter road through Wood Buffalo National Park, which would traverse the traditional hunting and trapping grounds of the Mikisew Cree First Nation.

The Mikisew argued this infringed their rights under Treaty 8.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Crown has a treaty right to 'take up' lands for purposes such as transportation, this right is subject to the honour of the Crown and the duty to consult.

The Court found that the Crown failed to adequately consult the Mikisew before approving the road, thereby breaching its duty.

The appeal was allowed and the Minister's approval was quashed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in the recharge to the jury regarding his criminal record and by failing to instruct the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the recharge on the criminal record could not have misled the jury when read in context.

The Court also held there was no error in failing to instruct on post-offence conduct, noting such an instruction was not requested at trial.

The appellants were convicted of drug-related offences based in part on wiretap evidence obtained under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code.

At trial, they challenged the admissibility of the wiretap evidence under s. 8 of the Charter and sought leave to cross-examine the police officer who swore the affidavit in support of the authorization.

The trial judge, applying the Garofoli threshold test, denied leave to cross-examine and admitted the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Garofoli leave requirement remains constitutional and that the trial judge did not err in finding no reasonable likelihood that cross-examination would elicit evidence of probative value.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge committed no error in finding the necessary criminal intent.

Kirkbi held patents for LEGO construction sets.

When the patents expired in Canada, Ritvik began manufacturing and selling interchangeable bricks.

Kirkbi claimed an unregistered trade-mark in the 'LEGO indicia' (the pattern of raised studs) and sued for passing off under s. 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act.

Ritvik challenged the constitutionality of s. 7(b).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 7(b) is intra vires Parliament as a valid exercise of the general trade and commerce power.

However, Kirkbi's passing-off claim was dismissed because the doctrine of functionality bars purely functional designs from being the basis of a trade-mark, whether registered or unregistered.

This document is a summary note regarding the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Contino v. Leonelli-Contino.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, establishing that a party seeking to deviate from the Federal Child Support Guidelines under the shared custody provisions of section 9 must establish on clear and compelling evidence that the deviation is in the child's best interests, and the court must consider all statutory factors without giving pre-eminence to any single factor.

The appellants, former employees of Stelco in Quebec, sought early retirement benefits under Stelco's pension plan after plant closures.

The plan was governed by Ontario law.

Ontario's Superintendent of Pensions ordered a partial wind up and approved a report granting early retirement benefits only to Ontario employees, while Quebec employees received deferred pensions under Quebec law.

The appellants did not contest this decision in Ontario but sued in Quebec based on their employment contracts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the action was an impermissible collateral attack on the Superintendent's final decision, barred by res judicata and issue estoppel, and that the Quebec courts should decline jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens.

The father applied to reduce his child support payments after the child began spending 50 percent of the time with him.

The Supreme Court of Canada established the proper approach to calculating child support under section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines for shared custody arrangements.

The Court held that there is no presumption in favour of the Guidelines amount or a simple set-off.

Instead, courts must take a contextual approach, considering the Table amounts, the increased costs of shared custody, and the conditions, means, needs, and other circumstances of each spouse and the child.

The father was ordered to pay $500 per month.

The appellant municipality sought to restore a conviction under a municipal noise by-law after the lower courts held the provision ultra vires and unconstitutional.

The case concerned amplified music and commentary projected from a nightclub entrance onto a downtown street, raising both municipal law and Charter issues.

The majority held that, on a contextual interpretation, the by-law targeted only disruptive noise that stands out from environmental noise and therefore fell within the municipality’s delegated nuisance power.

The Court further held that the prohibition infringed freedom of expression on public streets, clarified the approach to expression on government-owned property, and concluded the infringement was justified under s. 1 because combatting urban noise pollution was pressing and the measure minimally impaired expression.

The appeal was allowed with costs, over a dissent that would have found the provision ultra vires and unjustified.

The 13-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon, a primary designated offence, after stabbing his mother in the foot with a pen.

The trial judge declined to make a mandatory DNA data bank order, finding under s. 487.051(2) of the Criminal Code that the impact on the young person's privacy and security would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest, taking into account the principles of youth criminal justice legislation.

The Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, holding that a trial judge may consider the underlying principles of youth criminal justice legislation when balancing the factors under s. 487.051(2).

The appellant attended a residential school run by the respondent Order.

He was sexually assaulted by a lay employee who worked as a baker and maintenance man.

The trial judge found the Order vicariously liable based on the operational characteristics of the school.

The Court of Appeal set aside the decision, finding insufficient connection between the employee's duties and the wrongful acts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that vicarious liability requires a strong connection between the employer-created risk and the wrongful act, which was not established given the employee's limited duties and lack of authority over the students.

The applicants brought motions seeking an order to amend a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada or for a re-hearing of the appeal to clarify the disposition.

The Court dismissed the motions, finding they did not meet the criteria under Rule 81(1)(a) for accidental slips or omissions, nor the criteria under Rule 76 for exceptional cases involving a failure of justice.

The Court held that its previous judgment clearly expressed that the matter must be remitted to the Government and National Assembly for reconsideration.

The appellants applied for permanent residence in Canada under the investor and self-employed classes.

Both applications were denied because their dependent children had intellectual disabilities that medical officers concluded would cause excessive demands on Canada's social services.

The visa officers refused to consider the families' wealth and willingness to pay for private social services.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the legislation requires an individualized assessment.

A family's ability and willingness to attenuate the burden on the public purse are relevant factors in determining whether a disabled child might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on social services.

The appellant, a former student at an Indian residential school operated by the Government of Canada and the United Church of Canada, sought damages for sexual abuse suffered at the school.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both Canada and the Church were jointly vicariously liable for the sexual assaults committed by a dormitory supervisor, rejecting the application of a doctrine of charitable immunity for the Church.

The Court also found that the Indian Act did not impose a non-delegable statutory duty on Canada to ensure student safety.

The trial judge's unequal apportionment of fault (75% to Canada, 25% to the Church) and assessment of damages, which excluded prior trauma and statute-barred wrongs, were upheld.

The government of Quebec submitted questions concerning the constitutional validity of ss. 22 and 23 of the Employment Insurance Act to the Court of Appeal, arguing they encroached on provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Court of Appeal found the provisions unconstitutional.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the provisions relating to maternity and parental benefits are a valid exercise of Parliament's jurisdiction over unemployment insurance under s. 91(2A) of the Constitution Act, 1867, as their pith and substance is the replacement of employment income during an interruption of work.

The appellants, arm's length taxpayers, sought to deduct over $10 million in losses against their own incomes through a series of transactions involving partnerships.

The original losses belonged to an insolvent trust company, which transferred a portfolio of mortgages with unrealized losses to a non-arm's length partnership.

The trust company then sold its interest in the partnership to an arm's length party, and the appellants subsequently joined a new partnership to claim their proportionate shares of the losses.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the appellants and applied the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) to disallow the deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that allowing the appellants to claim the losses would defeat the purposes of s. 18(13) and the partnership provisions of the Income Tax Act, thereby constituting abusive tax avoidance.

The respondent mortgage company purchased trailers and leased them back to the vendor to claim a substantial capital cost allowance (CCA) and offset revenue from other leased assets.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the respondent and disallowed the CCA claim under the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the transaction resulted in a tax benefit and was an avoidance transaction, it was not abusive tax avoidance under s. 245(4) of the Income Tax Act.

The Court found that the transaction was consistent with the object, spirit, and purpose of the CCA provisions, which permit deductions based on the cost of assets acquired, regardless of the economic risk involved.