Marianne Salih

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and attempted robbery arising from a carjacking spree and was sentenced to 2.5 years' incarceration.

He appealed on two grounds: that the sentencing judge erred in treating denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for a youthful first-time offender, and that the sentencing judge failed to account for collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal found that despite a misstatement of the law, the sentencing judge did not overemphasize denunciation and deterrence, as evidenced by a below-range sentence.

The court also held that immigration consequences could not be avoided without imposing an unfit sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and related offences for firing shots at a female acquaintance, striking her twice.

The sole issues at trial were the identity of the shooter and intent to kill.

The trial judge rejected direct identification evidence and limited-weight photo identification evidence, instead relying almost entirely on circumstantial evidence including GPS data from the suspect vehicle, security camera footage with timestamps, and DNA evidence.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in accepting the accuracy of security camera timestamps without proper authentication and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no legal error in the trial judge's application of the law regarding measurement devices in common usage and concluding that the verdict was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter, discharging a firearm with intent to prevent arrest, reckless discharge of a firearm, killing a service animal, and possession of a loaded firearm.

The offences occurred over approximately 24 hours: the accused shot and killed the victim in his daughter's apartment after a physical altercation; the following day, he fired at a police officer attempting to arrest him; and subsequently shot and killed a police service dog during his apprehension.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted for a 14-year global sentence.

The court accepted the joint submission while providing detailed sentencing analysis for each offence, explaining how the principle of totality reduced what would otherwise have been a 23-year sentence.

The appellant, Preston Woods, appealed his 7-year sentence for drug offences on the basis that the sentencing judge erred by refusing to adjourn the sentencing hearing to allow him to obtain records of time spent in lockdown during pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by not allowing the adjournment, which prevented consideration of a possible sentence reduction (Duncan credit) for harsh pre-sentence conditions.

The Court allowed the appeal, admitted the lockdown records as fresh evidence, and substituted a sentence of 6 years and 9 months.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the appeals of Rushawn Anderson and Nicholas Rhoden from convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in admitting out-of-court statements, in his rulings on Charter violations, in instructing the jury on fabrication, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The majority dismissed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction sufficient and the verdicts reasonable.

In dissent, Gomery J.A. would have allowed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction flawed and the verdicts unreasonable, and would have substituted acquittals.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed J.C.'s appeal in part, setting aside his designation as a dangerous offender and substituting a designation as a long-term offender, while upholding the determinate sentence and 10-year long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The court found that the trial judge erred by failing to consider intractability at the designation stage, as required by R. v. Boutilier, but found no reviewable error in the trial judge’s findings regarding the patterns of behaviour or assessment of the criminal record.

The court considered whether A.O.'s post-arrest statement to police was voluntary, given his mental health history and evidence of psychosis.

After reviewing the circumstances of the arrest, A.O.'s mental state, and the content of the police interview, the court found that A.O. had the capacity to understand what he was saying and that his statement could be used against him.

The application to admit the statement was granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Malcolm Copeland’s appeal from his conviction for second degree murder.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation.

The court held that there was no air of reality to the defence of provocation, as the evidence did not support that Copeland lost self-control and acted on the sudden before his passion could cool.

The court found that the evidence was consistent with self-defence, not provocation, and that the trial judge properly applied the law.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals of Corey and Curtis Murray, who were convicted of second degree murder in the death of Trevor Seraphine.

The main issues on appeal concerned the police failure to preserve certain surveillance video evidence and the Crown’s late disclosure of the loss of this evidence.

The court found that while the loss of evidence breached the appellants’ Charter rights, the trial judge’s remedial jury instructions were adequate and a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

The court also upheld the 20-year parole ineligibility periods, finding them fit in the circumstances.

The appellant, Isaiah Todd, appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm while prohibited, following the dismissal of his s. 8 Charter application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the reviewing judge’s finding that the confidential informant’s information was compelling and corroborated, and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) established reasonable grounds for the search warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the Crown’s application for the complainant to testify via CCTV in a sexual assault and assault by choking prosecution.

The court grants the application, finding that the complainant’s concerns about testifying in the presence of the accused and before a jury are reasonably held and that testifying via CCTV will facilitate a full and candid account of her evidence.

The decision reviews the legislative amendments to section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, clarifies that necessity is no longer the standard, and emphasizes the importance of balancing the interests of the complainant and the accused’s right to a fair trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter despite s. 8 and s. 9 breaches.

Police stopped his vehicle for a Highway Traffic Act violation and arrested him based on an Alberta warrant, which was later found to be geographically restricted.

A firearm was discovered during a search incident to arrest.

The trial judge found the police conduct inadvertent and not in bad faith, and that the seriousness of the charges weighed in favour of inclusion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, deferring to her assessment of police conduct as being on the less serious end of the spectrum and emphasizing the seriousness of the firearm charges.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence of motive to fabricate and by engaging in improper propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons regarding motive to fabricate, deeming them adequate when read against the record.

The court also rejected the claim of improper propensity reasoning, clarifying that the trial judge used evidence of controlling behaviour as a contextual factor to assess competing narratives, not as proof of propensity to commit the assaults.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal, setting aside a motion judge's order that had granted certiorari with mandamus in aid.

The motion judge had compelled a Justice of the Peace to complete a bail hearing that the Justice of the Peace had aborted due to a proposed surety's misconduct and subsequent false denial.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by granting prerogative relief in the absence of jurisdictional error, as the Justice of the Peace's decision to abort the hearing was a discretionary exercise based on an assessment of fairness, not a jurisdictional overreach.

The Crown brought an urgent application for certiorari and mandamus to quash a Justice of the Peace's decision to strike a bail hearing under s. 515(6) of the Criminal Code.

The Justice of the Peace struck the hearing after the proposed surety made a profane remark and then lied about it, deeming it unfair to the accused.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace lacked jurisdiction to strike the proceeding, as the witness's conduct, while unexpected, did not impair the accused's right to a fair hearing or engage principles of fundamental justice.

The court emphasized that a bail hearing is not subject to a "do-over" simply because a release plan falters.

The application was granted, quashing the decision and ordering the bail hearing to be completed.

The accused, Mireille Pardieu, was charged with manslaughter after restraining Fadumo Hassan, who subsequently died due to complications of chest compression exacerbated by cocaine and ethanol intoxication.

The defense argued self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded an air of reality to self-defence but argued the force used was disproportionate, specifically the duration of restraint after the victim stopped resisting.

The court found Ms. Pardieu's actions reasonable, noting her belief of ongoing threat and the unknown contributing factors of the victim's drug and alcohol use, which a reasonable person would not have known would make the restraint fatal.

The Crown failed to disprove self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Mark Buckley, charged with unlawfully being in a dwelling, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, applied under section 24(2) of the Charter to exclude all evidence.

He alleged violations of his rights under sections 7, 8, and 10(b), specifically regarding delayed rights to counsel, failure to caution, questioning before counsel access, and unlawful search of his bag.

The court found a minor breach of the duty to hold off questioning in the police car but no other Charter breaches.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the breach was low, its impact on Buckley minimal, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits high.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and all evidence was deemed admissible.

The appellant appealed convictions for four counts of sexual assault, one count of assault, and one count of forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and reliability by treating memory gaps and inconsistencies as enhancing factors, and materially misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly grappled with the difficulties in the complainant's evidence, provided rational explanations for her findings, and that her credibility findings were owed deference.

The Crown sought a long-term offender (LTO) declaration and a 10-year long-term supervision order (LTSO) against the offender, Jeffrey Bluecloud, following his conviction for multiple bank robberies and associated charges.

The offender conceded LTO status but sought a lower reformatory sentence and a 5-year LTSO.

The court designated the offender as an LTO, imposing a further sentence of 15 months in a provincial reformatory and a 7-year LTSO.

The decision emphasized public safety through rehabilitation, considering the offender's Indigenous background and the unsuitability of a federal penitentiary sentence due to likely segregation preventing access to programming.