Marc Rosenberg

The plaintiff appealed a trial judgment apportioning 90% of the fault to it for corrosion damage to the steel roofs of two of its warehouse buildings.

The trial judge found the plaintiff negligent for failing to install a vapour barrier, which allowed condensation to cause the corrosion, and the defendant 10% at fault for failing to warn that its phenolic foam insulation contained corrosive acids that could accelerate the damage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the plaintiff's failure to consider the permeability of the insulation and foresee the risk of moisture damage constituted contributory negligence.

The defendant's cross-appeal regarding its duty to warn was also dismissed.

The respondents on appeal submitted a bill of costs following the appeal.

They sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on the trial judge's award of solicitor-client costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to award substantial indemnity costs but recognized the complexity of the matter.

The court fixed the costs payable by the appellants to the respondents at $25,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondents sought to develop land subdivided via testamentary devise, a method that bypassed Planning Act controls.

When they applied for building permits, the appellant Town delayed processing and passed an interim control by-law, followed by a zoning amendment increasing minimum lot sizes, effectively halting the development.

The trial judge found the Town acted in bad faith, quashed the zoning amendment, and ordered the issuance of building permits and damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings of bad faith and the order for building permits, finding no palpable and overriding error, but allowed the appeal in part to adjust the interest rate on damages and the scale of costs.

The mother appealed an order refusing to return her six-year-old child to California under the Hague Convention.

The motion judge had found that the mother and child's uncertain immigration status in the United States would place the child in an intolerable situation and that returning the child would be contrary to public policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that uncertain immigration status does not meet the high threshold of an intolerable situation under Article 13(b) of the Convention.

The court ordered the child returned to the mother in Los Angeles, provided United States authorities permit entry.

The appellant appealed a decision striking out her statement of claim against the respondents for malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and other claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that the pleading failed to set out the necessary elements of the asserted claims and lacked sufficient material facts, relying instead on conjecture and conclusions of law.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim for adverse possession over certain property areas, including a buffer zone.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's acceptance of evidence regarding the area south of Tree Line One was fatal to that part of the claim.

Regarding the western buffer zone, the Court held it was open to the trial judge to find that the appellants' use did not exclude the true owner's proprietary use of the land.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeals, stating they were in entire agreement with the reasons of the lower court judge.

The respondent did not seek costs.

The appellants appealed an order granting a sending order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and dismissing their applications to set aside search warrants and evidence-gathering orders.

The investigation related to alleged price-fixing and output restriction in the sulfuric acid industry contrary to the United States Sherman Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the warrants and orders were valid, the informations provided sufficient grounds, and the Sherman Act offences qualified as offences under the Act and Treaty.

The court also found that section 8(1) of the Act does not contain a reciprocal offence requirement and upheld the refusal to continue a sealing order.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order of Lane J. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no substance to it because a subsequent, unappealed order by Backhouse J. superseded the order of Lane J. The Court noted that the superseding order did not eliminate the appellants' bad faith or punitive damage claims.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing an agreement.

The appellants conceded there was an agreement on all essential terms.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge reasonably and properly applied the evidence relating to the territorial ambit of the restrictive covenant to resolve the one outstanding issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent, a middle manager for the former City of North York, was terminated following municipal amalgamation and unsuccessful job competitions.

The trial judge awarded 116 weeks' pay in lieu of notice, including an extension for bad faith conduct under Wallace, finding the employer's competition process was 'sloppy'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the employer's appeal, holding that the employer's conduct did not amount to bad faith or unfair dealing justifying a Wallace extension.

The court reduced the notice period to the 80 weeks originally offered by the employer.

The respondent's cross-appeal seeking reinstatement on the basis that he was an office holder was dismissed.

The 15-year-old first offender appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give apparent weight to the appellant's prospects for rehabilitation.

Noting that the appellant had completed the secure custody portion of his disposition and done well, the Court granted leave to appeal, struck out the open custody portion, and maintained the probation term.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial judge on three issues of liability and the allocation of costs.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error on the liability issues and no error in principle in the discretionary allocation of costs.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $6,000.

The Crown brought an application to remove the appellant's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The counsel had previously provided an opinion letter for a third party, whom the appellant now sought to implicate in the murder of the victim via fresh evidence on appeal.

The parties reached a resolution wherein independent counsel would handle the fresh evidence application and related grounds of appeal, ensuring no breach of duty to the former client while preserving the appellant's right to counsel of choice for the remainder of the appeal.

The Crown's application was withdrawn.

The parties agreed on the costs of the appeal and the motion for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs in the amount of $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST, to be paid by the appellant to the respondent.

The parties agreed on the costs of the appeal and the motion for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs at $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST, to be paid by the appellant to the respondents jointly and severally.

The appellant commenced two actions against the municipality regarding the removal of religious objects from his mother's grave and the administrative process concerning a monument.

The motion judge struck out most of the claims on the basis of res judicata and abuse of process, as they overlapped with previous Divisional Court litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding no error in the application of res judicata or the setting aside of a noting in default.

The Court allowed the municipality's cross-appeal in part, striking an additional subparagraph and a jury notice, while declining to order security for costs.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent 15 months' notice for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant argued the respondent was an independent contractor, that a release barred her claim, and that prior asset sales severed her employment history.

The respondent cross-appealed, seeking a longer notice period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the respondent was an employee, that her employment history carried over through asset sales, and that the 15-month notice period was within the acceptable range.

The appellant appealed an order refusing an adjournment of an application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion, noting the appellant had ample time to prepare materials and was on notice that further adjournments would be opposed.

The Court also refused to admit fresh evidence, as it was available prior to the application and the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the lack of diligence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the trial judge should have declared a mistrial when a juror expressed doubt during polling, that an adverse inference instruction should have been given for the Crown's failure to call a witness, and that the jury charge was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to allow further deliberations after the jury poll, that the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt arising from an absence of evidence, and that the jury charge was adequate.