Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for an impaired driving offence.

He argued that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to make a breath demand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the officer articulated grounds that fully satisfied the requirement and that the trial judge reasonably found the officer took into account that the motor was running.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown should not have been permitted to cross-examine the appellant on statements that had not been proven voluntary, as there was no clear waiver of a voir dire.

The trial judge had relied on these statements to impugn the appellant's credibility.

Furthermore, the court found the verdict unreasonable regarding 24 bills found in another person's home, as there was insufficient evidence of control.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were set aside.

Given that the appellant had already served over a year of his sentence, a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellants, who were 16 years old at the time of the offences, pleaded guilty to six violent convenience store robberies.

The Crown successfully applied to have them sentenced as adults under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The sentencing judge imposed five-year sentences in addition to three years' credit for pre-sentence custody, and ordered both to serve their sentences in adult penitentiaries.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the adult sentences and the quantum of the sentences, finding no error in the judge's approach to accountability, rehabilitation, or pre-sentence custody credit.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the placement of one appellant, finding the sentencing judge failed to properly evaluate expert evidence recommending he remain in a youth facility, and ordered a new placement hearing for that appellant.

Following an appeal that reduced the respondent's damage award from $55,000 to $1,000, the parties sought clarification on trial costs.

The appellants argued that the modest damage award justified no trial costs and relied on rules 57.05(1) and 76.13(3) regarding Small Claims Court and simplified procedure.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent was successful at trial, the finding of negligence was not reversed, and it was reasonable to have brought the claim under the ordinary procedure.

The court awarded the respondent trial costs fixed at the previously agreed amount of $115,000.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him to the United States to face charges of delivering cocaine to a minor and sexual assault.

The applicant argued that the Minister exceeded his jurisdiction because the surrender order included transactions not supported by the committal evidence, that the underlying offence of 'trafficking by giving' was unconstitutional, and that the Minister erred in assessing the risks of indefinite detention or deportation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the minor discrepancies in the transactions did not render the decision unjust or unreasonable, that the constitutional argument was moot given evidence of other forms of trafficking, and that the Minister's assessment of the risks was reasonable.

The appellant, a newspaper reporter, wrote an article that breached a publication ban under s. 486(5) of the Criminal Code.

Neither the reporter nor the newspaper knew of the ban.

The trial judge acquitted the reporter as a principal but convicted the newspaper.

On summary conviction appeal, the reporter was convicted as an aider and abettor under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code based on an objective mens rea standard.

The Court of Appeal allowed the reporter's appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that liability as an aider or abettor under s. 21(1)(b) or (c) requires subjective mens rea, specifically knowledge of the circumstances constituting the offence.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder after confessing to undercover police officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

He appealed, arguing his statements were obtained in violation of his section 7 Charter right to silence and should have been excluded at common law.

He also argued the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence on false confessions and failing to adequately warn the jury about the unreliability of his statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the right to silence is not engaged when a suspect is not detained, the police conduct would not shock the community, the expert evidence was unnecessary, and the jury instructions were sufficient.

The appellant, a lesbian woman, sought to conceive a child using semen from a known gay donor.

She challenged the definition of 'assisted conception' in the Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, which exempted women using semen from a spouse or sexual partner from rigorous screening requirements.

The appellant argued this violated her equality and liberty rights under ss. 15 and 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the exemption was based on health considerations rather than sexual orientation, as women using a spouse's semen are already exposed to any existing risks.

The court also upheld the exclusion criteria for donors over 40 and men who have had sex with men, concluding they were factually based on health risks and not discriminatory.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death, driving over 80, and dangerous driving causing death, and sentenced to four years and ten months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence of bolus drinking and improperly drew an adverse inference from his failure to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge properly rejected the bolus drinking evidence and correctly applied the burden of proof, though it conditionally stayed the over 80 conviction based on a Crown concession.

The appellant, who was in a same-sex union with the biological mother, sought a declaration of parentage for a child conceived with the assistance of a male friend.

The biological father remained involved in the child's life, meaning an adoption order would sever his parental rights.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Children's Law Reform Act only contemplates one mother and one father, a legislative gap existed regarding children born to same-sex parents through reproductive technology.

The Court exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction to declare the appellant a mother of the child, recognizing three legal parents to protect the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and robbery arising from the Just Desserts café shooting.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury selection process by prioritizing the return dates of potential jurors from identifiable minority groups to ensure representativeness.

The Court of Appeal held that while the process departed from strict statutory requirements, it did not prejudice the appellant or undermine the jury's impartiality.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the admissibility of surveillance videotapes, recognition witness evidence, the jury charge on identification, and the trial judge's refusal to compel testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed and the sentence appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed his sentence after inflicting a severe beating on the victim.

The Court of Appeal found that the offence required a lengthy penitentiary sentence, especially given the appellant's serious criminal record and prior convictions for similar offences of violence.

The court concluded that the trial judge made no error in principle, the sentence was not unfit, and the appellant remained a serious danger to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding that the parties had not reached a binding agreement regarding the purchase and development of a commercial property.

The trial judge concluded that the parties only had an unenforceable agreement to agree, as they had agreed on the ownership ratio but not on other essential matters, which were to be dealt with in an unexecuted shareholders agreement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a final order regarding child custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Ontario courts lacked jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act because the child was habitually resident in Mexico, where she had lived for four years and where an interim order was outstanding.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's conclusion on the merits.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant and setting a timetable and procedure for bringing an application to vary spousal support.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the appellant was attempting to relitigate previously decided issues and was properly declared a vexatious litigant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay a $3.3 million equalization payment, retroactive child support, ongoing child support, and costs including a $150,000 premium.

The core issues involved whether a cottage owned by the husband's numbered company constituted a matrimonial home, the valuation of his business, and the appropriateness of the support and costs awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to pierce the corporate veil regarding the cottage and accepted the business valuation and support orders.

However, applying recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the $150,000 costs premium.

The respondent wife's cross-appeal seeking higher pre-judgment interest was dismissed.

The successful appellants sought costs of $25,000 for the appeal.

The respondent argued for moderation because the appellants did not concede negligence until the appeal hearing, the respondent maintained a portion of the damage award, and due to the unique circumstances of the case.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the respondent and fixed costs at $5,000 inclusive of GST and disbursements, to be shared equally between the appellants.

The Attorney General of Canada obtained an evidence-gathering order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to allow a French expert to examine a collection of Rodin plasters held at an art centre.

The collectors appealed, arguing the order amounted to an unauthorized search and seizure.

The application judge made a sending order but attached conditions requiring the Crown to pay storage costs, indemnify the collectors for damage, and pay costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the collectors' appeal, finding jurisdiction for the evidence-gathering order.

However, the Court allowed the Crown's appeal, striking out the compensation and costs conditions as inconsistent with the general rule that costs are not awarded in criminal matters absent exceptional circumstances.

The appellants appealed a decision declaring their option to purchase a residential parcel of farmland void for contravening section 50 of the Planning Act.

The appellants had sold a 74-acre farm but entered into an option agreement to purchase back the residential portion.

The Court of Appeal held that the option agreement violated section 50(3) because the grantor retained abutting lands not within a registered plan of subdivision.

The Court further found that the agreement lacked an express condition requiring compliance with the Planning Act under section 50(21), and declined to rectify the contract due to a lack of evidence of a prior oral agreement to include such a condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was stopped for a traffic violation and refused to produce his driver's licence, ownership, and insurance.

The police officer arrested him for failing to identify under the Highway Traffic Act, and a scuffle ensued.

The appellant was convicted of assault with intent to resist arrest.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the arrest was unlawful because the officer did not make a separate request for alternative identification as required by section 33(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

Because the arrest was unlawful, the appellant was entitled to resist, and the convictions were quashed.