Mara Greene

The accused pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a firearm contrary to section 91(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused inherited firearms from his grandfather and stored them in his closet after a basement flood.

He did not have a valid permit and was unaware of the legal requirements for firearm ownership.

His son, who was on bail for firearms-related offences, was living in the residence and could have accessed the firearms.

The Crown sought 90 days intermittent imprisonment; the defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court imposed an absolute discharge, finding that despite the seriousness of firearm offences and the need for deterrence and denunciation, the unique circumstances, the accused's exemplary character, his guilty plea, cooperation with police, and the disproportionate impact of a criminal record on his business warranted a discharge.

The accused was charged with accessing child pornography.

The Crown sought to introduce purchase orders and invoices found on the defendant's account at AZOV Films (a website selling child pornography) as evidence of the offence.

The central issue was whether these electronic documents were admissible for the truth of their contents.

The Crown argued admissibility under section 31 of the Canada Evidence Act or as admissions against interest.

The defence argued that section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act applied and had not been complied with.

The court held that section 31 addresses only authentication and the best evidence rule, not hearsay exceptions.

Section 30 applies to business records and was not complied with.

The documents were also not admissible as admissions because the accused was not in possession of the computer housing the records and there was insufficient evidence he created them.

The Crown conceded it could not establish admissibility and requested a finding of not guilty, which was granted.

The accused was charged with driving while having over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a disclosure application seeking manuals used by police in conducting periodic inspections of the Intoxilyzer 8000C.

The Crown initially refused disclosure, arguing the materials were third-party records requiring an O'Connor application.

The court determined that certain manuals in the possession of the investigating officer were subject to Stinchcombe disclosure obligations.

The court ordered partial disclosure of training materials and maintenance protocols relevant to the proper functioning and operation of the instrument, finding such materials essential to preparing a defence.

A media outlet sought an exemption from complying with a production order requiring disclosure of email communications between a journalist and a corporate spokesperson regarding price-fixing charges.

The court considered whether the communications were privileged or otherwise protected by law, and whether compliance would be unreasonable.

The court held that the communications did not originate in confidence, the spokesperson's identity was publicly disclosed in the article, and no case-by-case privilege attached.

The court also found no evidence that compliance would impose an unreasonable burden.

The application for exemption was dismissed.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a recognizance (x4), possession of marijuana, and possession of cocaine.

The Crown sought to introduce two certificates of an analyst pursuant to section 51 of the Controlled Drug and Substances Act to prove the nature of the substances seized.

The defence argued that the notice of intention to introduce the certificates was inadequate and confusing because it failed to specify which trial the certificates related to, given that the accused had other outstanding charges.

The court found the notice sufficient because the certificates contained identifying information (officer names and police seal numbers) that would have made clear which charges the notice related to, and there was no evidence that the accused had multiple outstanding charges on the date the notice was served.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, refusing to provide a breath sample, assault with a weapon, dangerous driving, and assault following an incident on May 23, 2011.

The charges of assault with a weapon, assault, and dangerous driving were withdrawn.

Prior to trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging a violation of section 8 rights due to an unlawful strip search conducted at the police station.

The Crown opposed the application.

The trial proceeded on the impaired driving and refusal to provide a breath sample charges.

The court found that the strip search violated the accused's section 8 Charter rights and stayed the proceedings.

On the merits, the court acquitted the accused of both remaining charges.

The accused was charged with driving while having over 80mg of alcohol in 100ml of blood following a R.I.D.E. program stop.

The central issue was whether the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) were violated when police failed to wait a reasonable amount of time for the accused's chosen counsel to call back before directing the accused to speak with duty counsel and subsequently requiring a breath sample.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) and, applying the section 24(2) analysis, excluded the breathalyser results.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession of cocaine following the seizure of approximately 73 grams of cocaine found on a kitchen counter during a police search of an apartment.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish that the accused was in possession of the cocaine.

The court found insufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial, specifically finding that while there was some evidence of identification and possible knowledge of the drugs' presence, there was no evidence that the accused had any control over the apartment or the items within it.

The accused was discharged on all charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to abduction in contravention of a custody order.

She had abducted her daughter in 1993 when the child was approximately two years old, believing the child's safety was at risk.

The accused and child lived under assumed identities for 18 years until the accused's arrest in 2011.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day followed by two years of probation, finding that while general deterrence and denunciation are paramount in child abduction cases, the unique mitigating circumstances—including the accused's traumatic childhood, early guilty plea, remorse, and the victims' wishes for restorative justice—justified a community-based sentence rather than incarceration.

The accused was charged with driving while having over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a RIDE program stop.

The central issue was the admissibility of breath samples obtained at the police station.

The defence argued the samples were taken in violation of section 8 Charter rights and that the Crown failed to establish statutory compliance under the Criminal Code.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe the approved screening device was in proper working order, thereby violating the accused's section 8 rights.

Applying the section 24(2) test from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the breath test results and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with seventeen offences relating to a loaded firearm, folding knife, and cash seized during a search of his residence.

The Crown conceded that the search warrants were invalid due to the affiant's failure to properly investigate the credibility of untested confidential informants and the heavily redacted informations to obtain warrants that did not disclose reasonable grounds.

The court found a section 8 Charter violation and proceeded to determine whether the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The court found the police conduct was seriously careless and reckless in drafting the informations, including misleading characterizations of the accused as a "Dangerous Offender" and failure to properly investigate the reliability of informants.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court excluded the firearm evidence, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute despite the serious nature of the offences and public interest in prosecuting gun crimes.