B. Funston

The accused, Jules Meawasige, pleaded guilty to a serious charge, leading to a sentencing hearing.

The court accepted a joint submission for a 40-month sentence, acknowledging the accused's acceptance of responsibility and the saving of court time as significant mitigating factors.

The judgment detailed the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit, including specific consideration for lockdown days and COVID-19 impacts.

Various ancillary orders were imposed, including a 20-year SOIRA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and a no-communication order.

A three-year probation period was also imposed, with conditions focused on rehabilitation, particularly addressing alcohol abuse and sexual behaviours.

The accused, Justin Osmond, was charged with assault causing bodily harm to a young person (A.N.) in his care.

The trial focused on the reliability of A.N.'s evidence, which included numerous conflicting statements about the perpetrator and the nature of the injuries.

The defence also raised concerns about police investigation "tunnel vision" and suggested another potential perpetrator.

The court found that while the injuries occurred in the accused's care, the inconsistencies in the child's testimony, particularly regarding who caused the injuries and how, raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm against a child in his care.

The accused sought production of notes made by the child's foster mother (H.N.) a few days after the alleged assault.

H.N. had prepared these notes at the request of her family lawyer to obtain legal advice regarding custody proceedings.

The notes were protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court rejected the accused's argument that H.N. waived privilege by seeking to refresh her memory from the notes prior to trial.

The court applied a flexible, principled approach to determine whether implied waiver occurred, balancing the probative value of the document against the prejudicial effect of breaching solicitor-client privilege.

The application for production was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application for direction regarding the scope of a preliminary inquiry where an Information contains both offences with a maximum penalty of 14 years or more (14+ offences) and offences with a maximum penalty of less than 14 years (<14 offences).

Following amendments to the Criminal Code that came into force on September 19, 2019, defendants can only request preliminary inquiries for 14+ offences.

The court determined that a preliminary inquiry judge has jurisdiction only over the 14+ offences and must remit the <14 offences to the Superior Court, regardless of the outcome of the preliminary inquiry on the 14+ offences.

The defendant was charged with breach of recognizance for violating a condition prohibiting him from being within Peel Region except to attend court.

He was found guilty following a trial on May 2, 2018.

The defendant raised Charter defences challenging the lawfulness of his detention and pat-down search under sections 8 and 9, and the failure to inform him of his right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that the detention and pat-down search were justified under the Waterfield test and common law powers to preserve the peace.

While there was a technical breach of section 10(b) regarding the failure to inform the defendant of his right to counsel during the detention period, the court found no breach of the implementational component and ruled the evidence admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with assault, unlawful confinement, and failing to comply with a recognizance following an attack on a complainant.

The Crown's case relied primarily on DNA evidence found in a glove dropped by the assailant, which matched the accused's DNA with a high statistical probability.

The Crown also presented evidence that the accused's appearance was consistent with the complainant's generic description and that similar clothing was found in the accused's residence.

The court, however, found that the DNA evidence alone was insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, especially given the presence of DNA from other individuals on the glove and the generic nature of the physical description and clothing.

Citing principles from R. v. Villaroman and R. v. Wills, the court emphasized that alternative inferences need not be based on proven facts and that probable guilt is insufficient for conviction.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The accused were tried on 35 counts of break and enter and related offences involving commercial establishments across Ontario between May and October 2013.

The Crown relied on physical surveillance, GPS tracking data from a rental vehicle, forensic evidence (paint analysis and tool mark examination), and video evidence.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of attempted break and enter and possession of break-in instruments related to an A&W restaurant incident on October 17, 2013, where they were arrested.

The accused were also convicted of break and enter and possession of property obtained by crime at an Alden Coffee Shop on September 12, 2013 (Edwards only).

The accused were acquitted of the remaining charges, as the Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt despite circumstantial evidence being highly suspicious.

A voir dire was conducted to determine whether a proposed Tagalog interpreter was competent to assist the accused at a criminal trial for theft over $5,000.

The interpreter was conditionally accredited by the Ministry of the Attorney General and had previously failed to achieve full accreditation under the current testing regime.

Applying the constitutional standard for interpreter assistance under s. 14 of the Charter as articulated in Tran, the court emphasized that interpretation must meet standards of continuity, precision, impartiality, competency, and contemporaneousness.

The court held that the interpreter’s objective test results and lack of full accreditation did not satisfy the high threshold required to ensure the accused’s right to fully understand and participate in the proceedings.

The proposed interpreter was therefore found not qualified to interpret at the accused’s trial.