Louise Charron

The Crown requested to re-open a sentence appeal after discovering that an unknown 90-day consecutive sentence had nullified the probation order previously imposed by the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal re-opened the appeal and, on consent, varied the sentence for criminal harassment to twenty months plus three years probation to ensure the total period of incarceration remained under two years, preserving the probation order.

The Crown appealed a two-year sentence imposed on the respondent for multiple serious and sophisticated frauds committed while on parole for similar offences.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by discounting specific deterrence and held the original sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The appeal was allowed, and a fit sentence of five years was substituted, reduced to 43 months after accounting for pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to address the totality principle given the remnant of a prior sentence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle, that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, and that the fresh evidence did not warrant interference.

The appellant, a self-employed lawyer, filed a proposal to his creditors under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act which was accepted.

Following the proposal, he made income tax installment payments to the CCRA for the 1999 taxation year and subsequently claimed a refund.

The CCRA prorated the installments over the entire year and applied a portion to his pre-proposal tax debt.

The Court of Appeal held that the CCRA had no legal basis to apply post-proposal installment payments to pre-proposal tax debt, as this would allow the CCRA to recover its pre-proposal claim at 100 cents on the dollar contrary to the terms of the proposal.

The appeal was allowed and the CCRA was ordered to pay the refund.

The appellant, a self-employed lawyer, filed a proposal to creditors under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) was an unsecured creditor for unpaid income tax.

After the proposal date, the appellant made installment payments for his current-year tax obligations and subsequently claimed a tax refund.

The CCRA prorated the installment payments over the entire year, applying a portion to the pre-proposal tax debt, which eliminated the refund.

The Court of Appeal held that the CCRA had no statutory basis to apply post-proposal installment payments to pre-proposal tax liability, as doing so would allow the CCRA to recover more than its pro rata share under the proposal.

The appeal was allowed and the CCRA was ordered to pay the refund.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for attempting to break into the complainant's home with the intent to assault her.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by not specifically instructing the jury that the complainant's evidence regarding prior uncharged assaults was unreliable, as the parties had agreed her evidence regarding the main events was unreliable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury would have understood that all of the complainant's evidence was unreliable if unconfirmed, and that there was ample independent evidence of the appellant's intent.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant corporation issued share certificates as part of a stock roll program, representing them as fully paid when they were not.

A third party pledged one of these certificates to the respondent bank as collateral for a loan.

When the borrower defaulted, the bank sought to realize on the shares, but the appellant refused to acknowledge the bank as the valid owner.

The trial judge found the bank was a good faith purchaser and granted an oppression remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the bank was a good faith purchaser, the appellant was estopped from denying the validity of the certificate, and the restriction on transfer did not prevent the transfer to the bank.

The court also dismissed the third-party claim against a credit union for vicarious liability.

The appellant, Lafarge Canada Inc., sought a Bullock order regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to make the order, noting that the appellant should have known the inclusion of the successful insurers as respondents on the appeal was unnecessary, as evidenced by the appellant abandoning the appeal against most of them at the end of oral argument.

The Court requested further submissions on whether the successful insurers should receive partial or substantial indemnity costs and whether costs should be fixed or assessed.

The plaintiffs made a pre-trial offer to settle for $55,000, stating they would seek an adjournment if not accepted.

The trial proceeded and concluded.

Before judgment was issued, the defendants accepted the $55,000 offer, knowing the plaintiffs believed it was no longer open.

The motions judge enforced the settlement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the offer had not technically expired under Rule 49, the court should exercise its discretion under rule 49.09 to refuse enforcement.

It was unjust to enforce the settlement because the defendants took advantage of the plaintiffs' mistaken belief that the offer was off the table.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for aggravated assault and other offences.

The sentencing judge had credited the respondent's 16 months of pre-sentence custody as equivalent to almost three years, reducing the appropriate sentence to 14 months, which was then ordered to be served conditionally.

The Crown argued that pre-sentence custody cannot be used to reduce a penitentiary-range sentence to under two years to make a conditional sentence available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code, a sentencing judge may take pre-sentence custody into account when determining the appropriate range of sentence for the purposes of the conditional sentencing regime.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement on costs following an appeal.

The respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $50,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

In a supplementary endorsement, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal as abandoned.

Costs for the cross-appeal were fixed at $1,500.

The Crown applied for a stay of a summary conviction appeal court judgment that affirmed the dismissal of marijuana possession charges on the basis that the offence was unknown to law in Ontario.

The Crown also sought to expedite the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for a stay, finding no jurisdiction to stay the reasons underlying a dismissal of a charge or to suspend the doctrine of stare decisis.

However, the request to expedite the appeal was granted.

The appellant was convicted of weapons trafficking and transferring a prohibited firearm, but acquitted of possession for the purpose of transferring and possession for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

He appealed, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the possession charges required an additional element of purpose, which the jury may have had a reasonable doubt about, thus explaining the different verdicts.

Following an appeal with divided success, the court issued a costs endorsement.

No costs were ordered between the appellants and the Crown.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs of $5,000 each to the respondent Diocese of Sault Ste.

Marie and the respondent Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada.

The respondents, Quebec residents, were injured in an Ontario motor vehicle accident with an uninsured driver.

They obtained a judgment in Ontario, but the respondent Katia's claim under Quebec's no-fault scheme was denied.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund appealed an order requiring it to pay the Ontario judgment, arguing that s. 25(2) of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act precluded payment because no amount was payable under Quebec law.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 25(2) only requires the foreign jurisdiction to provide substantially similar recourse and does not require a fact-specific determination of entitlement under foreign law.

The appeal was dismissed regarding Katia's claim but allowed regarding Michel's Family Law Act claim, as Quebec law provides no corresponding right.

The appellants, members of a dairy cooperative, appealed a decision declaring that the cooperative was not required to include milk sold via export contracts when calculating patronage returns under s. 55(5) of the Co-operative Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal applied a contextual approach to statutory interpretation, finding that the term 'deliver' in s. 55(5) requires a transfer of title.

Because export contracts allow producers to direct milk to entities other than the cooperative without transferring title to the marketing board, the statutory presumption of a direct business link does not apply.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant moved for directions regarding a proposed appeal from an order dismissing its Rule 21 motion to dismiss or stay the action.

The defendant sought a determination on whether the order was interlocutory or final, and if final, an extension of time to appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory because the motions judge declined to decide the issues due to conflicting evidence and complexity, meaning no substantive rights were finally adjudicated.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the defendant successfully obtained the clarification it sought.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the respondent for a shoulder injury and resulting depression.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings of fact, the admission of late evidence, the assessment of damages for future care and wage loss, and the costs award based on a Rule 49 offer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasons that would justify intervention.

The court held that the factual findings were supported by evidence, the late admission of evidence did not warrant a new trial, the damages assessment appropriately accounted for contingencies, and the costs award was within the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant brought an application to reopen his appeal from a 1999 sentence.

The appellant did not appear at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to reopen the appeal.