Louise Charron

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by a summary conviction appeal court judge.

The appellant conceded that the appeal must be dismissed unless the court was prepared to overrule its previous decision in R. v. Hatfield.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to depart from the precedent and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in characterizing the case as a breach of trust based on the backdating of a certificate of exemption.

This erroneous assumption improperly influenced the sentencing judge's decision that a conditional sentence was inappropriate and likely affected the quantum of the sentence.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank for $32,796.01.

The appellant argued that her cross-motion to dismiss the bank's motion should have been granted due to the bank's failure to attend cross-examinations on its amended affidavit of documents.

The appellant conceded that summary judgment was properly granted based on the documentation eventually provided.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to set aside the judgment.

The court noted the bank's dilatory production but observed that the motion judge had already accounted for this by limiting prejudgment interest and denying the bank costs at first instance.

The appellant and a co-accused were convicted of trafficking in heroin following a joint trial before a judge and jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in the jury charge by conflating his defence with that of his co-defendant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury to consider each accused separately and that the recharge clarified any potential confusion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no submissions were made.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for robbery and breach of probation after the sentencing judge rejected a joint submission.

The joint submission proposed a 12-month sentence, less 2-for-1 credit for pre-trial custody, plus three years of probation.

The sentencing judge instead imposed one year in addition to pre-trial custody and two years of probation.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in applying the governing principles, as the joint submission was not unreasonable and would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to accord with the joint submission.

The text of this decision was removed by the publisher due to a Supreme Court of Canada order prohibiting the broadcast or publication of evidence taken at the preliminary inquiry pursuant to section 539(1) of the Criminal Code.

The landlord appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that a commercial lease was terminated because the tenant sublet the premises without consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the landlord's prior consents to subleases did not authorize the new sublease.

The Court held that section 20(7) of the Commercial Tenancies Act does not preclude resort to the court's equitable jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The issue of whether the tenant was entitled to relief from forfeiture was referred for trial.

The appellant appealed convictions for first degree murder and manslaughter arising from the stabbing deaths of two sisters.

The court held that the trial was unfair due to multiple reversible errors, including the admission of expert evidence that strayed from crime scene staging into inadmissible criminal profiling, the admission and mishandling of prejudicial after-the-fact conduct evidence related to a trip to Jamaica, improper Crown submissions and jury instructions about a supposed false alibi unsupported by any evidence, the introduction in the charge of an additional theory of liability without notice to the defence, and inadequate instructions on weak identification evidence.

The cumulative effect of these errors required a new trial.

Because the Crown did not cross-appeal the manslaughter conviction, the new trial was ordered on first degree murder with respect to one victim and manslaughter with respect to the other.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder.

He appealed on four grounds: the trial judge's failure to declare a mistrial due to mid-trial publicity about his prior murder conviction, the admission of discreditable conduct evidence regarding his habit of carrying a knife, the ruling allowing the Crown to cross-examine him on his compelled testimony from a co-accused's trial, and the jury instructions on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or instructions.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the lower court.

The Court of Appeal noted the appeal should have been brought before a Superior Court judge, but dealt with it ex officio.

On consent of the Crown, the appeal was allowed and the probation order was varied to delete the words 'or place of worship' and to add a new term.

The Crown appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that permitted an accused, found not criminally responsible and deemed a significant threat to public safety, to be transferred to Jamaica pursuant to a deportation order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the disposition unreasonable as it effectively abdicated the Board's jurisdiction over a dangerous offender without adequate safeguards in the receiving country.

The Court held that the existence of a deportation order does not grant the Board authority under the Criminal Code to permanently transfer an accused out of the country.

The appellants, serving life sentences for murder, applied for habeas corpus to challenge a new policy by the Commissioner of Corrections that automatically classified them as maximum security.

The motion judge declined to exercise jurisdiction, holding that the Federal Court was the appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that while provincial superior courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus applications regarding prison conditions, they should generally decline to exercise it when the application essentially challenges a federal statutory power that is subject to judicial review in the Federal Court, absent exceptional circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a minor complainant, arguing the trial judge failed to properly assess the complainant's evidence and ignored contradictory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inconsistencies in the evidence were not so significant as to require specific mention by the trial judge, and that the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonable.

Following the release of the judgment in two related appeals, the respondents submitted written submissions on costs.

The appellant elected not to file responding submissions.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the respondents for the leave application, the application to introduce fresh evidence, and both appeals, fixing the total amount at $50,000 all inclusive.

The appellant, an Ontario cattle dealer, challenged the obligation to pay a $2.25 per head license fee to the Ontario Cattlemen's Association on sales to an American slaughterhouse.

The appellant argued the fee was an ultra vires indirect tax or an invalid direct tax, and that it should not apply to export sales.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's finding that the charge was a properly authorized fee, not a tax.

The Court also held that the regulation should not be read down to exclude out-of-province sales, as the fee's purpose is to fund an association that benefits all Ontario cattlemen, and the extra-territorial effect is minimal.

The defendants appealed a motions judge's answers to questions posed under Rule 21.01(1)(a) regarding a pension plan surplus following the sale of a business division.

The appeal concerned only the answers relating to administrative costs and expenses.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the questions were inextricably linked to other issues that the motions judge had correctly directed to trial, such as the effect of statements in pension booklets and reliance on them.

The Court set aside the answers and directed that the issues regarding administrative costs and expenses also proceed to trial.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, appealed her conviction and sentence for social assistance fraud.

She argued that the trial judge's excessive intervention during her testimony prevented her from presenting her case, amounted to cross-examination creating an apprehension of bias, and that he failed to provide adequate assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice or apprehension of bias, and noting the trial judge went to great lengths to assist her.

The sentence appeal, challenging a restitution order of $25,281 at a minimum of $100 per month, was also dismissed as the appellant had full-time employment, home equity, and the quantum of loss was supported by evidence.

The Crown appealed the disposition imposed on a young person.

The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge gave the matter careful consideration and his assessment was worthy of considerable deference.

The Court also noted that the sentencing principles in the new youth justice legislation must inform their consideration.

The Court concluded that the sentence was not unfit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned her acquittal at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal judge erred by applying a correctness standard to the trial judge's finding that the officer lacked the requisite grounds to make a breath demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge's finding was not unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and restored the acquittal.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding stolen vehicles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that information retrieved by a U.S. customs officer from a computer system was not gathered in Canada merely because it referred to Canadian auto thefts.

The Court also found ample evidence of identification and that the vehicles were stolen, noting the appellant had placed false VIN numbers over the original ones.