Louise Charron

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal in its court and transferred it to the Divisional Court, awarding costs thrown away to the respondents.

The appellant, a Francophone, requested and was granted an order under s. 530 of the Criminal Code for a trial before a judge and jury that spoke French.

However, the trial judge and Crown counsel spoke English throughout much of the trial, and the first five days of testimony took place solely in English with translation provided to the accused.

No transcript of the interpretation was entered in the record during those five days.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant's rights under ss. 530 and 530.1(e) and (g) were infringed, as the trial judge and Crown counsel are required to actually use the official language of the accused's choice, not just understand it.

The remedial provision in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) could not be applied to this violation.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a Francophone, requested and was granted a trial in French before a judge and jury under section 530 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge and the Crown prosecutor spoke almost entirely in English during the first five days of the trial, with simultaneous translation provided to the accused but not transcribed.

The Court of Appeal held that the accused's language rights under sections 530 and 530.1 were violated, as these provisions require the judge and Crown to actually speak the accused's official language, not merely understand it.

The curative proviso in section 686(1)(b)(iv) could not apply to such a significant violation.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his two-year sentence.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification, circumstantial evidence, the theory of the defence, and motive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict was reasonable and the jury instructions were adequate, noting that trial counsel had approved the charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the two-year sentence for robbery with a weapon on a vulnerable victim was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellants appealed a decision approving a receiver's recommended settlement.

They argued the motions judge failed to properly apply the principles from Crown Trust v. Rosenberg.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge appropriately applied the Soundair principles, considered the differences between expert reports, and made no palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed an order suspending his bankruptcy discharge and making it conditional upon the payment of $250,000.

The trustee and major creditors opposed an absolute discharge, citing the appellant's failure to disclose financial affairs, control of offshore accounts, and failure to assist the trustee.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings under section 173 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, confirming the appellant was not entitled to an absolute discharge.

The court found the $250,000 condition was not oppressive given the appellant's dishonesty and unwillingness to make full disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conditional payment was increased to $262,000 to cover the successful creditor's costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and sexual assault, as well as his dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on potential collusion between the complainant and her son, and on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and noting the lack of objection at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had properly considered and rejected a long-term offender designation.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court that quashed his appeal of an order fixing mortgage arrears.

The Court of Appeal agreed the Divisional Court appeal was properly quashed because the original order was final, not interlocutory.

However, recognizing the applicant's consistent intention to appeal the merits of the original order, the Court treated the motion as one for an extension of time to appeal the original order and granted the extension.

The Court directed written submissions on the specific issue of a prepayment penalty.

The moving party, a self-represented mortgagor, sought leave to appeal an order quashing his appeal to the Divisional Court regarding the amount required to redeem a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal agreed the appeal to the Divisional Court was properly quashed because the original order was final, meaning the appeal lay to the Court of Appeal as of right.

Recognizing the moving party's consistent intention to appeal the substance of the original order, the Court treated the motion as one for an extension of time to appeal and granted it.

The Court directed written submissions on the merits of the appeal concerning a disputed prepayment fee.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for impaired driving causing death and breach of recognizance.

At trial, the central issue was whether the appellant or the deceased passenger was driving when the vehicle rolled into a ditch.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the driver, noting it was amply supported by witness testimony and expert evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued for a conditional sentence based on his aboriginal background and Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 12-month sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the aggravating factors, including a high blood alcohol level and a prior drinking and driving conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud and his sentence of two years less a day.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended appraisal evidence, failed to consider his honest belief in the property's value, and erred in denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the appraisals, correctly applied the elements of fraud, and imposed a demonstrably fit sentence given the breach of fiduciary duty and deliberate deception.

The appellants appealed their convictions and four-year sentences for importing cocaine.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's ruling that if an exculpatory utterance was admitted, its entire context had to be put before the jury.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the four-year terms were within the appropriate range and that positive fresh evidence did not justify reducing the demonstrably fit sentences.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, arguing that the definition of 'employer' in section 1 of the Act is overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the definition is not overbroad and declining to revisit the court's previous decision in R. v. Wyssen.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for robbery and weapons offences.

He argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding surveillance video evidence, hearsay evidence of a photo line-up identification, post-offence flight, and reasonable doubt arising from an absence of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and noting that the identification evidence was properly handled.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in imposing a consecutive sentence for the weapons offence.

The appellant, detained under a security certificate pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, appealed a Superior Court decision staying his application for habeas corpus.

He argued the Federal Court could not provide a timely remedy for his constitutional claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court properly declined jurisdiction because the Federal Court has concurrent jurisdiction, specialized expertise in immigration and national security, and an ongoing process that should not be circumvented.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him jointly and severally liable for over $325,000 wrongfully obtained from an elderly relative's estate.

The trial judge found the appellant knowingly assisted other family members in breaching their fiduciary duties by preparing a power of attorney and commissioning a land transfer tax affidavit while knowing the relative was incompetent.

On appeal, the appellant argued the respondents lacked standing under the Trustee Act and that his actions did not cause the loss.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to entertain the standing and limitation arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and upholding the finding of knowing assistance.

A cross-appeal seeking occupation rent from the appellant was also dismissed.

Following the release of the appeal decision, the parties disagreed on the settlement of the formal order regarding whether it should specify the date of termination of the commercial lease.

The Court of Appeal held that the omission of the termination date could be rectified under Rule 59.06 and determined by the remaining justices under s. 123(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court declared the lease was effectively terminated on November 19, 2001, noting this does not inhibit the trial judge's discretion on relief from forfeiture.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing 2.2 kilograms of cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in finding she knew the drugs were concealed in the lid of her suitcase.

The appellant contended the trial judge made erroneous inferences regarding the weight of the suitcase lid and failed to consider circumstantial evidence supporting her lack of knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence, including the physical exhibits, and that it was within the trial judge's purview to draw reasonable inferences from the strong circumstantial evidence of knowledge.

The appellant tenant terminated a commercial lease, arguing the landlord failed to complete the building in accordance with the schedule.

The trial judge found the tenant acted unreasonably and not in good faith by failing to consider other contractual options, such as completing the work itself and deducting the cost from rent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding but allowed the appeal on damages in part, reducing the damages award by the $50,000 it would have cost to complete the building.

The cross-appeal on damages was dismissed due to the landlord's failure to mitigate.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that an oral retainer existed between the appellant Mauro and the respondent law firm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the heavy onus on the solicitor to establish an oral retainer was met.

The Court also rejected the argument that an oral retainer is void unless in writing under the Solicitors Act, noting that there was no dispute as to the amount of compensation.