Louise Charron

The respondent Attorney General of Quebec brought a motion to strike portions of the appellant's record and factum.

The Attorney General argued that certain material filed by the appellant during the leave to appeal application constituted fresh evidence that was not before the lower courts, and that a new constitutional argument under s. 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867 was improperly raised.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion in part.

The Court struck the material from the record, finding it did not meet the test for fresh evidence as there was no due diligence and the evidence was not determinative.

However, the Court declined to strike the s. 121 argument, holding that it was relevant to the stated constitutional questions and should be determined by the Court.

In a federal reference concerning proposed civil marriage legislation, the Court held that Parliament had jurisdiction to define civil marriage as the lawful union of two persons, but not to legislate protections for religious officials in relation to solemnization, which falls within provincial authority.

The Court further held that extending civil marriage to same-sex couples was consistent with the Charter and that freedom of religion broadly protects religious officials from state compulsion to perform marriages contrary to their beliefs.

Exercising its residual discretion under the Supreme Court Act reference jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the pre-existing opposite-sex requirement for civil marriage was Charter-compliant, given the government's legislative position, the reliance interests created by lower-court rulings, and the risk of legal confusion.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent gynaecologist.

During a laparoscopic bilateral oophorectomy, the appellant's colon was burned by a cautery instrument.

The trial judge found that the respondent caused the burn but concluded there was insufficient evidence to find he fell below the standard of care, as the appellants' expert did not address the specific location where the respondent testified he applied the cautery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to decline to draw an inference of negligence given the gap in the expert evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the trial judge misapprehended the DNA evidence by assuming the complainant's DNA was found on the inside of the appellant's trousers, a finding unsupported by the record.

As this misapprehension was central to the trial judge's finding of guilt, the appeal was allowed, the conviction vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, driving while disqualified, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, holding that the frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence rendered the convictions unsafe.

Following a successful appeal by Canadian Waste Services Inc. and the Minister of the Environment, the Court of Appeal determined the issue of costs.

The Court exercised its discretion to order no costs for either the application in the Divisional Court or the appeal.

The Court reasoned that the case involved a novel and difficult issue of statutory interpretation regarding the 1996 amendments to the Environmental Assessment Act, raised issues of public importance, and featured a significant disparity in the financial resources of the parties.

The appellants, who were addicted to alcohol, were denied income support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act (ODSPA) because s. 5(2) excludes individuals whose only substantial impairment is substance dependence.

They appealed to the Social Benefits Tribunal, arguing the exclusion violated the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal and the Divisional Court held the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to apply the Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the Tribunal does have implied jurisdiction to decide questions of law, including whether the ODSPA contravenes the Code.

However, the Court concluded that the human rights process is the more appropriate forum for resolving this dispute, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants, who are addicted to alcohol, were denied income support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act (ODSPA) because s. 5(2) excludes individuals whose only substantial impairment is substance dependence.

They appealed to the Social Benefits Tribunal, arguing the exclusion violated the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal and the Divisional Court held the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to apply the Code.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to decide questions of law and apply the Code, the human rights process is the more appropriate forum for this dispute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The insured died from an amniotic fluid embolism during childbirth.

Her husband claimed the accidental death benefit under her life insurance policy.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the death was not an accident and was excluded as a physical illness.

The motions judge found the death was an accident and not an illness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the expectation test for accidental death does not apply to deaths from natural causes, and that an amniotic fluid embolism is a physical illness within the policy's exclusion clause.

The respondent's vehicle became stuck on a country road on a cold winter night.

She left the vehicle to seek help, became disoriented, fell into a river, and suffered severe frostbite requiring amputations.

She claimed statutory accident benefits.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the injuries were not directly caused by the use or operation of an automobile.

The motions judge ruled in favour of the respondent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that while the respondent met the purpose test, she failed the causation test because the use of the vehicle was not a direct cause of her injuries due to numerous intervening acts.

Canadian Waste Services Inc. sought to expand a landfill site and obtained the Minister of the Environment's approval for the terms of reference for an environmental assessment.

The respondents successfully applied for judicial review, with the Divisional Court quashing the Minister's decision on the basis that the terms of reference did not include all generic elements required by the Environmental Assessment Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Minister's decision to approve tailored terms of reference was entitled to deference and was reasonable.

The appeal was allowed and the Minister's decision was reinstated.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of attempted murder and the sentence imposed for a manslaughter conviction arising from a barroom shooting.

The Court of Appeal allowed the acquittal appeal, finding the trial judge erred by leaving self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code to the jury when there was no air of reality to the claim that the intervening bystanders were committing an unlawful assault.

The trial judge also erred by failing to instruct the jury on s. 27, which permits bystanders to use force to prevent an offence.

A new trial was ordered for the attempted murder charge.

The sentence appeals by both the Crown and the accused were dismissed.

The appellant, a general contractor, was convicted of six counts of fraud relating to home renovation contracts and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence from each count as similar fact evidence on the other counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the temporal connection and interconnectedness of the events made the evidence highly probative of fraudulent intent.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and a 12-month conditional sentence was substituted, as the court found the trial judge erred in characterizing the commercial relationship as a breach of trust and overemphasizing general deterrence.

The appellant Crown appealed a declaration that the respondent, Regulvar Ontario, was not a 'person resident in a designated jurisdiction' under the Fairness is a Two-Way Street Act.

The Act restricts construction access for corporations controlled directly or indirectly by residents of Quebec.

Regulvar Quebec owned 30% of Regulvar Ontario's shares, with the rest held by individuals who were directors or officers of Regulvar Quebec.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's use of the de jure control test, finding that Regulvar Quebec did not have the ability to elect the majority of the board of directors.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision declaring that Regulvar Ontario was not a 'person resident in a designated jurisdiction' under the Fairness is a Two-Way Street Act (Construction Labour Mobility), 1999.

The Act restricted access to construction jobs in Ontario for persons resident in Quebec.

Regulvar Ontario's head office was in Ontario, but 30% of its shares were held by Regulvar Quebec.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's use of the de jure control test from Duha Printers, finding that Regulvar Quebec did not control Regulvar Ontario directly or indirectly.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant defaulted on a mortgage and challenged the inclusion of a three-month interest pre-payment penalty in the redemption amount.

He also moved to set aside a registrar's order striking his appeal, arguing the registrar was not bilingual as required for a bilingual proceeding under s. 126 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the pre-payment penalty due to an incomplete record.

While the Court agreed the registrar's hearing breached the appellant's substantive right to a bilingual proceeding, it declined to set aside the order because the underlying appeal was moot, as the mortgage had already been redeemed.

The appellant defaulted on a mortgage, leading the respondents to issue a notice of sale.

The appellant challenged the redemption amount, specifically a three-month interest prepayment penalty, and appealed the motion judge's order.

The appellant also sought to set aside a registrar's order dismissing a related appeal, arguing the registrar was not bilingual as required by the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the prepayment penalty, found the bilingual rights issue moot because the mortgage had already been redeemed, and declined to determine the final redemption amount, leaving it to the master.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal claim against his former employer.

The trial judge had found that the appellant resigned when he stated he could not work for a rival who was appointed president.

The Court of Appeal overturned the finding of resignation, concluding the appellant was wrongfully dismissed.

However, the Court upheld the trial judge's findings that the nine-month notice period was reasonable, that the appellant suffered no damages for lost income because he mitigated his losses with higher-paying subsequent employment, and that the unambiguous language of the employer's stock option plans precluded the appellant from exercising options that would have vested during the notice period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order regarding child support arrears, imputed income, and costs.

He argued that the judge should have forgiven arrears for the entire time he was in Iran, rather than half, and that too much income was imputed to him upon his return.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the motion judge's discretionary decisions regarding arrears, imputed income, or the modest costs award.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to quash two municipal bylaws regulating dog kennels.

The appellant alleged the bylaws were passed in bad faith, were discriminatory, and acted in restraint of trade.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the applications judge's findings that the bylaws were reasonable, in the public interest, and not passed with illegality.