Lorne Sossin

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges including sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypical reasoning in assessing the complainant's credibility and by overemphasizing peripheral inconsistencies in the context of childhood abuse.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's repeated focus on why the complainant continued to engage with the respondent, despite knowing the risk of assault, constituted stereotypical reasoning, which is an error of law.

This error was deemed to have materially affected the verdict, as the trial judge's assessment of the respondent's credibility was inextricably linked to her flawed assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and breach of bail, and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed because the s. 8 Charter issue regarding the search was not raised at trial, and the evidentiary record was insufficient for appellate review under the R. v. Reid test.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, granting an additional two months of Duncan credit in recognition of the harsh conditions served during pre-sentence custody, thereby reducing the global sentence from 51 months to 49 months.

The appellant, David Lanktree, appealed his 5-year prison sentence for drug and weapons offences, arguing the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence, treating community drug problems as an aggravating factor, and failing to consider Duncan credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge correctly determined a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the appellant's history of re-offending and breaches.

The court also found the judge did not err in principle by considering the community impact of drug trafficking for denunciation and deterrence, and that the discretion regarding Duncan credit was properly exercised.

This appeal arose from a failed commercial real estate transaction where the appellants (buyers) failed to close and alleged fundamental breaches by the respondent (seller).

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment on liability in favour of the seller.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' motion for fresh evidence and their appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the alleged breaches by the seller were not fundamental and that the buyers had breached the agreement by failing to close.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and overcoming resistance by choking.

He appealed both the convictions and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and the minor inconsistencies in her evidence was entitled to deference.

The court also affirmed that corroboration is not a requirement for conviction in such cases.

The sentence appeal was not pursued.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and aggravated assault, primarily on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).

The Court of Appeal reviewed the materials and submissions, concluding that the IAC claim lacked merit as it was not supported by the factual record and failed to meet the established test for IAC.

The court specifically addressed the appellant's concern regarding certain video evidence, accepting trial counsel's assertion that it would not have aided the defence, and noting that the appellant's identity was otherwise compellingly established.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of domestic assault and breaches of orders, appealed the non-communication order prohibiting contact with his child, who was present during the assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, upholding the non-communication orders during incarceration and probation.

The court found the orders warranted due to the traumatic circumstances and prior family court orders, clarifying that any future contact with the child would be determined by family court or the Children's Aid Society based on the child's best interests.

The Crown applied to quash a motion by the appellant to re-open his conviction appeal.

The appellant, convicted of multiple aggravated assaults and assaults with a weapon, sought to re-open his dismissed appeal, alleging insufficient preparation time and improper consideration of grounds, particularly regarding video evidence and identity.

The Court of Appeal found no reasonable prospect of success for the appellant's motion, concluding his arguments were fanciful and the evidence of guilt overwhelming.

The Crown's application was granted, and the motion to re-open was quashed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to consider the unusually harsh conditions of his pre-sentence detention (lockdowns and triple-bunking) as a mitigating factor, relying on fresh evidence.

The Crown did not oppose the admission of fresh evidence but asserted the original sentence was fit.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and found it warranted a two-month reduction in the appellant's sentence for sexual abuse offences committed against his stepdaughter.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences and possessing child pornography, receiving a 10-year prison sentence.

He appealed his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial judge failed to adequately address inconsistencies in a complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant did not meet the factual threshold for ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial judge properly characterized the inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence as "peripheral," distinguishing the case from precedents where inconsistencies were deemed "profound."

This appeal concerned an alleged contract for the purchase and sale of goodwill in an investment business, with an alternative claim for unjust enrichment.

The trial judge found a binding contract or, alternatively, unjust enrichment.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on contract formation (intention and essential terms), unjust enrichment, and mitigation of losses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of a binding contract and declining to rule on the unjust enrichment finding.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding on mitigation, noting the appellant failed to meet the onus to show mitigation was possible.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and cross-appeal stemming from a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The appellant, Davide Giacomodonato, appealed the damages award, contending the trial judge erred by applying the second employment contract instead of the first.

The court dismissed his appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of fresh consideration for the second contract, including a $40,000 payment and additional vacation time.

The respondents, PearTree Securities Inc. and PearTree Financial Services Ltd., cross-appealed the costs award.

Their motion for leave to appeal costs was dismissed, as the court found no error in principle in the trial judge's discretionary costs award, which was justified by the respondents' litigation conduct.

The appellant, Shelly Legault, appealed a trial decision that dismissed her action against TD General Insurance Company for denial of a homeowner's insurance claim following a fire.

The trial judge found that Legault had made a fraudulent declaration regarding additional living expenses (ALE), leading to forfeiture of coverage, and granted TD damages on a counterclaim, plus costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant's fraud vitiated the policy, that the payment of professional witnesses was permissible, and that the costs award was within the trial judge's discretion.

The moving party, Joanne Vaughan, sought a panel review of an endorsement by a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had granted her an extension of time to perfect her appeal.

She requested amendments to the endorsement, including attributing delay in finalizing a lower court order to the responding party, requiring a Notice of Change in Representation, and setting a new appeal perfection deadline contingent on the resolution of two other motions in the court below.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for review, finding no basis to intervene as the original motion judge had not misapprehended evidence or erred in principle.

Ijeoma Chijindu moved to set aside an order from Justice Lois B. Roberts that required her and other appellants to post security for costs of $35,605.12.

The motion judge had found that the criteria for security for costs under r. 61.06(1)(a) and (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure were met, noting the appellants' inability to pay and the low prospect of success of their appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms. Chijindu's motion, finding no error in the motion judge's determination and upholding the order for security for costs.

The appellants were ordered to pay all-inclusive costs to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found a beneficial interest of 26% in a house for a deceased's estate, based on a purchase money resulting trust.

The appeal addressed whether the trial judge erred in applying the legal requirements for a resulting trust, particularly the "acted as a purchaser" requirement and the onus of proof regarding loans versus gifts.

It also considered the application of the corroboration requirement under s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the presumption of resulting trust places the onus on the title holder to rebut it by proving the money was a loan or gift, and that the "acted as a purchaser" requirement applies only at the time of advancement.

The court found no reversible error in the trial judge's findings on the resulting trust or the application of s. 13, as the trial judge rejected the loan evidence on credibility grounds.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Mr. Zaidi, appealed the dismissal of his application to enforce a settlement agreement against the estate of his uncle and the estate trustee.

The application judge had rescinded the settlement on grounds of innocent misrepresentation, unconscionability, and undue influence.

Mr. Zaidi argued procedural unfairness, that a trial should have been directed due to credibility issues, that his alternative claim for unjust enrichment was overlooked, and that the principle of settlement finality was not respected.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness as the issues were squarely before the lower court, upholding the summary determination as agreed by parties, confirming the unjust enrichment claim was not properly advanced, and reiterating that settlements, while generally final, can be rescinded on valid contractual grounds.

Leave to appeal costs was also denied.

This appeal concerned a dog bite injury where the appellants sued the dog owners and the landlords of the property.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the landlords (Crisols), dismissing the action against them, based on an interpretation of the Dog Owners' Liability Act (DOLA) s. 3(1) that it entirely ousted the Occupiers' Liability Act (OLA) for non-dog owners when a bite occurs on the dog owner's premises.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in this interpretation, clarifying that DOLA s. 3(1) only determines the liability of the dog owner under DOLA, not precluding OLA or common law claims against other parties.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissal against the landlords on the alternative ground that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding their liability under the OLA or common law, as absentee landlords who had no prior knowledge of the dog's temperament and no responsibility for the dog or its behaviour, and where the injury was not causally linked to any failure in property maintenance or repair.

The appellant mortgagor brought a motion to review a single judge's order denying a stay of a Superior Court order in mortgage enforcement proceedings, and also appealed the underlying order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the review motion and the appeal.

The court found that Rule 37.14, which the appellant relied upon to set aside a consent judgment, did not apply as he was represented at the original hearing.

Furthermore, there was no basis to reopen the mortgage enforcement proceedings given the established default and the appellant's inability to refinance or sell the property.

This appeal concerned a solicitor's negligence claim where the appellant alleged his former lawyers settled an estates dispute without his instructions, specifically regarding his ability to sue another lawyer involved in the estate.

The trial judge found that the settlement document did not preclude such a claim and that the lawyers had acted within instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the settlement terms did not prevent subsequent litigation against the third-party lawyer and that the limitation period argument was not a bar to commencing an action.

The court emphasized that the objective intention of the parties, not a default "standard form release," determines the scope of settlement terms.