Peter Thorning

The accused was charged with dangerous driving and related offences after allegedly hitting a police officer with a motorcycle.

During the trial, the Crown attorney berated a police witness in the courthouse hallway for providing testimony that contradicted the Crown's theory, stating 'we protect our own'.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an abuse of process.

The court found that the Crown's conduct, which included yelling, using profanity, and improperly aligning with the victim officer, compromised police independence and undermined the integrity of the justice system.

Concluding that no other remedy could address the ongoing harm to the administration of justice, the court granted the motion and stayed the charges.

Sentencing for sexual interference of one child complainant resulting in pregnancy, and for receiving material benefit from the trafficking of another child complainant in the sex trade, together with robbery and breach of a release order.

The court applied the proportionality principle, the child-sex-offence sentencing guidance in Friesen, the totality principle, and Summers pre-sentence custody credit, while also treating exceptionally punitive remand conditions as mitigating.

Significant aggravating factors included the victims' ages, the offender's degree of control, internet advertising of sexually exploitative images, pregnancy, repeated breach of a no-contact order, and serious emotional harm to the complainants and one complainant's family.

The court imposed a global 10-year penitentiary sentence less 608 days' credit, plus ancillary DNA, SOIRA, firearm prohibition, no-contact, s. 161, and forfeiture orders.

The accused, Alexander Campbell and Tyler Josling, were charged with manslaughter after restraining Frank Harbalis during a violent incident at a restaurant.

The court considered whether the force used, including a chokehold, was excessive and outside the scope of lawful self-defence or defence of others.

The court found that while a brief chokehold was applied, the actions of the accused were not unreasonable in the circumstances, given the sudden and dangerous situation.

Both were acquitted.

The decision concerns a bail application by Gurpreet Singh, who is sought for extradition to the United States on charges related to large-scale cocaine trafficking.

Singh proposed a strict house arrest bail plan with GPS monitoring and multiple sureties.

The court found the plan had strengths but ultimately denied bail due to a high risk of flight, citing Singh’s international connections, travel history, and lack of credible financial disclosure.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Steven Jackson, sought a stay of proceedings on multiple criminal charges, including assault and criminal harassment, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay in bringing the matter to trial was over 33 months, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances arising from a new voyeurism charge and subsequent arrest of the applicant.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the police had inappropriately and foreseeably disrupted the proceedings by arresting the applicant right outside the courtroom.

Accordingly, the court granted the application and stayed all charges.

The defendant, Jacob Martin Norn, was sentenced for manslaughter and trafficking fentanyl after supplying the drug to a friend who subsequently died.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the dangerous nature of fentanyl, and the need for general deterrence and denunciation, while also weighing mitigating factors such as the defendant's youth, lack of prior criminal record, and efforts towards rehabilitation.

Despite arguments for a conditional sentence and alleged Charter breaches, the court imposed a custodial sentence, emphasizing the defendant's continued drug use post-conviction and the societal impact of fentanyl trafficking.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of manslaughter against the defendant, Jacob Norn, following the death of Tyler Ginn from combined fentanyl and etizolam toxicity.

Norn had pleaded guilty to trafficking fentanyl to Ginn.

The central issues were whether the fentanyl supplied by Norn was a significant contributing cause of Ginn's death and whether Norn's warning to Ginn not to use too much fentanyl broke the chain of causation.

The court found that the fentanyl supplied by Norn was a significant contributing cause of death and that the warning did not sever the chain of causation, leading to a finding of guilt for manslaughter.

This decision concerns the sentencing of Zhuxi Xi Shen, who was convicted of sexual assault after a judge-alone trial.

The court found that Mr. Shen sexually assaulted the complainant twice: once while she was incapacitated and again after she awoke, without her consent.

The assaults were premeditated, and the complainant suffered profound physical and psychological harm.

The Crown sought a five-year custodial sentence, while the defence proposed three years, effectively time served.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the complainant's vulnerability, premeditation, and the severe impact on the victim, alongside mitigating factors such as the offender's lack of criminal record, youth, and compliance with bail conditions.

The court also addressed pre-sentence custody credits (Summers, Downes, and Duncan), particularly the harsh conditions experienced in detention.

A sentence of four years and one month was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, along with mandatory ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition, DNA order, Sex Offender Registry compliance, and a no-contact order.

The appellant, a former police chief, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a subordinate officer.

He argued the trial judge erred by rejecting defence expert evidence on document sequencing of the complainant's notebook and by misapplying the W.(D.) test when assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to reject the expert evidence as unreliable and had properly applied the W.(D.) framework in finding the complainant's evidence compelling and rejecting the appellant's bare denial.

Following a judge-alone conviction for sexual assault, the applicant sought a mistrial based on late disclosure of the Information to Obtain for a warrant authorizing the search of seized electronic devices and on an alleged unconstitutional search of his iPhone.

The court held that prior defence counsel had not exercised due diligence in requesting that the sealed ITO be unsealed and disclosed, and further held that any alleged prejudice could be addressed by hearing the s. 8 application on its merits.

Applying the governing principles for computer and cell phone searches, the court found that the warrant authorized the impugned search, that the full extraction created a forensic container without itself intruding on privacy, and that the subsequent review of the extracted data was conducted reasonably and in good faith within the warrant's scope.

The court therefore dismissed the s. 8 application, found no s. 7 breach, and refused to declare a mistrial.

The accused, a former high school teacher, was charged with four counts of sexual exploitation and sexual assault involving a 16-year-old complainant.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the credibility and reliability of the complainant and her mother.

The court found significant internal and external contradictions in the complainant's testimony, inconsistencies with prior statements, and issues with physical evidence.

Evidence also suggested collusion and collaboration between the complainant and her mother in revising statements to align their narratives.

Due to these profound credibility issues and the resulting reasonable doubt, the accused was acquitted on all charges.

The appellant, an immigration consultant, was convicted of forgery and use of a forged document after filing a non-authentic employment letter with an immigration application.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's jury charge was inadequate for failing to highlight evidence suggesting the appellant knew the application was stale-dated, which would negate the intent elements of forgery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's charge was adequate and noting that the appellant's counsel did not present this alternative theory at trial.

The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted of manslaughter after intentionally steering his vehicle into a longboarder, causing his death.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended witness evidence, erred in assessing credibility, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility, and holding that the reasons were sufficient.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the sentence of 3 years and 11 months was not demonstrably unfit given the high degree of moral blameworthiness.

The defendant, C.M., was charged with 24 sexual assault-related offences involving five complainants, all young female servers at his breakfast restaurant.

After some charges were stayed or dismissed, the court proceeded with 17 remaining counts.

The judgment meticulously analyzes the credibility and reliability of each complainant's testimony, considering factors such as "motive not to fabricate" and the potential for "tainted memory" from discussions among complainants.

The court found C.M. not guilty on most counts due to reasonable doubt, often influenced by contradictory defense evidence or concerns about the reliability of the complainants' memories.

However, C.M. was found guilty on four counts of sexual assault related to three complainants (V.F., E.R., and R.R.), where contemporaneous disclosure of the assaults provided sufficient reliability.

Sexual exploitation charges were dismissed due to insufficient proof of mens rea regarding the complainants' ages.

This preliminary inquiry determined if there was sufficient evidence to commit the accused, Jacob Norn, to trial for trafficking in fentanyl and manslaughter.

The defence conceded the trafficking charge but argued against committal for manslaughter, asserting insufficient evidence regarding causation, particularly concerning the victim's consumption of other substances (Etizolam).

The court reviewed evidence including text messages, e-transfer records, security video, witness testimony, and forensic toxicology reports, which indicated the victim died from combined fentanyl and etizolam toxicity.

Applying the legal test for preliminary inquiries (the Shephard test) and the essential elements of unlawful act manslaughter, the court found reasonable inferences available to a properly instructed jury that the fentanyl supplied by the accused was a significant contributing cause of death.

Consequently, the accused was committed to stand trial on both charges.

This is a voluntariness ruling in a preliminary inquiry concerning charges of trafficking in a Schedule I substance (fentanyl) and manslaughter.

The Crown sought to admit a video-recorded police statement made by the accused.

The court applied the contextual voluntariness test, considering factors such as threats, promises, inducements, atmosphere of oppression, operating mind, and police trickery.

Despite the accused repeatedly asserting his right to silence and expressing internal conflict, the court found that he had an operating mind and freely chose to speak.

The court concluded that the statement was made voluntarily and was therefore admissible for the purposes of the preliminary inquiry.

The appellant, Dwayne Gordon, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the imposed sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years parole ineligibility.

The appeal raised three issues regarding conviction: adequacy of jury instructions on identification evidence (including recognition evidence), the instruction on adoptive admissions, and the failure to discharge a juror with colour distinction difficulties.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by considering youth court disposition and conditional discharge as a criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, found no error in the jury instructions on identification or adoptive admissions, and upheld the decision not to discharge the juror.

While acknowledging errors in considering the appellant's youth record for sentencing, the court found these errors did not impact the parole ineligibility period.

The appeal was dismissed, except for setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The appellants, Daye, Isaac, and Saunders, appealed their drug-related convictions.

Isaac also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals from conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings regarding Charter breaches (s. 10(b), s. 9, s. 11(b)), refusal to permit cross-examination of the affiant, or the issuance of search warrants.

The court also found Saunders' conviction for constructive possession reasonable.

However, Isaac was granted leave to appeal his sentence, and his six-year global sentence was reduced to four years, as the trial judge failed to adequately consider his de facto guilty plea.

The appellant appealed convictions for historical sexual offences involving his adopted sister and sisters-in-law.

The appeal primarily challenged the trial judge's assessment of similar fact evidence, including its probative value, alleged misapprehension of evidence, and consideration of collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no grounds to interfere with the trial judge's rulings on similar fact evidence or credibility assessments.

The court affirmed that the trial judge properly considered the probative value of similar fact evidence holistically, including the context of the alleged acts and the absence of collusion, and that credibility assessments are within the purview of the trial judge.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to call a forensic psychiatrist to testify that the accused may have been in a cocaine-induced psychosis at the time of the offence, and that the alleged conduct was out of character.

The court ruled that the expert could testify about the potential impact of cocaine consumption and the possibility of psychosis, as this was relevant to the defence of intoxication and the ability to form specific intent.

However, the court excluded the expert's opinion that the offence was out of character for the accused, finding it to be impermissible character evidence and oath-helping.